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THE ROLE OF CONSTITUENCY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS
IN REPRESENTING
THE INTERESTS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES
AND OTHER GROUPS

Political Parties and Canadian Unity

by

PETER MALCOLM LESLIE

A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism

and Biculturalism

August 1967

ABSTRACT

This study analyzes two complementary methods by which political parties may contribute to the unity of Canada as a political entity.

It is argued that the cohesion of political communities requires that the political system be responsive in some minimal degree to the demands of its members; otherwise it will fail to obtain the support which is necessary to preserve its existence. Since it is inevitable, however, that some demands will remain unsatisfied, it is necessary also that some means be available by which potentially disruptive demands may be eliminated.

The role of parties in (a) increasing the responsiveness of the system and (b) reducing the volume of demands, is studied by examining the structure and activities of political parties in three constituencies. This approach was chosen because evidence of the parties' role in each of these respects would necessarily appear at the constituency level.

Serious limitations on the effectiveness of parties in increasing the responsiveness of the system are discovered. The analysis differentiates between different categories of demands, including the demands of ethnic minorities. It is shown that the deficiencies of parties in increasing the responsiveness of the system, in relation to certain categories of demands, is compensated for by their role in demand-reduction.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are two people without whose help this study could not have been done.

Jean-Pierre Bourduas did at least half the interviews in the three constituencies studied. I am grateful to him for his enthusiastic participation in the project: he was skillful, tireless, and astute in judgement. His familiarity with current developments in French-Canadian society was a continual help in carrying out the field research, and provided the basis of many interesting and valuable discussions.

Professor John Meisel, supervisor of the project, was a goad, a friend, a critic. From the initial research proposal to the preparation of the final draft, he was generous in the help and advice which he unstintingly provided.

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In this study we shall examine the structure and activities of political parties in three constituencies in eastern Canada. The immediate object will be to assess the sensitivity of constituency political parties to the needs, grievances, and aspirations of the people in the riding. More remotely, we shall be concerned with the effectiveness of Canadian political parties in representing a variety of political interests, and with their role (if any) in promoting the unity of Canada as a political entity.

This study is presented as a report on an inquiry of frankly limited scope, viewed within the context of the evolution of French-Canadian society as interpreted by contemporary French-Canadian analysts of their own milieu. If the conclusions are tentative, sometimes speculative in nature, this is due to the fact that only relatively modest resources for empirical research were at my disposal, and to the often apparently intuitive interpretations of the evolution of French-Canadian society.

I would suggest, however, that an inquiry such as I have undertaken is only prudent in view of the paucity of existing empirical research in the area of the study: to have set out on a major expedition without first identi-

fying the principal landmarks would have incurred the risk of scaling craggy peaks, only to find that the path to the summit lay across an unbridgeable gully: a mountainous failure. The aim of the present study is simply to prepare the ground for further research in the same area, covering the terrain more intensively and employing more sophisticated survey techniques. The reader should approach this study, therefore, as he would an account of a brief exploration trip into territory which remains, even at the end, only roughly mapped.

* * *

Our ultimate objective is to determine whether or not political parties contribute to the unity of Canada as a political entity. Although the study offers only very tentative conclusions on this matter, the research program was conceived and designed with the objective of assessing the role of parties in promoting Canadian unity. The more immediate objectives, though more readily subject to empirical investigation, are ancillary. Thus an exposition of the content and methodology of the study is most clearly accomplished by describing first how we approached the problem of assessing the role of parties in promoting Canadian unity.

We begin with the proposition, which will be explained in the succeeding paragraphs, that the cohesion of a political community, such as Canada, depends in part on the

responsiveness of its political system to the demands of the major groups within the political community. This proposition is a fundamental assumption of the study.

Some of the terms used in this proposition no doubt require clarification. First, I must assure the reader that to describe Canada as a political community makes no assumptions about the emotional attitudes of Canadians towards one another. Canada is a political community in the sense in which this term is used by David Easton: a group of individuals who, "...participate in a common political structure and set of processes, however tight or loose the ties may be."¹ Thus the phrases "cohesion of the Canadian political community" and "unity of Canada as a political entity" are employed synonymously in this study. Secondly, in referring to the Canadian political system, I do not wish to allude to existing institutions or customs, but to the processes by which Canadians impose decisions on one another through the power of the state--these processes constituting a system of behaviour or interactions.² The

¹David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 177.

²I have avoided offering a general definition of the term "political system." This act of cowardice is justifiable on the grounds that the purposes of this study do not require us to identify what actions or processes are "political" in systems where no state exists. The purist-minded systems analyst may shudder; I apologize. What makes my use of "the state" in this context particularly offensive is that in other respects I have drawn the concept of "the political system," (as several

advantage in using the concept of political system is that it focusses attention on the political processes as such, and not on what may be described as the regime--that is, institutions and the rules under which they operate. As the argument of this study will illustrate, the regime may have to be modified from time to time in order that the system may persist in spite of disturbances, such as the formulation of new kinds of demands or of an increased volume of demands. The terms responsiveness (of the system), and demands (of individuals and groups) will deserve later comment, but normal usage is adequate in the present context.

Our concern with the cohesion of the Canadian political community leads us to examine the responsiveness of the Canadian political system to the demands of major groups because realization of demands indirectly generates support for the political community. Again following the analysis of David Easton, we may discern an inter-relationship between three objects of support within a political system. Both support and discontent, Easton argues, although initially focussed on those who wield authority, may subsequently be transferred to the regime, and ultimately to the political community itself. A part of Easton's analysis is contained in the following passage:

other concepts and terms) from David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965) pp. 23-57, esp. pp. 48-50.

...where members of a political community ⁷ become discontented with the outputs e.g. policies ⁷ of a regime, they may perhaps place the blame on the authorities at first but if the outputs persist in failing to meet what are considered just expectations, or if they are at once seen as being related to the nature of the regime, the temptation presents itself for the members to seek a change in the structure and norms of the regime itself. If they should find it impossible to achieve this or to bring about the desired changes in time, as a last resort some members may be driven to question the desirability of maintaining the political community in its existing form. They may make efforts to shape one that includes only members who are more responsive to their wants.

Traditionally this has frequently happened, as cases of nationalist separatism or irredentism amply testify....In Canada, some French-speaking Canadians have become part of a separatist movement in part due to the perceived failure of the Constitution, the B.N.A. Act, to provide for an equitable distribution of power in the Canadian political community as a whole.¹

We may conclude that the cohesion of a political community requires some minimum of responsiveness of the political system to the demands or expectations of every large or powerful group.² By corollary, any structure which increases the responsiveness of the system, thereby

¹Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 321.

²In the case of regimes which employ massive coercion as a substitute for more spontaneous support, the "minimum of responsiveness" may be quite small; it will be larger for regimes which cannot employ, or abstain from employing, a substantial degree of coercion.

also contributes to the stability of the regime (without its being maintained by force) and to the cohesion of the political community.

Our concern, in this study, with the role of political parties in promoting the unity of Canada as a political entity, thus leads us to consider whether or not parties, or the party system, help to render the Canadian political system more responsive to the demands or expectations of the Canadian people.

An analysis of the functions attributed to political parties by writers on the subject reveals that parties in democratic regimes are indeed frequently regarded as instruments by which the system can be made responsive to the demands of the members of the political community. The argument supporting this view is that parties constitute a channel of communication between the authorities and the members of the political community, that the policies they enunciate are supported by the mobilization of electoral majorities, and that their quest for office leads them to search out discontent and to incorporate remedial measures in their programs. Various elements of this argument, with varying emphases, are found in the writings of different authors. Some examples will illustrate this point:

Sigmund Neumann:

The connection between leaders and followers becomes a necessity in the two-way traffic

of democracy. It is the major function of the party to keep these lines of communication open and clear. Such a task makes the parties, if not the rulers, at least the controlling agencies of government in a representative democracy.¹

J.A. Corry and J.E. Hodgetts:

The first essential function of the party system...is to organize voters into majorities behind platforms and leaders. The voters get alternatives from which to choose, and the electorate can reward the party that appears to be deserving and be sure that both parties will strive to merit reward. This is the only way in which a numerous electorate can exercise effectively the power which democratic theory assigns to it.²

E.E. Schattschneider:

The parties⁷ have extended the area of popular participation in public affairs enormously and have given elections a meaning and importance never before thought possible....The parties are the special form of political organization adapted to the mobilization of majorities. How else can the majority get organized?³

¹Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," Modern Political Parties, ed. Sigmund Neumann (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1956), pp. 396-7.

²J.A. Corry and J.E. Hodgetts, Democratic Government and Politics, (3rd edn. rev.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 224.

³E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942), p. 208.

Frank J. Sorauf:

'...the tie between the political party and the democratic regime is clear. The parties facilitate the popular participation, the representation of interests, and the presentation of alternatives on which the processes of democracy depend. They augment the representational processes of the democratic system by providing an organizational link between political man and the institutions of government beyond the one provided by the formal election machinery....

The American political party also acts in another sense on behalf of majoritarian democracy. It has increasingly become the instrument through which massive, popular majorities exert their influence within the political system. By organizing sheer numbers it offsets the advantages of wealth, expertise, status, and access that minorities may enjoy. ¹

William Chambers:

...parties may serve as democratic counterforces to advantages in power. Only through time can they affect the economic and social conditions of "the poor and middling class." They can exert a more immediate impact on other factors of power potential, however, if certain minimal conditions obtain in the populace, such as awareness of interests, some propensity for political participation or initiative, and receptivity to association or organization. Parties may offer leaders and leadership; and through their structure they may diffuse knowledge and skill in political tasks, stir the sense of

¹Frank J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, ("Basic Studies in Politics," Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), pp. 10, 11.

political consciousness and efficacy, promote cohesion in their followings, and develop tools of association or organization. They may also counteract the weakness of "divisions" among the "common people," in Melancthon Smith's words, by drawing them together into popular partisan combinations. Thus they may call forth and mobilize the latent strength of numbers.¹

Avery Leiserson:

The distinctive roles of party organizations in the political system are (1) to activate and identify voter sentiments with a set of ideological convictions concerning the quality of party leadership and the direction of governmental performance, (2) to mobilize, out of the welter of conflicting individual and group interests in society, electoral majorities for the party's candidates, and (3) having established the electoral foundations for the government in office (administration or ministry), to provide it with continuing channels of mutual influence and communication with its sources of electoral support....

Party ideology or doctrine provides a kind of intellectual bridge between voters' decisions in the electoral process and the acts of public officials, in the form of more or less concise statements of conviction and preference concerning the direction and quality of governmental performance. The facts that voters make up their minds on both ideological and non-ideological grounds, and that these cannot be satisfactorily translated into absolutely binding commitments

¹William Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 111 (quoted in Sorauf, op. cit., p. 11).

upon elective and administrative officials, constitute one of the most perplexing difficulties of democratic government. The constructive function of political parties, however, is not to delude the electorate into thinking that it can make better decisions than can public officials, but to recruit the most qualified potential candidates for legislative and administrative office from whom the electorate may choose, and to sensitize officials constantly to the importance of informing, consulting, anticipating, and reconciling public and group expectations in arriving at decisions of policy.¹

I do not wish to imply that there is unanimity among writers on political parties that parties are, or even that they should be (in Sorauf's words) "instrument[s]² through which popular majorities exert their influence within the political system." We shall consider some other viewpoints later on. In the meantime we should note that the argument which we have reviewed does not attribute to parties or to party leaders any special motivation to perform the function of representing interests (communication, support of policies by mobilizing electoral majorities, and articulation of otherwise-unorganized interests); the argument is simply that in attempting to generate support for themselves, within a competitive party system, they are led to undertake these activities, and (we add) indirectly to generate support for the regime and for the political community. This line of

¹ Avery Leiserson, Parties and Politics, An Institutional and Behavioural Approach (New York: Knopf, 1958), pp. 274-5.

reasoning enables us to shift our attention from the role of parties in promoting Canadian unity to the role of parties in representing group interests in Canada. In this way we have taken the first step towards finding some operational method of approaching our ultimate objective: to assess the role of parties in promoting Canadian unity.

Our argument to this point has been based on the proposition, an assumption of this study, that the cohesion of a political community depends in part on the responsiveness of its political system to the demands of the larger and more powerful groups within the political community. We have noted also that a variety of writers have asserted that political parties contribute to the responsiveness of democratic regimes by articulating group interests and mobilizing electoral support behind them. In our empirical research we shall examine the extent to which parties at the constituency level do concern themselves with these activities; but we cannot afford to let these activities constitute the sole focus of our attention. This fact emerges from a second major proposition, also an assumption of this study: In any political system, it is impossible to realize all the political demands of all groups within the political community.

This proposition requires us to consider not only the responsiveness of the political system to demands placed upon it, but additional factors conduced to the cohesion of political communities. Among the several factors

which might be examined,¹ there is one which has a prior claim on our attention because it modifies somewhat our previous comments on the unifying effects of the parties' role in representing group interests.

David Easton, in his A Systems Analysis of Political Life, argues that attenuation of stress on a political system may occur through the reduction of the number and variety of demands which the system has to process. The validity of the argument is self-evident in cases where disputes are excluded from the political arena as a result of cultural factors such as the norms which determine the range of subjects which are considered to be political in nature. For example, disputes over the content of religious dogma are generally considered to be beyond the purview of the state in most modern democracies, and a potential source of disruption is thus removed. On the other hand, the validity of Easton's argument is less obvious in cases where political parties or other structural mechanisms, rather than cultural factors, operate to reduce the number and variety of demands.

¹A full exposition of factors affecting the persistence of political systems is contained in David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life. I have drawn heavily on Easton's work in elaborating the theoretical framework for this study, but I have not followed it consistently or in its entirety. Appendix II contains a resume of the factors considered by Easton to affect the persistence of political systems. It identifies those factors which I have focussed upon in this study, and explains the omission from this study of the remaining factors in Easton's schema.

Structural mechanisms for demand reduction, according to Easton, operate both at the point where wants are converted into demands, and at subsequent points along the flow of demands within the political system. As he points out, much of the conversion of wants into political demands, in democratic systems, is performed "by those who...hold well-defined political roles such as that of opinion leader, politician, legislator, or administrator, or by organizations such as an interest group, legislature, political party, or newspaper."¹ These individuals or organizations are therefore in a strategic position to either facilitate or hinder the formulation of demands; and at later stages in the political process they may expedite or delay their passage through the political system. Thus demands, even after they are actually formulated, remain subject to reduction through a variety of actions by influential members of the system--combination or aggregation with other demands, temporary or indefinite postponement (whether resulting from deliberate decision or from indifference), or perhaps even outright rejection.²

Are structural mechanisms for demand reduction capable of attenuating stress on the political system, thus promoting the cohesion of the political community? Easton's argument on this point--although not, to my mind, very fully or clearly elaborated--appears to be that there

¹Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 95.

²Ibid., pp. 128-149.

must exist a rough congruence between (a) the volume of demands, (b) the capacity of the channels for transmission of demands within the system, and (c) the capacity of the decision-making centres.¹ Logically enough, Easton's analysis allows the possibility that an imbalance between two of the three elements may be prevented or redressed by changes of magnitude in either of the two items. Thus the overload of transmission channels may be remedied by expanding their capacity (and also, presumably, that of the decision-making centres) or by reducing the volume of demands. Although Easton notes that efforts to reduce the volume of demands may not always be possible,² he does not discuss the circumstances which may rule out this alternative. Some exploration of what these circumstances are, however, is essential to the purposes of this study.

An illustration of the way in which structural mechanisms may, as Easton suggests, reduce the volume of demands, is provided by a number of writers on political parties. It is quite common, especially for analysts of American political parties, to note that parties combine or aggregate demands in such a way as to secure compromises between conflicting political interests. In some cases,

¹This interpretation of Easton's position is drawn from several parts of A Systemic Analysis of Political Life. See especially pp. 117-23, 128-9, 148-9.

²Ibid., p. 148.

though not in all, writers who have suggested that parties are agencies of compromise have acknowledged and even advertised the fact that the mediation of political conflicts frequently involves governmental delay, blurring of issues, and the watering-down of programs of action in order to remove features which are objectionable to small but vocal minorities. Witness, for example, a rather extreme instance of this point of view, in the following passage from Herbert Agar's The Price of Union:

Instead of seeking "principles" or "distinctive tenets," which can only divide a federal union, the American¹ party is intended to seek bargains between the regions, the classes, and the other interest groups. It is intended to bring men and women of all beliefs, occupations, sections, racial backgrounds, into a combination for the pursuit of power. The combination is too various to possess firm convictions. The members may have nothing in common except a desire for office. Unless driven by a forceful President they tend to do as little as possible. They tend to provide some small favor for each noisy group, and to call that a policy. They tend to ignore any issue that rouses deep passion. And by so doing they strengthen the Union.¹

In a similar vein, Ranney and Kendall, writing about the American party system, have also pointed out how the attempt to appeal to a wide variety of groups has given each major group a "veto power" over decisions which

¹Herbert Agar, The Price of Union (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 689.

affect it particularly:

Our pluralistic political system gives each major group in the community a virtual "veto power" for self-protection and it produces majorities that are themselves bundles of compromises rather than homogeneous, ideologically uniform, and dedicated political armies. And the party system is certainly the main agency that operates to keep the system pluralistic. Not only are the parties the principal arenas in which the "concurrent-majority" compromise programs are worked out, they are also the place in which each group in the community can most effectively make known its intention to veto all or part of any proposed program.¹

The remarks of Agar and of Ranney and Kendall epitomize the view that parties may foster the cohesion of political communities in some measure, and perhaps even primarily, by their refusal to espouse policies which would provoke serious dissent from any major group. The argument presented by these authors suggests a modification in the hypothesis, which we advanced earlier, that the responsiveness of the political system conduces to the cohesion of the political community. In company with writers such as E. Pendleton Herring,² and Peter F. Drucker,³

¹ Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy and the American Party System (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1956), p. 510.

² E. Pendleton Herring, The Politics of Democracy, (New York: Rinehart, 1940), pp. 131-3.

³ Peter F. Drucker, "A Key to American Politics: Calhoun's Pluralism," Review of Politics, v. 10 (October, 1948), esp. p. 417.

they maintain that the American federation has held together and can hold together only because strong opposition from any one of a large number of groups can succeed in postponing or preventing government action in response to majority demands. Thus we arrive at the hypothesis that parties may contribute to the cohesion of a political community not only by what they do, in the way of espousing policies in response to political demands, but by what they refuse to do, in the way of preventing potentially disruptive issues from coming to the fore. If the parties' avoidance of controversy results in majority demands being temporarily or even permanently set aside, that is simply, in Agar's phrase, the price of union.

The argument of Agar and others illustrates Easton's contention that structural mechanisms--in this case political parties--may reduce the volume of demands fed into a political system, and thereby reduce also the amount of stress to which the system is subjected. The process of demand reduction by the parties involves accommodation between conflicting political interests, where this is possible, and--where it is not--deliberate failure to articulate conflicting and therefore controversial demands. In cases where demands are already being articulated by other persons or organizations--such as voluntary associations--the parties may simply do their best to obfuscate controversial issues, thus escaping the opprobrium of those whose interests have been neglected or subordinated

by the inaction of the government.

Up to the present point in the argument, we have discussed the process of demand reduction by parties without relating it to the process by which parties generate support for themselves and indirectly for the authorities, the regime, and the political community. This abstraction presents an inadequate view of the activities of parties, and of their possible contribution to the cohesion of the political community.

When controversial issues arise, parties may employ delaying tactics or may deliberately obfuscate the discussion of them in order to alienate as few as possible of their traditional supporters. Obfuscation and delay, however, can only reduce possible losses of support; these tactics cannot generate new support or entrench existing loyalties. Parties seem often to have reacted to this problem by devising what we may call substitutive responses to political demands. The concept of substitutive responses will play an important part in our analysis.

A substitutive response is one which does not directly meet a political demand, but is designed to provide at least partial satisfaction of the want which gave rise to it, or else to focus public attention on other objects.¹

¹ Gabriel Almond describes three kinds of elite response to demands: adaptive, rejective, and substitutive: "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics, v. 17, (January 1965), pp. 210-1.

We may identify two kinds of substitutive responses: the palliative response, and the symbolic response. Palliatives, such as patronage and public works expenditure, are consolation prizes offered to individuals or groups whose interests have been sacrificed in the process of bargaining over the major orientation of government policy. Such palliatives may alleviate group tension by making the losers' position more tolerable in the short run; but they do nothing to alter fundamentally or to ameliorate the position of those to whom they are administered. Symbolic responses are similar to palliatives in their effects, but rather different in character. A good example would be the launching of some foreign adventure, involving the symbols of national glory, to distract attention from troubles at home. Or if unfriendly neighbours appear to be threatening, the authorities may appeal for sacrifices to protect the homeland. Symbolic achievements may, however, be more pacific: in French Canada, the symbols which have generated collective pride have been religious and cultural.

We have so far considered two means, which are at least analytically distinct, by which parties may contribute to the cohesion of political communities. One of these is to render the political system more responsive to demands which are placed upon it. This involves acting as a communication link between the government and the people, the mobilization of electoral majorities in order

to implement the policies which they espouse, and the articulation of otherwise-unorganized interests. The other means is to attenuate the degree of stress on the political system by achieving demand reduction--avoiding the articulation of interests when they would provoke controversy, delaying government action as long as there is strong opposition from any sizeable group, and obfuscating the discussion of potentially disruptive issues. Demand-reduction is often supplemented by the formulation of substitutive responses to weakly-articulated demands; indeed, the conversion of wants into political demands may be prevented or delayed by evoking symbolic achievements and administering the palliatives of patronage and public works. Thus it may also be legitimate to consider the formulation of substitutive responses as a means of achieving demand-reduction.

Our inquiry into the role--if any--of political parties in promoting Canadian unity ought to take into account, and distinguish empirically between, each of the above two means of contributing to the cohesion of political communities. I propose to do this by examining the ways in which parties attempt to generate support for themselves, an objective which is most easily accomplished by observing the activities of parties at the level where they establish contact with the individual voter--i.e. at the constituency level.

The appropriateness of this approach may be inferred

from Sorauf's assertion, already quoted:

✓ The American political party 7 has increasingly become the instrument through which massive, popular majorities exert their influence within the political system. By organizing sheer numbers it offsets the advantages of wealth, expertise, status, and access that minorities may enjoy.

If parties do organize sheer numbers, thus counterbalancing the political power of minorities blessed with wealth, expertise, status, or access to the authorities, the evidence of such activity must appear at the constituency level. Conversely, if parties favour--whether by acts of omission or commission--the interests of powerful minorities, to the detriment of others, they may be presumed to gather support for themselves by substituting palliative or symbolic responses for more direct action in relation to social wants and political demands. Again, the evidence--particularly in the case of palliative responses--may be expected to appear from a study of the activities of parties at the constituency level.

We are not yet ready, however, to describe fully the content of our research program. It will first be necessary to analyze the relative effectiveness of the two methods referred to, by which parties may promote the cohesion of political communities.

The final major assumption of the study is that only a high degree of responsiveness by the political system to the fundamental demands of all major groups can ensure

the long-term stability of the regime and cohesion of the political community. The arguments of Agar and others illustrate how in certain circumstances, it may be possible to diminish stress on the system by regulating the conversion of wants into political demands, or by reduction of demands during the course of their flow through the system. Success in employing this method of alleviating stress is the more likely to be achieved when substitutive responses are formulated, thus sidetracking rather than simply suppressing the original demands. We shall postulate, however, that in any political system there are certain minimal or irreducible demands put forward by certain groups; these demands arise from wants so intensely felt that no substitutive response can be successful in winning support for the regime and the political community.

It is obviously difficult to identify, other than ex post facto, the "essential or irreducible demands" to which a system must be responsive if the regime and the political community are to survive. I am unable to offer an empirically-applicable formula for identifying such demands; but it may nevertheless be useful to make some comments on this subject, with a view to subsequently discussing the responsiveness of the Canadian political system to certain demands which are being placed upon it.

The most important point to be made in relation to identifying essential demands is that we must be concerned not so much with the actual content of the demands as with

the frame of mind in which they are put forward. While this may be thought to be an elementary observation, we should note also that it bears the consequence that a rather sudden change may occur in the number of content of demands which could appropriately be classified as "essential." In particular, we may easily imagine a situation where a group's objective situation remains unchanged over time, but where it (a) comes to formulate new demands, or (b) refuses to go on accepting substitutive responses to demands already formulated, or (c) does both. These developments may occur for a number of reasons, of which we shall have occasion in later chapters to discuss the following: (1) the group acquires a different perception of its position vis-à-vis other groups, and thus redefines its political interests; (2) objectives which once it sought to achieve by non-political means it later perceives to be politically-relevant and, (3) it forms a more generous estimate of its own political power. In all three of these cases, one of the factors inducing the redefinition of the situation may be a change in the internal structure of the group, including the advent of new leadership.

We should bear in mind, then, that the number or content of "essential" demands put forward by any given group within a political system is subject to change--indeed, to rather sudden change--in spite of there being little or no modification in the objective relationship

of the group to other groups in the political system. This realization will enable us to enter upon a discussion of the apparent erosion of conditions in Canada under which French-speaking Canadians have accepted, for a long period of time, substitutive responses to what are increasingly acquiring the character of essential and irreducible demands. This remark leads us into a brief outline of the structure of this study.

* * *

The study consists of two parts. Part One contains an analysis of (1) the role of political parties in the process of demand-reduction in French Canada, (2) the reasons why demand-reduction is decreasingly effective in attenuating stress on the Canadian political system, and why substitutive responses to social needs and political demands are decreasingly effective in securing the support of French-Canadians for the existing political regime (with adverse consequences for the degree of support for the political community also), (3) the reaction of parties to these changing circumstances, and (4) the role of voluntary associations in articulating the political interests of various groups: a possible contribution to the responsiveness of the system in relation to certain categories of the political demands put forward by the Canadian people, especially French-speaking Canadians.

These themes are introduced in Chapter II. Chapters

III, IV, and V each contain studies of one federal constituency, including a review of the structure and activities of both federal and provincial constituency party organizations. The object of these three chapters is to continue the discussion, initiated in Chapter Two, of the role of parties in promoting Canadian unity by each of the two methods we have discussed: the "responsiveness" method and the "demand-reduction" method, the latter being complemented by the formulation of substitutive responses to political demands. As has already been pointed out, one would expect evidence of each of these methods to appear in the activities of parties at the constituency level. The constituency studies, in addition to producing evidence on this matter, contain a number of empirical observations which may contribute to an assessment of the probable long-run effectiveness of the two methods of promoting the cohesion of the Canadian political community. Our final remarks on this matter, however, are reserved for the concluding chapter, following Part Two.

Part Two consists of a single chapter, Chapter VI. This chapter is an interpretive essay on the role of parties in promoting the interests of minority ethnic groups. It suggests that there are certain categories of group demands, epitomized by demands for protection of the cultural distinctiveness of ethnic minorities, which are particularly difficult to realize through the action of political parties. The analysis of this chapter,

though inspired and informed by the constituency studies, is speculative in nature.

The Conclusion, Chapter VII, again takes up the discussion of the relative appropriateness of the "responsiveness" method and the "demand-reduction" method of promoting the cohesion of the Canadian political community. Material obtained in the constituency studies, plus a small amount of comparative material, is invoked in offering a tentative estimate of the effectiveness of parties in representing the changing political interests of members of the Canadian political community, particularly French-speaking Canadians. It is suggested that parties will have to adapt their structures and undertake new activities if they are to continue to hold their traditional importance in the political process. In the face of doubts concerning their adaptability, it is hypothesized that other structural mechanisms, especially voluntary associations, may well take over the performance of some of the functions traditionally performed by political parties. The way in which this development may affect the long-term responsiveness of the Canadian political system, is discussed. Finally, the implications of Part II are considered: are the essential demands of French-speaking Canadians capable of realization under the existing regime, thus conducing to the cohesion of the Canadian political community? Or, are some of the essential demands of French-Canadians, as an ethnic minority, unrealizable under a political regime

based, ultimately, on the principle of majority rule?

PART ONE

CHAPTER 2

PARTIES AND THE REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS: SOME CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

"The American political party...has increasingly become the instrument through which massive, popular majorities exert their influence within the political system. By organizing sheer numbers it offsets the advantages of wealth, expertise, status, and access that minorities may enjoy."

Frank J. Sorauf¹

"The political party is a structure ideally adapted to plutocratic control."

Henry Wise Wood²

To those who launched the agrarian protest movement in the Canadian West during and after the first world war, parties were certainly not instruments through which they could exert their influence within the political system. On the contrary, parties appeared to be one of several instruments of control or domination which were wielded by the business interests of the East.

Whereas Sorauf describes political parties as being--

¹Quoted above, p. 8.

²"Neither Farmers Nor Labour Can Break into the Plutocratic Classes," an address delivered at the convention of East and West Calgary United Farmers of Alberta District Associations, Oct. 7, 1921. Quoted in C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2nd edn., 1962), p. 41. Henry Wise Wood was President of the United Farmers of Alberta.

potentially at least--a counterbalancing mechanism to offset the advantages of wealth or other factors augmenting a minority's political power, the agrarian radicals of the Canadian West thought of parties as an additional advantage in the hands of economic elites to entrench their already considerable power. In the words of William Irvine: "...partyism became an investment for big interests in Canada, dividends being paid in the shape of legislation and privileges to those in a position financially and morally to make the investment."¹

The agrarian radicals' grievances against the party system arose from their discontent with the policies of the federal government. The political system, indeed, was manifestly unresponsive to their fundamental demands such as reduction of the tariff. The parties had secured support not by responding directly to the demands of the farmer, but by purveying substitutive responses: the palliatives of patronage and public works, and the symbolic achievements of constructing a country from sea to sea, and of national participation at Britain's side in the Great War. Even before the war ended, however, the agrarian protest movement gave evidence of the farmers'-- and others'--unwillingness to go on accepting substitutive

¹ William Irvine, The Farmers in Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1920), p. 58. William Irvine was then editor of the Western Independent, official organ during part of 1920 of the United Farmers of Alberta.

responses to their fundamental demands.

Since it is of great importance to us in this study to understand the conditions under which rejection of substitutive responses may occur, we shall enquire briefly into the circumstances which produced the agrarian protest movement.

The party system on which the agrarian radicals focussed their ire had been built up gradually in the decades following Confederation. It has been shown by Escott Reid how both the Conservative Party and (later) the Liberal Party were constructed as coalitions of regional interests, which consolidated only slowly into cohesive, disciplined parties.¹ We may infer from Reid's analysis that the process of consolidation occurred, not as a result of growing identity of interest between the regions, but rather as a consequence of the workings of parliamentary institutions and the electoral system. In the first three elections in the new Dominion, when voting was open and elections were held over a period of weeks, there was an openly-observable process of bargaining in which many candidates, particularly in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, pledged their allegiance to whichever coa-

¹ Escott Reid, "The Rise of National Parties in Canada," Papers and Proceedings of the Canadian Political Science Association, v. 4, 1932. Also reprinted in Hugh G. Thorburn, Party Politics in Canada (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 14-21. Page references in subsequent citations are to the reprint in Party Politics in Canada.

lition of groups appeared to be most likely to form the ministry. They did so, not on the basis of the legislative program which they would be called upon to support, but in return for whatever bargains they might secure for their region, for their constituencies, or perhaps for themselves. Later on (in 1878 and after) simultaneous elections forced candidates to make an earlier declaration of partisan allegiance, with the result that the bargaining process occurred at an earlier stage--i.e. prior to rather than during the election. Reid summarizes the situation as follows:

The loose coalitions of Macdonald and Mackenzie¹ had as their core dual alliances of Quebec and Ontario groups. Whichever of these alliances proved to be the more powerful ruled with the assistance of the maritime and western groups which remained neutral until the struggle in the central provinces had been resolved and then made as good terms as possible with the victors. There came a time when the neutral groups had to choose, before the struggle of the rival dual alliances, which one they would support.

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¹ Ibid., p. 20.

The end result was the coalescence of the loose dual alliances into "federal unions", later on cemented together by better means of communication, by immigration and the settlement of new territory, and by the growth of "a national feeling."¹ Reid's interpretation of the historical development of Canadian parties, therefore, stresses their role in creating the federal union; it does not interpret the consolidation of the parties as the consequence of any prior establishment of "a national feeling" or of a growing identity of interest between regions.

A similar view, with a rather different emphasis, is presented by F.H. Underhill.

In the politics of the new federal state after 1867 writes Underhill⁷ there is to be discerned a double process. Most important and fundamental is the continuing drive of great business interests for the conquest and consolidation of this expanded economic empire which lay open to their exploitation; and it was the primary function of Macdonald's Liberal-Conservative party to make the state a partner in this enterprise, a function which was taken over by Laurier's Liberal party after 1896. But to achieve this end of a united centralized economic empire a great variety of particularist sectional,

¹Ibid., p. 21.

racial, and religious interests had to be conciliated, manipulated, and kept moving together in some kind of practical concord. It was the second function of the party system to perform this task of conciliation and management of the diverse sectional interests in the new loosely-knit nation.

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Underhill traces, rather more clearly than Reid, the developing pattern of group alliances which emerged finally into the Conservative and the Liberal parties. Whereas Reid focusses attention on the position of the candidates from the Maritimes and the West, and describes how they bartered their support in return for favours from the ministry, Underhill describes the bartering process from the optic of the Government. He recounts how the divergence of interest between the regions was appeased by astute political management, first by Macdonald and later by Laurier.

The process of political management will be the more easily understood if we recognize the importance of

¹Frank H. Underhill, "The Development of National Political Parties in Canada," Canadian Historical Review, v. 16 (December 1935); reprinted in his In Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 32-3.

localism and regionalism in determining the basis of political loyalties. In this connection, we may observe the fundamental divergence of interest between the maritimes and central Canada, a divergence which arose out of the maritimers' disinclination to pay the heavy costs of westward expansion in the post-Confederation period. The cleavage between the St. Lawrence valley area and other areas was reinforced by the introduction of the protective tariff in 1879, which imposed a burden on the maritimes as a whole, and also on the agricultural districts of central Canada. In addition to this cleavage there was strong commercial and financial rivalry between Montreal and Toronto, and desperate conflicts within New Brunswick and British Columbia over the location of railways. It should also be observed that the social structure, particularly in the rural areas, was less differentiated than it is now. Thus there were several factors which produced a situation where identity of economic interest tended to derive from geographical proximity rather than from class position. This tendency was reinforced by the comparatively restricted area of government activity.

Sectionalism, which derived in part from the geographical determination of economic interest, was reinforced by the regional concentration of ethnic and religious groups. Thus political conflict and political loyalties were determined largely on the basis of locality and region. No matter then, whether the pearls of po-

itical oratory were encrusted on the irritants of language and religion, or formed around the jealousies of commercial rivalry: political conflict and political loyalties were determined largely on the basis of locality and region.

The significance of geography in determining political loyalties had, as one of its consequences, the effect of creating a number of sectional leaders within Parliament, each of which had political power commensurate with the size of his personal following. Thus the process of political management through which ministries were constructed, and a parliamentary majority obtained, involved a series of bargains to secure the adherence of sectional leaders and "loose fish" or "wobblers"--individual members of Parliament who were ready to support any ministry that would offer them a satisfactory inducement in the nature of public works or other grants for their constituencies, or perhaps some kind of personal enticement such as the promise of a judgeship.¹

¹The terms "loose fish", "wobblers", "shaky fellows", and "waiters on providence" were part of the contemporary parliamentary and journalistic jargon. Escott Reid asserts that loose fish formed "an important fraction of all the early parliaments," and suggests that they were particularly common in the outlying regions. Although Paul G. Cornell asserts, with reference to the parliaments of the Province of Canada in 1841-67, that pursuing "the more attractive bait" did not characterize "any sizeable number of members," his analysis does not modify Reid's conclusions. Reid, it will be recalled, acknowledged the existence of "dual alliances of Quebec and Ontario groups" under Macdonald and Mackenzie, and he attributed

The parliamentary majority obtained by sectional bargaining was transformed into an electoral majority by a combination of skillful concealment of the way in which the Government's expansionist program adversely affected certain groups, plus large-scale recourse to substitutive responses to political demands. Thus, economic arguments against the tariff were met by anti-American slogans and Macdonald's famous election cry of 1891: "A British subject I was born, a British subject I will die." The potential influence of French Canadians on matters of economic policy was easily traded by concessions to the "minority rights" which protected their language and religion, a bargain which had the eager support of the Church and the elite which had acquired dominance after the suppression of the "patriote" rebellion of 1837.¹ The symbols of Canadian nationalism or pro-Britishism (outside Quebec) and of cultural protection for French Canadians (in Quebec) were combined with the lavish use of the palliatives of patronage and government appropriations, chiefly public works and the periodic readjustment of federal subsidies to the provinces.

neutrality in the struggle between them only to "maritime and western groups." Reid, op. cit., pp. 15, 20; Paul G. Cornell, The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada 1841-1862 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 83.

¹Jean-Charles Falardeau, "Des élites traditionnelles aux élites nouvelles," Recherches sociographiques, v. 7 No 1-2 (janvier-août 1966), pp. 131-3.

One of the factors contributing to the establishment and perpetuation of the two-party system was the growth of political attitudes favourable to stable party rule. We may cite particularly what might appropriately be termed a paternalistic concept of government, and (secondly) the development of entrenched partisanship. Both were favoured by the wide latitude of discretion available to those responsible for distributing the palliatives of patronage and local public works.

The desire to benefit from government largesse propagated or reinforced the concept of government as a paternal institution. We have already observed that in the early years of Confederation, the advantages of supporting the existing ministry first produced a sizeable shoal of loose fish; later, as partisan coalitions were consolidated through a series of bargains between sectional leaders and as "ministerialism" declined, the astute man whose politics were still, "Government appropriations,"¹ sought to protect his personal interests and those of his community by supporting the party which was most likely to form the government. Indeed, many persons, rather than aspiring to control the government by according support to a favoured candidate or party, simply tried to obtain favours from whoever happened to be in office. Such persons

¹ See Goldwin Smith's account of his visit to British Columbia in his Canada and the Canadian Question (London: 1891), p. 220. Quoted in Underhill, op. cit., p. 34.

might be said to have a paternalistic concept of the role of government.

People who have a paternalistic view of government tend to regard it as a source of favours or as a provider. It is appropriate, from the point of view of such a person, to ask the government's beneficence for oneself or for one's community; but to threaten it with reprisals if it fails to respond to one's requests simply invites rebuke. I do not mean to imply that voters never rebel against a government or an elected representative who fails to "produce", but rather that the normal strategy--barring acts of recalcitrance--is to get on the right side of the government. Generally speaking, the paternalistic concept of government evokes the attitude that faithfulness and submissiveness in one's relations with the government will be rewarded, and it encourages the feeling that government largesse deserves one's gratitude, partly because it is good tactics but also as a matter of political morality. This is the direct antithesis of the view that government is the instrument or agent of an active citizenry. As long as the paternalistic concept of government maintains its currency, the idea of threatening to withdraw support is simply not meaningful to many voters.

The growth of entrenched partisanship may also be explained partly by the discretionary method of making government allocations. If the desire to obtain govern-

ment grants led to manoeuvering to share the privilege of supporting the ministry, the importance of patronage produced a similar effect within the constituency: the best-known rule of the political game was to identify oneself with the winning side - and the earlier the better. In the absence of bureaucratic methods of awarding contracts, hiring personnel, and distributing relief and welfare payments, these responsibilities devolved upon the Member, who acted as a general administrative officer in his constituency. Hence one of the characteristics of a good Member was, and to some extent remains, that he should be always approachable in case of need and that he should dispense the patronage fairly and honestly. This kind of personalized administration, however, is open to abuses which seem always to accompany it to a greater or a lesser degree. Favouritism (usually combined with nepotism) is one form of such abuse; another is the granting of excessive allocations (over-priced contracts, sinecures, etc.) in return for a contribution either of money or of time to the Member's electoral organization.¹ These abuses of the patronage system led to the development of an entrenched partisanship which often was determined by family ties and acquired over time an almost hereditary

¹Vincent Lemieux, "Patronage ou bureaucratie," Paper read before the Association canadienne-française pour l'avancement des sciences, Québec, 1963. (Mimeo-graphed)

character. The patronage system also formed the foundation of political organization in the constituencies, since the most hardy partisans often stood to gain the most when their party was "in". As Premier Ferguson of Ontario is reputed to have remarked: "There are two things which hold the party organization together: patronage and the hope of patronage."

It must be emphasized that although the patronage system suffered from abuses large and small, it did succeed in mobilizing support for the government, and in this way helped the Canadian political community to hold together. Goldwin Smith's classic "excuse, if not... justification," of Sir John A. Macdonald's astute management of men and conciliation of conflicting interests deserves quotation here:

Sir John Macdonald may be the Prince of Darkness; with some of its imps he is certainly far too familiar. But an angel of light would perhaps have not been so successful in holding together the motley and discordant elements, local, ethnological, religious, social and personal, on a combination of which the Dominion Government has been based; or if he had, it would not have been without detriment to his seraphic purity. Not Cavour or Bismarck was more singularly fitted for his special task than Sir John....

The task of his political life has been to hold together a set of elements, national, religious, sectional and personal, as motley as the component patches of any "crazy quilt", and actuated each of them, by a paramount regard for its own interest. This task he has so far accomplished by his consummate address, by his assiduous study of the weaker points of character, and where corruption

was indispensable, by corruption. It is more than doubtful whether anybody could have done better than he has done....By giving the public the full benefit of his tact, knowledge and strategy, he has probably done the work for us as cheaply as it was possible to do it.¹

While the discordant sectionalism of Canadian politics was muffled by Macdonald's subtle orchestration--with that virtuoso fiddler himself playing a sostenuto of concession and conciliation--the same arts of management at the constituency level secured local support for the sectional bargains which were the stuff of Canadian politics. The patronage-built organizations were effective in securing the allegiance of voters who, jovial with election-day liquor and enticed by the promise of jobs and contracts, backed the ministerial candidate and incidentally supported a government devoted to a program of nation-building. The same organizations found their justification in assisting the Member in his role of intermediary between the government and the citizen. Thus partisanship and patronage, and the form of party organization to which they gave rise, played an important and perhaps indispensable role in holding together the Canadian political community in its early days.

The makeshift expedients of patronage and government appropriations, however, did not compensate for the eco-

¹ The Week, (Toronto) February 28, 1884; April 10, 1884. These excerpts are quoted in Underhill, op. cit., p. 37.

nomic and political subordination of the West to central Canada. As the West developed, it became increasingly aware of the divergence between its interests and those of the industrial East. This situation, and its political repercussions, are described in the following excerpt from W.L. Morton's The Progressive Party in Canada:

Not only was he [~~the western settler~~] compelled to a great extent to buy the services of the Canadian banks, railways, and grain trade at the seller's price, but he was compelled by the protective tariff to buy the necessities of life and much of the supplies and equipment for his farm at prices which were competitive only to a degree. Had national policies afforded him countervailing advantages, the situation might have been equitable, but most of the products of western agriculture were sold at prices determined by the world market, while the bulk of his purchases were made at prices sheltered from competition by the national tariff, a tariff accepted and elaborated by both national parties....

Since influence at Ottawa was exercised through the parties, western voters were forced to consider the operation of the party system with more care than voters in more favoured sections. They addressed to the parties the telling question, did they deliver the goods, did they obtain for the West what it wanted--and assumed to be in the national interest? Although the western constituencies during the years from 1896 to 1911 were remarkably faithful to the party in power, after the usage of frontier regions, western voters were to develop a growing scepticism of the benefits to be derived from their representation at Ottawa. This scepticism was deep-rooted, going back to Territorial days in Saskatchewan and Alberta, to the time when the political leaders of the Territories deliberately kept themselves separate from the activities of the national parties, the better to conduct their contest with Ottawa

for greater powers and better terms. The same scepticism was increased by the character of western representation at Ottawa. The representatives were men of average capacity; one indeed was the greatly talented Clifford Sifton. But Sifton's very success won him widespread distrust, and most of the others, notably Frank Oliver, who succeeded Sifton as Minister of the Interior in 1905, were men of marked party orthodoxy. The western member, in short, was a party man and subject to caucus, and therefore easily aroused the suspicion of having sacrificed the interests of his section to national policies. By the end of the period under review 1896-1911, the belief was growing in the West that the "national" parties were controlled in caucus by majorities drawn from central Canada, to the advantage of the sectional interests of the East.¹

The political grievances of the West were augmented by changes in economic circumstances during the 1910's and early 1920's. From 1913 to 1915 there was a period of recession, aggravated for the prairie farmers by a decline in export prices and a poor wheat crop in 1915. This situation was reversed after 1915; the price of wheat in 1917-20 was more than double that of the average price from 1910-16, and acreage under wheat rose eight per cent between 1913 and 1919.² The debts which were incurred at

¹W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), pp. 7,8-9.

²These figures and other data reported in this paragraph were obtained from W.T. Easterbrook and Hugh G.J. Aitken, Canadian Economic History (Toronto: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 486-8; and from W.A. Mackintosh, The Economic Background of Dominion-Provincial Relations,

this time, at high interest rates, proved to be a staggering burden when wheat prices collapsed after 1920--a drop of 60% between 1920 and 1922. Even before wheat prices broke, Westerners had been angered by a wartime increase in the tariff (7½% on the general rate, and 5% on the preferential rate in 1915), and the suspension of the Crow's Nest Pass railway rates in 1919,¹ both of which served to augment the already-rising cost of living and production costs; when their revenues dropped in the post-war period, these added costs became unbearable.

The change in the objective position of the prairie farmers was accompanied by a change in their subjective attitudes as well. Distrust of both the old parties was increased by the defeat of the Laurier Government in 1911:² the Conservatives suffered because of their opposition to Reciprocity, and the Liberals because their defeat, apparently due in large measure to the dramatic defection of eighteen prominent Toronto industrialists and financiers, had demonstrated the dependence of the Party on its commercial-industrial-financial wing. Moreover, the Liberal Party was later disrupted by the for-

Appendix III to the Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 1939 ("The Carleton Library"; Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), pp. 67-75.

¹R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1873-1923 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), p. 394.

²Morton, op. cit., p. 25.

mation of Union Government in 1917, an event which had the important effect of seriously weakening existing partisan loyalties.

The weakening of partisan ties was matched by an increase in the farmers' estimate of their own political power. The political demands of farmers had been explicitly formulated in the Farmers' Platform, the first version of which appeared in 1910; and between 1911 and 1919 the farmers saw the three provincial governments on the prairies adopt most of the provincial aspects of their program. These successes were accompanied by demands for direct political action. They were voiced in and through the farmers' occupational associations, the Grain Growers Associations in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and in the United Farmers of Alberta. These demands provide clear evidence that the leaders of the farmers' movement, far from regarding government as a paternalistic institution, were attempting to use political power in an instrumental fashion in order to secure precisely-formulated objectives.

The change in the objective situation, the weakening of partisan ties, and the adoption (under the prodding of established farm leaders) of an instrumental view of government, all contributed to the agrarian revolt which scored its most spectacular successes (provincially and federally) in the years 1919 to 1922. This movement is an excellent example of a reaction, not only against policies which were contrary to a group's perceived political

interests, but against the system which had perpetrated this injustice. Appropriately enough, a large part of the agrarian radicals' reforming zeal was directed towards the party system. The parties were blatantly corrupt,¹ and they had attracted much of their support by the lavish though discriminate use of the patronage. Through the patronage, partisan loyalties had been established; and thus the parties had been instrumental in imposing on the West a government which had offered at best palliative and symbolic responses to their political demands. In this way the political organizers had become the agents--perhaps the unwitting agents--of the business elites of the East. Hence the protests against the "moral degeneracy of party politics" and "the old machine politics that fogged issues and led nowhere except to political debauchery."²

* * *

In Chapter I we discussed two means, presumably used in combination with each other, by which political parties may promote the cohesion of political communities. We suggested that to a certain extent, the degree of stress

¹Escott Reid, "The Saskatchewan Liberal Machine Before 1929," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, v. 2, 1936; also reprinted in Thorburn, op. cit., pp. 49-59.

²William Irvine, op. cit., p. 75; J.J. Morrison, letter to V.A. Clarke, November 18, 1919; quoted in Dawson, op. cit., p. 325. J.J. Morrison was Secretary of the United Farmers of Ontario.

on a political system may be attenuated through demand-reduction, either at the point where wants are converted into political demands, or at subsequent points in the political system. We also suggested, however, that groups may formulate certain minimal or irreducible demands which must be realized if the regime and the political community are to receive the voluntary support of the groups concerned.

The non-partisan revolt in the Canadian West may be viewed as an example of the failure of the demand-reduction method for generating support for the political regime, even though the authorities attempted to sidetrack the West's demands by formulating substitutive responses to social needs and political demands. Although demand-reduction was successfully practised during the West's formative years, the intensification of the existing regional cleavage by the events of the 1910's and early 1920's, plus the growing political awareness of the prairie farmers, combined to produce the formulation of new minimal demands, including demands for modifications in the structure of the regime.

We may discern similar developments in Quebec during recent years. Whereas in the West the parties were in effect the agents of a dominant elite which lived outside the region, in Quebec the parties were for many years the instruments of an indigenous elite composed of members

of the liberal professions and the clergy,¹ allied with the interests of English-Canadian and American capital.² The government policies which were the fruits of this alliance had adverse effects on the material welfare of many Quebecers, but electoral support was nevertheless secured through the actions of the parties in dispensing the palliatives of patronage and public works, and through strong emphasis on the symbolic achievements of the regime. These were, at the federal level, a strong French-Canadian presence in the Cabinet giving the promise of protection of French-Canadian rights, and, at the provincial level, the protection of a largely negative provincial autonomy (i.e. non-participation in federally-sponsored programs).

Since the end of the St. Laurent and Duplessis eras --that is, since the late 'fifties--the symbolic achievements of those years have been widely condemned as illusory. A more positive form of French-Canadian national-

¹Fernand Dumont and Guy Rocher, "Introduction à une sociologie du Canada français," Le Canada français, aujourd'hui et demain, ed. André Latreille et al. ("Recherches et Débats," No 34; Centre catholique des intellectuels français; Paris: Fayard, 1961), p. 35.

²Falardeau, op. cit., pp. 137-8; Albert Faucher, "Pouvoir politique et pouvoir économique dans l'évolution du Canada français," Recherches sociographiques, v. 7, No 1-2, janvier-aout 1966, pp. 61-79; see also the commentary by Jean-Réal Cardin, pp. 80-3.

ism, often an exclusively Quebec nationalism, has become current;¹ it stresses the goals of social well-being and of economic growth under the direction of French-Canadians --or Québécois.

Can the new collective goals of French-Canadian--or Quebec--society be achieved within the Canadian political community? Many French-Canadians doubt that they can. Even among those who do not at the present time believe that the Canadian political community must be dissolved, it is often felt that significant structural changes in the regime are necessary if the political community is to survive.

In some respects the present challenge to the Canadian political system differs significantly from the challenge of the period just after the first world war; but the similarities are nevertheless instructive. In Quebec, as earlier in the West, excessive reliance on the demand-reduction method for alleviating stress on the system (even though reinforced by the formulation of substitutive responses to political demands) has weakened the degree of support not only for the regime but for the political community. Moreover, the apparent failure of the demand-reduction method may be attributed to a combination of

¹Jean-Marc Léger, "Aspects of French-Canadian Nationalism," University of Toronto Quarterly, v. 27, 3 (April 1958), pp. 310-29; Léon Dion, "The Nationalism of Growth," Canadian Forum, v. 43, #516, (January 1964), pp. 229-33.

(a) changes in the content or degree of political conflict, and (b) the adoption of new political attitudes--broadly speaking, the same factors as we invoked to explain the failure of the demand-reduction method in the West. There is the important difference that in the West there occurred an intensification of existing cleavages, whereas in Quebec, as I shall argue below, new forms of political cleavage have arisen, which have derived from changes in the structure of French-Canadian society; but in both cases a more irrepressible political conflict increases the difficulty of demand-reduction. This difficulty is augmented by the adoption of new political attitudes: both in Quebec and in the West we note the decline of entrenched partisanship and a growing inclination to attempt to control the government in order to have it implement policies favourable to one's interests.

* * *

Why is demand-reduction, even though accompanied by the distribution of palliatives and the vaunted achievement of symbolic objectives, decreasingly effective as a means of retaining French-Canadian support for the political regime and indeed the political community in Canada? In seeking to answer this question we shall look first at changes in the structure of French-Canadian society.

Our first observation is that the industrialization

of Quebec has made French-Canadians, generally speaking, more dependent on the state as an instrument for securing the material conditions which they consider to be essential to their welfare. French-Canadians, like other peoples who have undergone the process of social adjustment which industrialization requires, have suffered a decline in self-sufficiency; this has been coupled with a general tendency to redefine the minimum acceptable standard of living.¹ Both factors have operated to increase the degree of dependence on the state, and have thus encouraged the formulation of new and more insistent demands in policy-areas such as economic development, industrial relations, and social welfare.

A further consequence of industrialization, in Canada as elsewhere, has been to create a vastly more complex social structure and a growing diversity of political interests within the society. This tendency has been particularly marked in French Canada, because during the nineteenth century, after the suppression of the Papineau rebellion, the clerical-bourgeois elite which acquired dominance (with the support of the English) defined collective goals for the society stressing its religious

¹A striking instance of this is contained in Gerald Fortin, "Socio-Cultural Changes in an Agricultural Parish," French-Canadian Society, v. 1, ed. Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin ("The Carleton Library;" Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), pp. 96-8.

mission and the moral superiority of the rural way of life.¹ The goal of cultural survival was linked to acceptance of the commercial supremacy of the English and an ideology premised on the absence, under a Christian social order, of social conflict.² The conscious abjuration of material goals for the society had the advantage, from the optic of the clerical-bourgeois elite, of preserving the cultural and religious values to which they subscribed, and of preserving also their own pre-eminent position within French-Canadian society, although acknowledging the supremacy of the English in more mundane affairs. The society which was the product of this relationship between its elite and the colonizing power, and of the ideology espoused and propagated by the elite, was remarkably homogeneous in its class composition, values, and political interests. Thus when industrialization began to break up the pattern established in the mid-nineteenth century, the social differentiation and the diversification of leadership which occurred brought with them a growing diversity of political interests

¹A polemical summary of these themes in the nationalist ideology is contained in Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, "La province de Québec au moment de la grève," La grève de l'anante, ed. P.E. Trudeau (Montreal, Editions Cité Libre, 1956), pp. 10-37.

²Jean Hulliger, L'enseignement social des évêques canadiens de 1891 à 1950, ("Bibliothèque économique et sociale;" Montréal: Fides, 1958), pp. 232-3, 237-42, 267-70.

within the society.

The way in which these developments have affected the rural milieu is described by Gerald Fortin in the following passage:

Le milieu rural en 1965 est habité à 70% par des familles non agricoles. La proportion des familles agricoles tend même à diminuer d'année en année. Ceci est vrai non seulement pour l'ensemble du milieu rural mais pour à peu près chacune des paroisses rurales. Le village qui autrefois constituait la minorité est devenu le lieu d'habitation de la majorité de la population rurale. On y retrouve vivant côté à côté les rentiers, les artisans, les journaliers, les bûcherons, les mineurs et même les chômeurs.

Toute cette population villageoise ayant plus facilement accepté les modes de vie de type urbain se trouve souvent en opposition avec la population des rangs qui, elle, est demeurée agricole et d'une certaine façon plus traditionnelle. Les conflits déjà existants entre village et paroisse deviennent de plus en plus nombreux. Conflits au sujet de l'école, conflits au sujet des transformations de type moderne exigées par les gens du village et refusées par les gens des rangs. Ce conflit est d'autant plus grave que très souvent la nouvelle population villageoise n'a pas su se créer un leadership qui lui soit propre. Population instable à cause de son occupation saisonnière qui l'oblige assez souvent à travailler en dehors du lieu de résidence, les villageois tout en revendiquant de meilleures écoles, de meilleurs systèmes de loisir, de meilleurs services ont peu d'organisations ou de mouvements qui leur soient propres et même ont peu de leaders particuliers. Leur difficulté est accrue par le fait que les positions de pouvoir (soit dans les mouvements coopératifs, soit au niveau du conseil municipal et scolaire) sont ou ont été déjà accaparées par la

population traditionnellement majoritaire, c'est-à-dire la population agricole.

Ce communauté homogène, la paroisse agricole, est donc devenue ainsi une société où plusieurs groupes à intérêts divergents se retrouvent. Les divergences sont d'ailleurs autant accentuées que les groupes au pouvoir ou les groupes qui contrôlent la vie de la paroisse sont maintenant des groupes minoritaires dans l'ensemble de cette population.¹

Equally important, and perhaps rather more obvious, are the conflicts which exist between employer and employees, and between a variety of groupings sharing certain common characteristics such as income level, age, marital status, residence (size of community), or religious affiliation. Many of these conflicts arise because of demands for--or as a result of--an expansion in the range of government activities. For instance, policies relating to economic development, industrial relations, or social welfare inevitably affect some groupings favourably and others adversely, and for this reason constitute a subject of political controversy.

The development of a more complex social structure, and the growth of political controversy within French-Canadian society have a dual significance in the context of this study. On the one hand, as I shall later argue, political parties in French Canada have not been well

¹Gerald Fortin, "L'évolution du milieu rural," Paper read before the convention of the Fédération des Caisses Populaires, Lévis, May 1965. (Mimeographed.)

adapted to representing the interests of geographically-dispersed groupings such as one finds in industrial-urban societies. Although this hypothesis is of critical importance in this study, at the present juncture we are more concerned with the fact that one aspect of the process of social differentiation has been the emergence of new leaders in both urban and rural milieus. The new leaders (who will be referred to in greater detail below) have issued a triple challenge to the existing order:

- (1) they have challenged the hegemony of the traditional clerical-bourgeois elite
- (2) they have denied the orthodoxy of the traditional ideology
- (3) they have attacked the patronage system as an unsatisfactory response to the social and economic problems of the milieu.

These three aspects of the challenge to the existing order are closely interrelated, so that it is very difficult to identify any one of them as fundamental, the others as instrumental. The way in which the three are linked together is exemplified by the following passage by Fernand Dumont and Guy Rocher:

On peut dire, sans trop forcer la réalité, que dans notre société fortement rurale et artisanale du xixe siècle, le leadership était relativement simple. Il était constitué principalement d'une certaine bourgeoisie (de caractère professionnel) et du clergé. Celle-là a exprimé les objectifs politiques et nationaux de l'ethnie canadienne-française, et le clergé, la "vocation religieuse" de notre peuple. Ce sont ces deux groupes

restreints qui ont défini le double messianisme du Canada français. Et c'est par la jonction de ces deux groupes que s'est opérée au début de ce siècle la fusion du nationalisme et de l'idéologie religieuse dans une idéologie unitaire que nous avons essayé de décrire.

Cette hiérarchie est en voie de transformation par suite de la diversification des élites que l'on peut aisément observer. La bourgeoisie et le clergé ne peuvent plus se dire les seuls titulaires de la conscience collective.

The authors then refer to the growth of working class leadership and of leadership comprised of "certains petits administrateurs et animateurs locaux de coopératives et de caisses populaires." They continue:

Ces deux exemples d'élites nouvelles indiquent bien que notre société ne se refléchit plus seulement dans des élites globales. Ils montrent aussi la dimension selon laquelle s'opère cette transformation: il n'y a pas seulement diversification, mais l'originalité des situations locales et concrètes exige, par l'action et par la conscience de ces nouveaux leaders, d'être intégrée à notre conscience sociale. Il est dans la ligne de notre évolution sociale que nous en arrivions bientôt à un leadership local ou régional tout à fait nouveau par rapport à la situation d'hier. Il est sans doute très significatif que l'on discute présentement beaucoup la suppression du "patronage" dans la vie politique de notre province. L'institution existe depuis un siècle: elle fait de l'organisateur électoral du parti au pouvoir le porte-parole des besoins locaux auprès de l'Etat et le dispensateur attitré des largesses gouvernementales. En ce sens, cette institution comble littéralement, depuis long temps, une lacune profonde de notre structure sociale: elle constitue à la fois l'antithèse et le substitut d'un véritable leadership local en même temps

qu'elle empêche les problèmes locaux d'être vraiment intégrés à la définition explicite d'une politique et d'une société globales. On ne la supprimera donc pas en interdisant simplement aux députés de recourir à ce système, mais plutôt en s'appuyant sur des élites locales en formation.¹

We should note particularly the idea that patronage has been an institution which "...constitue à la fois l'antithèse et le substitut d'un véritable leadership local en même temps qu'elle empêche les problèmes locaux d'être vraiment intégrés à la définition explicite d'une politique et d'une société globales." The parties, by offering a palliative response to the needs and demands of individuals and localities were able to ignore and perhaps to sidetrack attention from more fundamental problems, and thus to escape the need to articulate the interests of larger groups. Thus the patronage-agents, if not always men of very high status themselves, became the hangers-on and the supporters of the elite, and contributed to its dominant position in society. As Jean-Louis Gagnon has written:

Il y a 30 ou 40 ans, soit à la fin du régime Taschereau, le député était le représentant autorisé de ceux qui, dans son comté, tenaient le haut du pavé dans tous les sens du mot. Ces gens dont il [le député] était le fondé de pouvoir et l'avocat, étaient aussi les pourvoyeurs de ceux qui lui assuraient sa majorité

¹Dumont and Rocher, op. cit., pp. 35, 37.

électorale. Mais ils n'étaient pas véritablement des "patroneux". Ils étaient plus exactement des parrains qui avaient leurs clients et leurs pauvres....¹

In a similar vein, Jean-Charles Falardeau has written of the Duplessis era:

Les années qui font suite à la seconde guerre mondiale voient l'apparition des classes moyennes dans notre société. Le régime Duplessis leur offre l'illusion d'un symbole et une institution parapolitique. L'illusion sera celle de l'autonomie provinciale qui camouflera l'inactivité en matière sociale par une rhétorique correspondant à un voeu latent d'opposition à Ottawa. Par contre, le régime maintiendra de façon plus ostensible que jamais l'alliance avec la finance américaine et québécoise, avec les formes les plus abusives du patronat américain et québécois. Le règne du roi nègre. Le pouvoir politique est autocratique. Il personnalise et surpolitise à la fois ses contacts avec le peuple-electeur en institutionnalisant ses faveurs arbitraires par l'intermédiaire du patronage. Ce sera l'ère du député-entrepreneur-homme d'affaires-commanditaire-distributeur de largesses: l'Etat-Providence à l'heure des anciens clochers québécois.²

Falardeau continues his analysis of the evolution of elites in Quebec society by emphasizing the indispensable role of intellectuals in acting as catalysts of the

¹Jean-Louis Gagnon, "D'où viennent nos hommes politiques," Nos hommes politiques, Travaux présentés à la 10ème conférence annuelle de l'Institut Canadien des Affaires Publiques (Montréal: Editions du Jour, 1964), pp. 19-20.

²Falardeau, op. cit., p. 138.

changing social structure in the post-1945 period. He refers to the intellectuals as "une élite clandestine" which, through the agency of the review Cité Libre and of l'Institut canadien des affaires publiques, attacked the traditional (nationalist-ruralist-clericalist) ideology and substituted for it new definitions of the milieu. Of these he commented: "Elles sont par-dessus dynamiques et, en définitive, optimistes, pour autant qu'elles ambitionnent de promouvoir le salarié canadien-français, ouvrier ou collet blanc, du statut de sujet à celui de citoyen."¹

To nourish political attitudes which encourage the individual to think of himself as a citizen (with rights) rather than as a subject (hoping to obtain favours) attacks the foundation of the authority of the traditional elites. In French Canada the traditional elites had perpetuated their dominant position in society at least partly through their control of the political machinery. They could do this only through the complaisance of the population, which had shown little inclination to challenge a benevolent, if arbitrary, government paternalism. Thus Falardeau writes, of the post-war period:

L'écart demeure grand, il s'élargit même entre ces attitudes nouvelles et les habitudes de pensée de très vastes secteurs de la population. La Lutte est particulièrement acerbe de la part des

¹Falardeau, op. cit., p. 139.

tenants de l'idéologie traditionnelle. Les porte-parole du régime négligent l'"ouvriérisme" qui s'oppose, dit-on, au nationalisme classique--entendons: ruraliste. Certaines couches géologiques de la pensée ecclésiastique se durcissent sous la poussée des grondements souterrains. Le patronat requiert l'appui politique et policier pour maintenir ses positions. Ces oppositions, ces conflits d'idéologies et de classes se révéleront au moment de la dé-confessionalisation des coopératives en 1946 et surtout lors de l'abécéde fixation que fut la grève de l'amiante de 1949.¹

If ideological conflicts in French Canada became also conflicts of class which produced such spectacular episodes as the Asbestos strike of 1949, it was due partly to the proselytizing efforts of the apostles of secularization and "ouvriérisme", who (as Falardeau recounts) set out to transform and reorient trade unionism and the co-operative movement; at the same time (and less under the guidance of university-trained animateurs sociaux) the leaders of the farmers' syndicalist organization, the Union Catholique des Cultivateurs (U.C.C.), reoriented their movement to the commercialization of agricultural production. The consequence:

Voici donc un leadership nouveau agissant dans plusieurs couches sociales et professionnelles. Malgré le couvercle vissé de force sur notre société convertie en marmite de Papin, ce leadership cherche à en faire bouillonner l'intérieur.²

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 140.

Similar conclusions are reached by Dumont and Rocher (in the passage already quoted), and by Guy Bourassa, Gerald Fortin, and Jacques Brazeau, all of whom stress the importance of new leadership in French-Canadian society: in the trade union movement, in the agricultural milieu, in the Church, in education, and perhaps most spectacularly in the upper ranks of the Quebec civil service.¹

The degree of progress, however, in developing new elites at the local level is a subject of some difference of opinion. Thus Falardeau, although discerning "un leadership nouveau agissant dans plusieurs couches sociales et professionnelles," nevertheless cautions the reader:

Fernand Dumont et Guy Rocher, dans leur "Introduction à une sociologie du Canada français," prévoyaient à brève échéance un pluralisme de nos élites et prédisaient qu' il est dans la ligne de notre évolution sociale que nous en arrivions bientôt à une leadership local ou régional tout à fait nouveau par rapport à la situation d'hier . Nous sommes encore loin d'une telle réalisation. Le leadership local ou régional jusqu' à maintenant a été latent plutôt qu'explicite. Sauf en de rares exceptions, il n'a pas été spontané. Il lui a fallu, pour se

¹Dumont and Rocher, op. cit., Guy Bourassa, "Leaders nouveaux et nouvelles formes de leadership," Les nouveaux Québécois, Troisième Congrès des Affaires canadiennes, 1963 (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1964), pp. 34-6 and passim. Gerald Fortin, "Milieu rural et milieu ouvrier, deux classes virtuelles," Recherches sociographiques, v. 6 #1 (janvier-avril 1965), pp. 47-60; Jacques Brazeau, "Les nouvelles classes moyennes," Recherches sociographiques, v. 7, #1-2 (janvier-août 1966), pp. 151-63.

révéler et pour agir, l'aiguillon des
animateurs sociaux ou des planificateurs.

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As evidence for the view that, "...il existe à peine de nouveau leadership spontané dans la vie locale ou régionale,"² Falardeau alludes to a study of social structures in the area around St. Jerome,³ 30 miles north of Montreal, and to a series of studies conducted in the Lower St. Lawrence and Gaspe regions, under the auspices of the Bureau d'aménagement de l'est du Québec (B.A.E.Q.).⁴

¹Falardeau, op. cit., p. 143. The short passage from the article by Dumont and Rocher was quoted in this study, above, in the context of a rather longer excerpt.

²Ibid., p. 141.

³Fernand Dumont and Yves Martin: L'analyse des structures sociales régionales. Etude sociologique de la région de Saint-Jérôme (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1963), pp. 204-5 and passim.

⁴The B.A.E.Q., or Eastern Quebec Planning Board, is an incorporated body which undertook the most ambitious program of animation sociale in the province. The object was to prepare, with the assistance and support of the population of the regions, a plan for economic development. It is now published under the title of Plan de développement 1967-72 du Bas St.-Laurent, de la Gaspésie, et des Iles-de-la-Madeleine (Mont Joli, Que.): Bureau d'aménagement de l'est du Québec, 1966), and according to a newspaper report in May 1967, steps are being taken for the implementation of the Plan (Paul Cliche, "Québec s'engage dans l'exécution de du Plan du BAEQ," Le Devoir (Montreal), May 29, 1967. The B.A.E.Q. was financed, after the initial stages, under the joint federal-provincial Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Agency (A.R.D.A.). There is an excellent summary of the project by Paul Cliche in Le Devoir, 27 septembre - 1 octobre 1965.

The B.A.E.Q. studies are particularly valuable for our purposes, because they describe the initial stages of the diversification of elites at the local level, under the prodding of animateurs sociaux. It is to be noted that the regions studied are economically depressed, and have suffered a very heavy rate of emigration due to lack of attractive employment opportunities, especially for the more highly-qualified personnel. Thus they have been relatively slow to develop new leadership cadres.

The B.A.E.Q. studies have documented several frequently-repeated assertions about French-Canadian society outside the large urban areas: the paucity of leadership resources at the local level, the close integration of political leadership with other types of social leadership (to the point where formal organizations, even non-political ones, may become the instruments of political leaders), and the local orientation of political and other community leaders. Furthermore, some of the data collected for the B.A.E.Q. enable us to discern a movement towards a diversification of elites, including a separation of political leadership at the provincial and federal levels from other types of leadership. Since each of these findings of the B.A.E.Q. studies is highly germane to our own constituency studies, it will be worth our while to examine them in rather greater detail.

We note first the small number of leaders who are active in political or other organizations, especially

in the smaller and less prosperous communities. In such communities, political activists tend to be closely associated with members of the traditional elite(s)---as indeed one might expect from the remarks of Jean-Louis Gagnon and Jean-Charles Falardeau, already quoted. These features of the social structure of the Lower St. Lawrence and Gaspe regions are described briefly by the author of a study on political parties in the area, Michel Chaloult, who has reported:

Il est devenu un lien commun dans la province de Québec de constater le caractère traditionnel du leadership, particulièrement dans les régions rurales. Le nombre restreint de leaders et la politisation de la vie sociale a concentré entre les mains de quelques individus le pouvoir de décision de tout le groupe. Dans les comtés étudiés [Gaspé-sud, Rimouski], dans un sens, la situation n'a pas changé puisque tous les organisateurs [politiques] sont unanimes à déplorer le nombre trop restreint de ceux qui participent activement aux organisations politiques et diverses associations. Ce sont toujours les mêmes--on les appelle les "TLM"--qui se retrouvent partout, et ils sont peu nombreux. Ils se connaissent tous, et les relations inter-personnelles règlent la plus grande partie des problèmes qui se posent...¹

Chaloult noted that of the voluntary associations, the Chamber of Commerce was the one which showed the highest

¹Michel Chaloult, Les partis politiques dans le territoire-pilote, Annexe technique No. 14 au Plan de développement 1967-72 du Bas St. Laurent, de la Gaspésie, et des Iles-de-la-Madeleine, (Bureau d'aménagement de l'est du Québec, fév. 1966), pp. 63-4.

correlation with political activism:

Selon les dires de plusieurs organisateurs, la Chambre de Commerce est devenue un centre de décisions de premier ordre. Celui qui veut détenir une influence quelconque doit d'abord y pénétrer. Il n'y a pas un leader politique important qui n'en fasse partie (parmi ceux rencontrés 207).
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The large number of cross-memberships between political party organizations and the Chambers of Commerce is all the more interesting for the fact that in the villages and towns in the area, organizations such as the Chambers of Commerce are foci of local interests, rather than of group interests within the locality. This was clearly demonstrated by a series of studies for the B.A.E.Q. on the subject of the regionalization of school districts, when local rivalries were brought to the fore by the consolidation process. In cases where there was no obvious choice for location of the regional school, associations such as the Chambre de Commerce and the Société St.-Jean-Baptiste were actively involved in the disputes between the different towns, each claiming for itself whatever school facilities it could reasonably hope for. The situation was summarized as follows by Marc-A. Morency:

¹Ibid., p. 65.

Au niveau local, les relations sont très étroites. Les associations sont bien plus des instruments de quelques leaders, des canaux de diffusion de leurs idées, de leurs décisions, qu'un instrument de représentation d'intérêts précis. L'idéologie communautariste est le propre de ces associations. Les leaders sont toujours les mêmes, et les associations sont de faciles instruments de coalition....Le rôle des associations est étroitement lié à la communauté locale; le leadership donne une orientation localiste aux mouvements de ces associations; les regroupements sont faciles, même entre organisations partisanes, lorsque l'on perçoit l'intérêt local comme menacé, ce qui explique le peu d'influence des partis dans la régionalisation.¹

The close association between political and social leadership, and also the local orientation of the leaders, receive further emphasis in the following account of leadership in the Rivière-du-Loup school region:

...le leadership formel et informel occupe des emplois très prestigieux et moyennement prestigieux. Ainsi, nous rencontrons des commerçants, des industriels, des hôteliers, des médecins et vétérinaires, ainsi que des agronomes et des professeurs. Nous constatons également que le leadership scolaire...participe à beaucoup d'associations locales comme la Chambre de Commerce et la

¹Marc-André Morency, Régionalisation scolaire et aménagement du territoire, (mimeographed by the Bureau d'Aménagement de l'Est du Québec, Mont Joli, Québec 1964), pp. 25-6.

Société St-Jean-Baptiste. Ces associations constituent ainsi une école de formation pour le leadership scolaire; en revanche, cette participation à des associations locales indique également une intégration du leadership.... Nous savons en outre que le leadership scolaire participe activement à la politique provinciale par l'intermédiaire des partis politiques et des associations partisanes au niveau local et régional. Cette dimension de la partisanerie politique n'exerce aucune influence à cause de la définition même du problème de la régionalisation scolaire comme celui de localisation des écoles plutôt que celui d'assurer les meilleures institutions d'éducation¹. En effet, ce qui prime c'est la promotion des intérêts de la localité.

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The B.A.E.Q. studies, in addition to describing the character of traditional leadership in small communities, also document a movement towards the diversification of elites. On the one hand, an inquiry by Guy Bourassa revealed that members of the regional development councils in the Lower St. Lawrence and Gaspe regions were quite active in voluntary associations, particularly the Chambers of Commerce and secondarily the Caisses Populaires, the Société St.-Jean-Baptiste, and the Chevaliers de Colomb. On the other hand, having made this observation, Bourassa

¹Gabriel Gagnon and Claude Gousse, Le processus de régionalisation scolaire dans l'est du Québec, Annexe technique au Plan de développement 1967-1972 du Bas St.-Laurent, de la Gaspésie et des Îles-de-la-Madeleine (Bureau d'aménagement de l'est du Québec, décembre 1965), pp. 186-7.

comments:

Nous voulons insister sur deux remarques intéressantes. D'abord, les membres du conseil de la Gaspésie témoignent d'une participation plus faible aux diverses associations que ceux du Bas-St.-Laurent. D'autre part, semble se dégager une tendance chez les individus qui assument à l'heure actuelle des responsabilités importantes, notamment dans la direction du Bureau d'Aménagement, à se retirer des mouvements et associations volontaires.¹

Bourassa records the further observation that there was a high participation by Council members in political affairs: 54% in municipal politics, 40% in provincial politics (either in party organizations, or as député) and approximately 25% in federal politics. He notes also a higher degree of participation of Council members from the Gaspé region than from the Lower St. Lawrence, where there is a declining participation in politics both at the provincial and at the municipal levels.²

These observations are rather tantalizing, since Professor Bourassa does not offer any explanation for the

¹Guy Bourassa, La mise en place de nouvelles structures régionales, Annexe technique au Plan de développement 1967-1972 du Bas St-Laurent, de la Gaspésie, et des Iles-de-la-Madeleine, (Bureau d'aménagement de l'est du Québec, juin 1966), p. 72.

²Ibid., pp. 72-3.

phenomena which he has reported. We may note, however, that the members of the regional development councils are encouraged, by the nature of their collective task, to abandon the local orientation which appears to be firmly entrenched in the parties and in the voluntary associations referred to: Chambers of Commerce, Société St.-Jean-Baptiste, Caisses Populaires, and Chevaliers de Colomb. Moreover, it is worth remarking that the decline in cross-membership between the regional development councils and other organizations has progressed further in the Lower St. Lawrence region, which (by comparison with the Gaspé region) is more prosperous, contains larger urban agglomerations (Rivière du Loup, Rimouski), and has a more diversified economy and occupational structure.

The indications of a growing diversification of leadership, as reported by Professor Bourassa, are confirmed by the findings of Michel Chaloult. Chaloult's data, based on interviews with twenty party activists, indicate the following results:

Les leaders politiques se détachent de plus en plus de la politique municipale. Dans les villes, de moins en moins la couleur du parti au pouvoir à Québec définit celle du Conseil municipal. On préfère séparer la vie politique municipal de la vie politique provinciale. Il y a une méfiance des Conseils municipaux, des Commissions scolaires... et aussi, à un moindre

degré, des associations volontaires... face aux partis politiques. Ceci est la marque d'une évolution du leadership. (A cet égard, on peut noter une différence entre les comtés de Gaspé-Sud et de Rimouski: cinq sur dix des organisateurs de Gaspé-Sud s'occupent de politique municipale, tandis qu'on en compte seulement un sur neuf dans Rimouski, encore que ce dernier, tout membre de l'association libérale qu'il soit, ne fait plus officiellement de politique pour la durée de son mandat de maire). Dans les petites localités, au contraire, les organisateurs politiques noyaient les autres organisations. Le plus souvent il n'y a pas de Chambre de Commerce. Les organisateurs détiennent entièrement le pouvoir qui fait leur puissance: seul celui de faire du patronage. De plus, la collusion des pouvoirs, dominée par le pouvoir politique, tend à la désintégration des autres pouvoirs / comme dans des associations volontaires autonomes /.

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Two of these remarks deserve special emphasis in view of our own observation, to be reported in the three constituency studies, that many leaders of certain kinds of voluntary association have tended to adopt a non-partisan stance. First, we note that in the smaller localities, the political organizers derive their power from their control of the patronage, and tend to prevent

¹Chaloult, op. cit., pp. 65-6. The emphasis on "la méfiance... face aux partis politiques" was added by me.

independent centres of power from developing by penetrating (noyauter) other organizations. Second (an observation perhaps explained by the first), there is in the larger municipalities a growing distrust of parties within municipal councils, school boards, and (to a lesser degree) voluntary associations.

It seems to me significant that Chaloult reports distrust of parties, and not simply lack of interest in their affairs. Party activities outside election time, according to Chaloult, consist of distributing the patronage.¹ In this fact, and the reported distrust of parties, we catch a glimmer of a very fundamental divergence in attitudes between party activists and the elite-groups which are developing outside the political parties. While it is most easily observed in relation to the suppression of patronage, the divergence of attitudes really extends to the fundamental question of the relationship between the individual and the state.

If government is conceived of as a paternalistic institution, and its authority accepted in this light, then the mass of people are placed in the position of suppliants while a smaller group composed of party organizers and elected Members constitute a political elite. The political elite "have connections" and pro-

¹Chaloult, op. cit., pp. 83-93.

vide the sole channel of access to the authorities. Such a situation leaves the government open to control by an economic or other elite (religious, military), while the political party becomes an instrument for administration and for securing support from the people without acting as a means by which they can control the authorities.

The idea, however, that the state is an instrument which individuals and groups can influence to their own advantage, and that all have equal access to the authorities, is an idea which strikes at the privileged position of the traditional political elite. The "instrumental" concept of government, which drains away the power of the political organizer in the constituency, thereby also weakens the grip of other elites on the government and may force it to be more responsive to popular demands.

The controversy in Quebec over the suppression of the patronage system thus derives its significance from a double conflict: a conflict of ideas or attitudes concerning the relationship between the individual and the state, and a conflict between competing elites. For aspiring leaders effectively to challenge the dominance of the traditional elite it was necessary to sap the basis of its political power, an objective which could be accomplished only by mobilizing the potential political power of working-class people in both town and

countryside. That these groups should take on a new political awareness and reject the notion of government paternalism was not only an objective in itself but became a necessity simply as a matter of tactics. Thus Jacques Brazeau has written:

Depuis 1949, et encore davantage depuis 1960, le Québec a donné la parole à de nouvelles élites dans l'épiscopat, les syndicats, les journaux, l'administration publique, le gouvernement et les universités. Le Québec, depuis lors, est aussi en train de se créer de nouvelles classes moyennes. Les défineurs de situations ont attiré l'attention sur les problèmes sociaux, sur l'industrialisation et sur l'emploi de modalités propres à rendre les effets de celle-ci bénéfiques pour l'ensemble de la population, sur les problèmes techniques que l'ère industrielle pose à l'Etat, à l'Eglise, à l'école, à l'entreprise et au citoyen....

Il est remarquable que l'extension des classes moyennes a eu, en premier lieu, des causes politiques. C'est contre le gouvernement québécois, allié de l'intégrisme et du patronat exploiteur, que syndicalistes, journalistes et universitaires ont croisé le fer. Ils étaient une élite, une minorité, qui allaient éveiller les classes moyennes et laborieuses des villes.¹

One may contest Brazeau's opinion that the extension of the middle class in Quebec was the result of a conscious effort by emerging elites, motivated by political objectives; but his argument is nevertheless a cogent illustration of the way in which the adoption of a new conception of the relationship between the individual

¹Brazeau, op. cit., pp. 156-7.

and the state threatens the dominance of the traditional elite.

We are now in a position to offer at least a partial answer to the question which initiated our discussion of changing social structures in French Canada. The question was:

Why is demand-reduction, even though accompanied by the distribution of palliatives and the vaunted achievement of symbolic objectives, decreasingly effective as a means of retaining French-Canadian support for the political regime and indeed the political community in Canada?

In the first place, we have noted that changes in the social and economic environment have increased the degree of dependence of many French-Canadians on the state, thus evoking new and more insistent political demands. In many instances the demands are not those of French-Canadians (or even of Quebecers) as a whole; on the contrary, they have emphasized a hitherto-latent divergence in political interests between groups within French-Canadian society.

Recognition of this divergence of interests by newly-emerging elites has encouraged them to challenge the traditional ideology which postulated collective goals for the society and was premised on the absence of conflict

within it. Since it was the traditional ideology which gave significance to the symbolic achievements of previous years, in both federal and provincial politics, the criticism of the ideology robbed the symbolic achievements of their lustre. Once this happened, it was tempting to criticize the failures of previous years, in respect of demands only subsequently formulated, and to heap retroactive blame on the regime for having neglected the material welfare of French-Canadians for many years.

In addition to the formulation of new political demands, changing political attitudes have been of immense significance in sharpening the degree of political conflict, and thus reducing the effectiveness of the demand-reduction method of attenuating stress on the system. I refer to the tendency to redefine the relationship between the individual and the state, and to attack the patronage system as a symptom of paternalism, as a practice which encourages an excessive partisanship, and as an unsatisfactory solution to social and economic problems which prevents the formulation of more adequate responses to social needs and political demands.

* * *

In view of the decreasing effectiveness of demand-reduction in attenuating stress on the Canadian political system, we now ask: how have political parties reacted to these changing circumstances?

In offering an answer to this question, we shall have to make a distinction between the reaction of the senior leadership of the parties, and the reaction of the constituency organizers. We shall look first, briefly, at the response of the upper ranks of the parties.

The orientation of the Quebec Liberal Party during the fifties was one of equivocal reformism. The proclaimed object of Georges-Emile Lapalme, leader between 1950 and 1958, was to make the Liberals the political expression of innovating forces in the province:

Lapalme set himself the task *[writes* Herbert Quinn *]* of enlisting under the Liberal banner all the forces of discontent within the province by associating the party with most of the grievances and proposals for reform put forward by the social nationalists, the Church, the trade unions, and other groups.¹

This strategy was combined with a major effort to reconstruct the Liberal Party organization at the poll and constituency levels. The aim was to build a mass-membership party adhering to democratic principles of organization. After a hesitant five-year period of gestation

¹Herbert Quinn, The Union Nationale (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 171.

in which the preliminary organizational work was carried out, the Provincial Liberal Federation (later renamed the Quebec Liberal Federation) was officially founded in November 1955.

The reorientation of policy and the democratization of the party structures which were set afoot by Lapalme, however, met resistance within the Liberal Party both at the constituency level and in the more senior ranks of this federal-provincial hybrid. As Gerard Bergeron relates, the party suffered from internecine strife between the reform element in the party, which was largely pre-occupied with provincial affairs (but did not constitute by any means the whole of the provincial wing) and certain of the federal Liberals (the "collabos") who had apparently made unofficial non-aggression pacts with the Duplessis machine.¹ Successive annual meetings of the new Federation were the scene of a struggle between the two groups, the reformers succeeding in passing resolutions to expel the "collabos" and to work towards the creation of a Union des Forces Démocratiques.²

¹Gerard Bergeron, Les partis libéraux du Canada et du Québec, 1955-1965, Aspects bilingues et biculturels, Etude préparée pour le Service des Recherches de la Commission Royale d'Enquête sur le Bilinguisme et le Biculturalisme [janvier 1966], pp. 10-17, 38-40. (Mimeo graphed.)

²Ibid., pp. 40-1. The resolution aiming at creating a Union des Forces Démocratiques was passed in November 1958, the first convention after the election of Jean Lesage as leader.

The real significance of these victories is difficult to assess. A clear indication of the difficulties in the path of reform of the Party is provided in the public record of the leadership convention of May 1958. The retiring leader, M. Lapalme, gave the opponents of reform within the party a verbal drubbing, and predicted the growth of a third party if the Liberals failed to achieve internal harmony in support of a reform program.¹ Similar speeches of an even more outspoken nature were delivered by Jean-Louis Gagnon and Jean-Marie Nadeau.

In the face of the uncertain success of the Liberal Party's reform wing, it is hardly surprising that the Party's aim to form a common front of all anti-Duplessis forces within the province did not achieve an early success. A few hundred intellectuals grouped into a non-partisan but highly political organization, Le Rassemblement, declined to embrace any political party but opted instead for undertaking a program of political education through the mass media, and through bodies such as l'Institut canadien des affaires publiques and l'Institut canadien d'éducation des adultes. Léon Dion reports how those who were later to form Le Rassemblement met after the election of 1956:

To the question, "What is to be done?" the majority decided against working inside the ranks of the provincial Liberal Party--not on account of its

¹Le Devoir (Montreal), 31 mai, 1958, pp. 1,7; 2 juin, 1958, pp. 1,4,5.

poor performance during the recent elections, but because the core of this party looked to them to be made of the same elements that constituted the essence of Duplessism.¹

Although I do not wish to offer an explanation for the Liberal Party's electoral victory in June 1960, it is worth remarking that one factor was the accretion of a number of opinion leaders to the Liberal ranks between 1958 and 1960. Several of the new supporters, of whom the foremost was René Lévesque, joined the party only after the death of Paul Sauvé, reformist Union Nationale premier between September 1959 and January 1960. The addition of these supporters was in part the result of, and in part contributed to, a strengthening of the reform wing of the party at the top echelons.

This brief review of the reconstruction of the Quebec Liberal Party in the 1950's obviously does not purport to follow in detail the course of the struggles between different elements in the Party; its object is simply to indicate that reformist ideas found a welcome reception among some of the leaders of this opposition party, but that the reorientation of the Party's program involved it in a struggle which continued for a decade and more--for even after the election of 1960, Premier Lesage continued

¹ Léon Dion, "The New Regime," pamphlet containing reprints of articles from The Globe and Mail (Toronto: The Globe and Mail, 1962), p. 4.

to face the difficult problem of reconciling the innovating and the more traditional forces within the Party. One of the most interesting features of this running battle was the role played by the Quebec Liberal Federation, as the instrument of the reform wing.¹

The internal changes in the Union Nationale while it was in opposition from 1960 to 1966 are difficult to trace, and I shall not attempt to do so. It is worth remarking, however, that in this party, as within the Liberals, there were reform forces which demanded rejuvenation of the party's program and structure after its electoral defeat. The outstanding instance was that of Jean-Jacques Bertrand, who was Daniel Johnson's chief rival for the leadership in 1961: at that time Bertrand insisted that the party should embark on fundamental reforms and declared that he could only remain a member of the party if it did so. An attempt was subsequently made to reorganize the party along democratic lines; and in March 1965 the Union Nationale held its first modern-style convention. On that occasion Bertrand indicated his full support for the party and its leaders, remarking:

Le renouveau que nous avions souhaité est lancé; nous sommes sur la voie qui remet le parti démocratiquement entre les mains de l'Union Nationale de tous les comtés, dans des structures démocratiques qui vous permettront de

¹Bergeron, op. cit., pp. 1-10, 38-44, 75-8, 91-5, and passim.

faire du parti ce que vous voulez.¹

It would serve no purpose to engage ourselves in the tendentious task of assessing the adequacy of the Liberal and the Union Nationale governments' response to social and economic problems in the province, and to the political demands which they engendered. It is of real interest, however, in the context of this study, to observe that the initiative for reforms in education, economic development, labour, and social welfare policies, first manifested itself in what Falardeau described (in a passage quoted earlier) as "une nouvelle génération d'intellectuels, une élite clandestine". They were taken up by reform elements within the upper echelons of the political parties, who then sought to remould the party structures, right down to the constituency level, to mobilize electoral support for policies which had been formulated through other channels.

It may occasion little surprise to find that innovating demands were formulated outside the ranks of political parties, and that within the parties these demands were first accepted (at least in some measure) by the more highly-placed party personnel. This observation, however, poses questions of great theoretical and practical significance. Have constituency party organizations been active in securing electoral support for innovative

¹Le Devoir, 22 mars 1965, pp. 1-2.

policies? Have they been active in articulating the interests of the electorate at the local level, indicating favourable or unfavourable reactions to policy proposals emanating from elites at the provincial level? In sum, are Quebec parties, through their constituency organizations, fulfilling the role attributed to American parties by Frank J. Sorauf:

The American political party...has increasingly become the instrument through which massive, popular majorities exert their influence within the political system. By organizing sheer numbers it offsets the advantages of wealth, expertise, status, and access that minorities may enjoy.

Existing studies of the reaction of constituency organizers in Quebec to the reform of party structures, including the deflection of party activities from the traditional patronage-dispensing role to a more policy-oriented role, suggest that there are very substantial obstacles to party reform at the constituency level. The basis of opposition has frequently been the desire to preserve the patronage, partly because it has been the cement which has held together the traditional forms of party organization; partly because the patronage-agents do not wish to lose the basis of their political power and social prestige in the community, and partly because

it is often regarded as a means of achieving certain moral values, as will appear from the discussion below.

Patronage, as Vincent Lemieux has remarked,¹ is a method of administration which leaves substantial discretion in the hands of the administrator; the patronage-agent has the responsibility of distributing government grants to individuals and localities, and of hiring for local government work. The norms which ideally govern his behaviour do admit of substantial discretion, because he is expected to make allocations according to need; in return he may expect payment in the form of electoral support for his party, but he ought not to require excessive payment in the form of time or money for party purposes. He ought not to give undue preference to party supporters ("favouritisme") or to friends or relatives ("népotisme"), nor especially to grant excessive allocations--on contracts, for example--in return for personal or party reward beyond that of electoral support ("graissage"). Favouritisme, népotisme, and graissage are all thought of, according to Lemieux, as abuses of the patronage system. The patroneux who discharges his responsibilities fairly and honestly is a man of prestige in his community: valued personal relationships are established between the patroneux and his clients, and these are frequently valued by both sides.

¹Lemieux, op. cit., pp. 5-7.

One of the features of the new political attitudes held by the party reformers within the parties and outside them, is a desire to avoid the arbitrariness of patronage, and its attendant abuses, by transferring administrative responsibilities to a non-partisan civil service which would apply regulations according to bureaucratic norms. In cases where the government has responded by cutting back on patronage, the reaction of party activists has been predominantly negative; not surprisingly, they often regard it both as a threat to their own local prestige, and as an innovation which is destructive of genuinely-held values. To many of them, the impersonal bureaucratic norms are inferior to the personal values realized through the relationship between patroneux and client. Moreover, the introduction of bureaucratic methods of administration involves the danger that new abuses may arise. Both these complaints against the diminution of patronage in the Lower St. Lawrence and Gaspe regions after 1960 are well illustrated in the following two excerpts from Michel Chaloult's study for the B.A.E.Q.:

Il semble que le premier patronage supprimé fut celui "d'en bas", celui dont bénéficiait chaque électeur, celui que pratiquait l'U.N. Plusieurs organisateurs qui avaient fait des promesses aux électeurs n'ont pu les tenir, ce qui a occasionné beaucoup de mécontentement dans les rangs libéraux et une forte diminution du nombre des partisans dans certains comtés (Gaspé-Sud, Gaspé-Nord). On accuse les libéraux d'avoir supprimé ce "petit patronage" aux

dépens du peuple, et de pratiquer le "gros patronage" au profit des "gros organisateurs"....Le patronage "d'en haut" se manifesterait de plusieurs façons: il y aurait plusieurs manières de détonner les règlements sur la soumission des contrats; les achats du gouvernement, la location des immeubles, ou le choix de l'emplacement des travaux auraient comme condition première de favoriser tel ou tel député ou organisateur etc. Comme le dit un informateur, la suppression du "patronage d'en bas" et son remplacement par la bureaucratie favorise les groupes qui soutiennent le parti libéral et accroît leur pouvoir politique.

Il est devenu classique de distinguer entre bon et mauvais patronage et nos informateurs ne manquent pas de faire cette distinction. Tous condamnent le patronage, mais la plupart affirment qu'il y aura toujours du trafic d'influence, car "telle est la nature humaine"; ou encore qu'à compétence égale il est normal de choisir ses amis ou un partisan; ou encore qu'il est tout à fait normal d'être rémunéré pour son travail politique, ou encore qu'il faut conserver les valeurs humaines du patronage, c'est-à-dire les relations personnelles d'estime ou d'amitié entre deux individus. Aussi s'oppose-t-on à la bureaucratie qui ne respecte pas ces valeurs....On peut conclure de ceci que les organisateurs politiques n'abandonneront pas de bon gré leur pouvoir traditionnel de patronage au profit des bureaucrates; non parce qu'ils veulent bénéficier injustement de certains avantages, mais parce qu'ils privilégiennent avant tout la compréhension du lien qui les unit à ceux avec lesquels ils communiquent.¹

An excellent example of the difficulties involved in the process of democratization at the constituency level,

¹Chaloult, op. cit., pp. 84-5, 88-90.

in addition to the resignations of activists because of lack of "support" on patronage matters, is contained in Paul-André Comeau's article, "La transformation du Parti libéral québécois."¹ This is a case study of Shefford constituency, which borders on Brome-Missisquoi; Comeau reports that the existing clique of party organizers reacted to the threat of a diminution in their power (resulting from the establishment of a democratic constituency association) by simply taking over the new posts: "En installant des membres de l'organisation électorale aux divers postes-clés de l'Association, l'équipe dirigeante s'assure le contrôle de cette formation en ne lui laissant que des fonctions purement rituelles."²

In the three constituency studies undertaken for this project, as reported in Chapters III, IV, and V, we found a similarly unenthusiastic attitude amongst constituency organizers towards party reform. In particular, we found little inclination to undertake policy-oriented activities while accepting a decline in their patronage role. This theme is more appropriately dealt with within the context of the studies themselves, so I shall not attempt here a more complete summary of this aspect of the findings of our field research. Some comments about the choice of constituencies, however, are in order.

The first of the constituencies studied was Brome-

¹Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, v. 31 # 3 (August 1965), pp. 358-367.

²Ibid., p. 364.

Missisquoi, an Eastern Townships riding located along the American border, about thirty miles (at the closest point) from Montreal. It was chosen because, as will be explained in greater detail in Chapter III, it is of mixed ethnic composition, is partly rural and partly urban, and appears in its economic situation to be typical of a large group of ridings surrounding the metropolitan area of Montreal. It also had the advantage of being relatively accessible geographically; and we¹ were assured of the generous assistance of the incumbent M.P. and M.L.A.'s, which we gratefully acknowledge.

The second riding is the New Brunswick county of Westmorland, which consists of Moncton and the surrounding area. It had the advantage of being similar in many respects to Brome-Missisquoi, although Moncton is larger than any of the towns in our first constituency, and the area is not within the immediate hinterland of any large metropolis such as Montreal. Like Brome-Missisquoi, however, Westmorland is of mixed ethnic composition, and contains both rural and urban population. This constituency study was particularly valuable for our estimate of the role of parties in promoting the interests of ethnic minorities, since the Acadians are in the minority both

¹Throughout the reports of the constituency studies, the plural will be used in references to observations made during interviews, since the interviewing was conducted jointly by Jean-Pierre Bourduas and myself. Interpretive remarks are made in the singular, since I alone am responsible for them.

in the constituency and in the province. Moreover, since the majority is English-speaking, it enables us to understand those features of political organization and political attitudes which are common to English- and French-Canadians, though correlating (as I shall suggest) with socio-economic status.

For our final constituency, a wholly urban area was chosen: St. Henri, a working-class district in Montreal. The population is almost wholly French-speaking. Thus it contrasts sharply with both of the previous two studies, especially in view of its more homogeneous class and ethnic composition. Although political organization and attitudes in St. Henri are not likely to be typical of Montreal as a whole, the importance of choosing a constituency within the metropolitan area, which contains almost half the population of the province, is obvious.

In sum, the constituencies studied were chosen to incorporate, between them, maximum diversity in social composition and economic situation, within the limits of what could be achieved with only three ridings.

Our three constituency studies, therefore, provide a fair amount of evidence concerning the initial, generally adverse, reaction of constituency organizers to the initiatives of senior party personnel, who have proposed the reform of party structures and the reorientation of party activities at the local level. The reliability of our findings is substantially increased by the constituency

studies by Comeau (Shefford) and Chaloult (Rimouski and Gaspé-Sud). We shall, of course, examine this subject further in the conclusion to this study, Chapter VII.

* * *

Although the apparently meagre results of the first attempts to stimulate new activities within constituency party organizations leads us to doubt the long-term success of parties in making the political system more responsive to social needs and political demands, structural mechanisms other than political parties may contribute towards the same end. For this reason, in the constituency studies, we explored the activities of voluntary associations in articulating the political interests of their members. The possibility exists that voluntary associations, either by themselves or in concert with political parties, may articulate certain categories of political interest, thereby enabling and indeed forcing the authorities to respond more adequately to social needs and political demands.

We have particular reason to look at the political (though non-partisan) activities of voluntary associations, since their leaders, at least at the provincial level, are members of the emerging elites which played a prominent role in attacking the traditional ideology and chipping away at the political pedestal of the traditional elites. As Guy Bourassa has written:

[Il y a] une nouvelle élite politique en train de s'exprimer en parallèle ou même en dehors des partis eux-mêmes. Nos hommes politiques en tant que tels ne résument pas toute la pensée politique de notre société mais il y a des citoyens qui, par le biais des associations liées à un parti, ou par d'autres mécanismes, font maintenant valoir leurs vues politiques....¹

Since there is lack of unanimity amongst interpreters of the French-Canadian milieu concerning the strength of the developing local leadership,² it will be valuable to examine both the vitality of local leadership as expressed through emerging voluntary associations, and the adequacy of voluntary associations as articulators of the interests of diverse groups within the constituencies.

In view of our objectives, I have chosen to emphasize the role of only certain categories of voluntary association. There are many voluntary associations whose activities are recreational, religious, cultural, or "service-

¹ Bourassa, "Leaders nouveau," pp. 35-6.

² The reader may recall particularly Falardeau's opinion that the emergence of new local leadership, as predicted by Dumont and Rocher, is still far from being realized.

oriented", and which therefore have relatively little concern with the articulation of the political interests of their members. Many associations are partially political and partially non-political in character, there being a whole spectrum of gradations between the mostly political and the mostly non-political ones.

Those associations with which we were concerned in the constituency studies were rather more politically-oriented (though not party-oriented) than many other associations, and they also represented groups which were adversely affected by recent changes in the economy and social structure. Our special concern with such groups, whose dependence on the state for aid in improving their material situation was patently obvious, caused us to pay little attention to certain organizations traditionally associated with the political elite. The Chambers of Commerce, for example (as evidenced by the B.A.E.Q. studies), have been in this position; and they have also been foci for the expression of local interests rather than the interests of groups which constitute a part of many communities--groups such as farmers, tenants, or bird watchers. It is on the interests of geographically-dispersed groups that we must focus if we are to assess the political aspects of the problems which have arisen as a result of changes in the economic and social environment.

We are now in a position to explain in rather greater

detail the content of the constituency studies, and to preview briefly their findings. The first part of each study consists of a short description of the area. It is followed by an account of the way in which recent changes in the environment have affected various identifiable groups in the constituency. Having in this way reviewed the diversity of political interests which appear even within individual communities, we turn to an examination of the activities of voluntary associations in improving the position of their members, including (but not exclusively) through political means. Our findings, generally speaking, tended to corroborate Falardeau's view that the emergence of new forms of local leadership is still only in the early stages. Moreover, it appeared that certain groups, those most disfavoured by the changes in the milieu, were very poorly organized for the purpose of finding solutions to the problems which faced them, or for initiating any kind of political action.

Particular attention was paid to the political attitudes of leaders of voluntary associations. We found that they held an emphatically instrumental concept of the role of government (as contrasted with the paternalistic concept), but we found also (rather paradoxically) a marked tendency to avoid political involvement. This tendency, although not observable in all instances, appeared to be due to fear that political activity, especially at the local level, might involve their associations in partisan

controversies. Such controversies might well, in view of the existing partisan loyalties of their members, weaken their own organizations. Thus even the better-organized associations were not very well equipped to mobilize political support for government policies which they thought to be favourable to their members. Though they contributed to the articulation of the political interests of their own group, certainly more effectively than did political parties, their activities in this respect generally appeared to be rather feeble.

The final part of each constituency study focusses on the structure and activities of local party organizations, and the attitudes of their personnel towards the reorientation of the activities and the role of parties at the constituency level. By saving our analysis of the parties to the end of each constituency study, we were better able to assess the reciprocal relationship between them and the local environment. As I have already mentioned, constituency party workers generally appeared to remain oriented to their role as distributors of palliatives and to have shown little inclination to undertake policy-oriented activities of the kind which would make them effective in increasing the responsiveness of the political system to the needs and demands of their constituents. Indeed, by adhering to their traditional role, the party activists tended to foster the retention of partisan loyalties, and in this way their activities constitute an obstacle to the articulation of interests by voluntary associations.

CHAPTER 3

BROME - MISSISQUOI

This chapter and the two others succeeding it are devoted to the study of individual constituencies. The object of each chapter is to illustrate and explain some of the major contentions which are made in Chapter Two. The relevant points may be summarized as follows:

- (1) The increasing pluralism of society has resulted in the growth of conflict between groups at the constituency level. Some of the divergent group interests are being articulated - although often in only a very feeble way - by an emerging network of voluntary associations.
- (2) The leaders of voluntary associations are frequently hesitant to involve themselves in partisan debates, for fear of weakening their associations.
- (3) There is a tendency among party workers at the constituency level to apply palliative solutions to the problems which gave rise to group conflicts. Thus constituency party organizations are quite ineffective in articulating certain categories of political demands. Moreover, by fostering the retention of partisan loyalties, they have probably hindered voluntary associations in performing the interest-articulation function.

This chapter consists of an introductory section to outline the course of recent economic and social development, followed by three sections which are designed to deal with each of the above points in succession.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The federal constituency of Brome-Missisquoi¹ is a semi-rural area of the Eastern Townships. As is indicated in the fold-cut map at the end of this volume, it is located along the United States border to the east of Lake Champlain.

Brome-Missisquoi faces problems of social dislocation resulting from the decline of its agricultural economy. The effects of this decline have been mitigated by the establishment of manufacturing industries in the towns, with the consequence that residents of the rural areas and the villages may commute to work without abandoning their homes; frequently, however, this is only an intermediate step in the process of rural depopulation. Moreover, the region lacks the natural advantages to stimulate rapid industrialization, and there has been an increasing stream of emigration, not only from the farm to the town, but also from the region itself to Montreal. It may be supposed that those who move away are usually those who, of the maturing generation, have most initiative and who would accordingly have taken positions of leadership had they remained: thus the difficulties of evolving a new leadership to facilitate the necessary

¹Each of the three constituencies referred to in this study is defined according to the boundaries which existed prior to the Representation Act of 1966. See maps at the conclusion of the study, on fold-out sheets.

adjustments to the changing milieu are vastly increased.

Brome-Missisquoi, like most of the Eastern Townships, was originally settled by English-speaking people, many of them immigrants from New England after the American revolutionary war. During the past century, however, there has been a gradual influx of French-Canadians. Missisquoi, which lies along the American border at the edge of the St. Lawrence plain, is now French-speaking by a majority of almost four to one; but the more mountainous, poorer, and almost wholly rural Brome County to the east retains a slight English-speaking majority - indeed, the 1961 census registers a small increase in the percentage of English-speaking persons.

The two counties of Brome and Missisquoi each make up one provincial constituency; together they form a single federal riding. The political complexion is red and blue in approximately equal daubs, and it seems probable that the personalities of the candidates and the strength of their personal electoral organizations are the decisive factors in elections. At the present time, the incumbent Members are: for the federal constituency, Heward Grafftey, an English-speaking Progressive Conservative; and for the two provincial constituencies, Jean-Jacques Bertrand (Union Nationale, Missisquoi) and Glen Brown (Liberal, Brome).

Agriculture and the Phenomenon of "Disguised Unemployment"

Brome-Missisquoi is one of the many parts of eastern Canada which is having to adjust to the disruption of its agricultural economy. A single, inexorable fact renders the transformation of the milieu inevitable: it is that farming can no longer sustain as large a population as it used to. Mechanization has led to a vast increase in productivity which reduces the size of the labour force required to produce a given quantity of foodstuffs; and, in the face of relatively inelastic demand, agriculture suffers from chronic over-production. Efficient producers take advantage of technological improvements and specialize their operations in order to produce more cheaply for the urban markets. As a consequence, the farmer who lacks the initiative, technical skill, or financial resources to buy adjoining farms and to emulate the methods of large-scale production which others employ, faces a declining income and is soon forced to abandon an enterprise which has become unprofitable. It must be emphasized therefore, that it is not merely the attraction of the towns which is reducing the farm population; farmers are being forced off the land because it no longer provides them a living. This is attested to by the fact that the number of farms which produced a cash income of more than \$1200 dropped substantially between 1951 and 1961. (See Table III-1; a more long-range view of the decline of agriculture is provided in Table III-2).

TABLE III-1
AGRICULTURAL DECLINE, 1951-61

	Brome	Missisquoi
1. Decline in farm population	27%	17%
2. Decline in number of farms	28%	20%
3. Decline in number of farms with income of over \$1200	33%	13%
4. Decline in improved land area	25%	9%

Source: Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Census.
1961, v. 5.2, Table 12; 1951, v. 6.1, Table 16.

TABLE III-2

AGRICULTURE

	Farm Pop.	Farm Pop. %	Farm Pop. %	Farms	Income \$1200+	Improved Land Area
<u>Brome</u>						
1911	13,216	-	-	-	-	94,418
1921	13,381	-	-	1,815	-	78,197
1931	12,433	7919	63.7	1,724	-	79,359
1941	12,485	7004	56.1	1,585	-	89,849
1951	13,393	6425	48.0	1,352	985	94,235
1961	13,691	4663	34.1	972	660	70,931
<u>Missisquoi</u>						
1911	17,466	-	-	-	-	132,536
1921	17,709	-	-	1,634	-	116,844
1931	19,636	8528	43.4	1,749	-	124,968
1941	21,422	7563	35.3	1,635	-	129,723
1951	24,689	7507	30.4	1,526	1075	132,891
1961	29,526	6258	21.2	1,221	938	121,121

Source: Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Census.
1961, v. 1.1, Table 6, and v. 5.2, Tables 13, 14;
1951, v. 6.1, Tables 15, 16; 1941, v. 8.1, Table
28; 1931, v. 8, Table 21; 1921, v. 5, Table 81;
1911, v. 4, Table 1.

It will be noted that the social and economic dislocation is most severe in Brome county. This may be ascribed to the fact that there is a fairly sharp line of demarcation at the edge of the St. Lawrence plain (see map), separating prosperous agriculture from marginal or poor agriculture. Dairy farming is profitable on the plain, provided the farmer has the skills and the financial resources to work a large farm by mechanized production. But the thinner, rockier, and poorer soils which one finds in Brome county and in the southeast corner of Missisquoi, necessitate more fundamental changes - either shifting to the production of different farm commodities, or developing an alternative basis for the rural economy. Two possible sources of income for those rural areas are forestry and tourism.

The urgency of finding some solution to the present farm problem is indicated in Table III-3, which gives estimates of average annual income per farm-operator in the rural municipalities in Brome and the south-eastern part of Missisquoi. The very low figures for some municipalities and the negative sum for East Bolton are explained by the fact that the calculation of the farmer-operator's costs includes the value of family work on the farm, which is actually unpaid. In other words, only the free labour contributed by the farmer's family permits him to operate the farm at all. In view of the difficulties in estimating the number of hours' labour by the

family and in attributing a value of work done by a child who would not qualify for the full unskilled-workman's wage, this calculation must be assumed to be only a very rough one; nevertheless, it does indicate clearly that there are many cases where it would be more profitable for the farmer to curtail or abandon farming operations and take up a job in the town if there he can find one, or else to migrate to the city. Indeed, the study estimates that only in St. Armand Est and in Dunham do most farms provide revenue superior to that of the average urban wage minus the average rent; it is this calculation that leads the authors to assert that there exists in Bromé and parts of Missisquoi a high rate of "disguised unemployment". By this they mean that many people are looking for work in the towns but that in the meantime they continue to work their farms, which at least provide a subsistence; though looking for work, they are not actually "without a job", and hence they do not figure in the unemployment statistics.

The existence of "disguised unemployment" is a fact of cardinal importance, not only because it indicates the poverty of a sector of the rural population, but also because it contributes to keeping wages low in the towns: the existence of a pool of manpower within commuting distance of the factories serves to dampen employees' demands for a higher wage and militates against effective trade unionism. Indeed, it is precisely this abundance of relatively cheap labour which explains the existence

of manufacturing industry in the three main towns of the constituency, Cowansville, Farnham and Bedford.

TABLE III-3
INCOME PER FARMER-OPERATOR

Missisquoi:

St. Armand Est	\$2291
Dunham	1446
St. Armand Ouest	900

Brome:

Brome	858
Farnham Est	738
Potton	357
West Bolton	256
Austin	114
Sutton	12
St.-Etienne-de-Bolton	4
East Bolton	-184

Source: Société Technique d'Aménagement Régional: Brome-Stanstead. Vallée de La Rouge (by W.T. Perks, 1965). (Unpublished study commissioned by Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Agency.) Section 8, page 60.

Industry, Conditions of Employment and Population Movements

Of Brome-Missisquoi it could be said, as it has been said of the province's economy in the latter half of the nineteenth century, "Its industry, with the exception of sawmills, was not based on the exploitation of its natural resources, but on cheap labour and the exploitation of the tariff-protected consumer market."¹ The average income

¹R. Lamontagne and A. Faucher, "History of Industrial Development," French Canadian Society, ed. M. Rioux and Y. Martin (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), v. 1, p. 264.

of wage-earners in Cowansville, which is the largest town in the constituency, is a full one thousand dollars below the Montreal average. In part this reflects a lower wage rate; in part, greater instability of employment. This discrepancy is indicated in Table III-4, which lists average earnings in Brome-Missisquoi and the percentage of wage-earners who work at least thirty-five hours a week on a job which employs them at least forty weeks a year. Since this is the highest classification on the Census employment scale, it is the best available approximation to a definition of the "fully employed" worker. The Table also indicates, for the sake of comparison, earnings and employment in the province as a whole and in some other urban centres. It will be observed that the average wage in the urban centres of Brome-Missisquoi is substantially lower than that in centres which have the advantage of proximity to electric power or other natural resources, or are favoured with a strategic commercial location. On the other hand, the wage-level is comparable to that in other towns on the periphery of the metropolitan area. Their raison d'être is precisely the availability of manpower at cheaper rates than in Montreal, which makes it profitable for labour-intensive industries requiring unskilled or semi-skilled workers (whom they can train themselves) to establish their factories outside the metropolis where land and labour are cheaper, but where they are not too far removed from the principal urban market and

TABLE III-4

WAGE-EARNERS: EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT

	Average Earnings (\$)		Fully-employed as % of wage-earners	
	M	F	M	F
<u>Brome</u>	<u>2303</u>	<u>1431</u>	<u>54.8</u>	<u>46.3</u>
Rural	2118	1390	53.4	43.7
Non-farm	2265	1382	56.5	42.8
Urban	2786	1504	71.8	51.0
Sutton	2702	1429	76.0	46.0
Knowlton	2895	1579	66.4	56.6
<u>Missisquoi</u>	<u>2837</u>	<u>1624</u>	<u>72.7</u>	<u>59.1</u>
Rural	2350	1569	63.8	55.2
Non-farm	2624	1598	68.0	55.0
Urban	3805	1653	77.2	61.1
Cowansville	2955	1482	77.5	57.0
Farnham	3205	1671	73.9	58.3
Bedford	3164	2006	84.4	75.5
Quebec (prov.)	3367	1904	68.7	58.1
<u>Montreal</u>	<u>3972</u>	<u>2213</u>	<u>75.2</u>	<u>65.4</u>
Shawinigan	3687	1716	71.3	56.6
Quebec (city)	3559	1782	70.3	53.1
Trois Rivieres	3454	1650	71.5	54.4
St. Jean	3226	1778	71.3	58.6
Sherbrooke	3222	1631	72.3	58.3
Granby	3157	1911	72.5	62.0
St. Jerome	3034	1819	72.3	65.1
Drummondville	3030	1648	74.0	61.0
St. Hyacinthe	2863	1588	74.3	53.3
Magog	2811	1637	80.9	64.9

Average Earnings of Head of Household
(based on population sample)

	Family Households		Non-family Households	
	M	F	M	F
Brome	3248	869	1684	1323
Missisquoi	3792	1603	1792	1601
Quebec Prov.	4523	1521	3248	2168

Source: Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Census.
1961 - v. 3.3, Tables 13,14; v. 4-1, Tables F-2
and F-3.

shipping centre. The establishment of manufacturing industry in the towns, therefore, has cushioned the ill-effects of the disruption of the rural economy by providing enough employment to slow down the depopulation of the region (with its attendant social ills); but this has been accomplished and can be accomplished only at the expense of the industrial worker, who must accept a lower salary than workers obtain in those centres which enjoy greater natural advantages. As stated in a recent study commissioned by the town of Bedford (Missisquoi), industrial progress there will be achieved only if wages remain substantially lower¹ than those in other manufacturing centres in the province, and if the town can provide good housing and educational facilities for the families of managers, as well as a high level of municipal services, without over-taxing the industrial enterprises.² In other words, the town will have to make up for lack of power resources or exceptional transportation facilities by offering special concessions to prospective industries and by recognizing that the workers will have to accept a lower standard of living than they would enjoy in Montreal. This fact is all the more striking when one considers that wages in Bedford are higher than in the

¹"sensiblement inférieurs"

²Société Technique d'aménagement Régional, Bedford: Plan d'urbanisme / by W.T. Perks, 1965. (Mimeographed.)

other towns in Brome-Missisquoi. The disparities within the region are reflected to some extent in the figures showing average wage-rates (Table III-4, above), but are more starkly revealed in Table III-5 (below) which groups wage-earners according to level of earnings.

TABLE III-5

WAGE-EARNINGS

	1961 - % of wage earners earning:					
	less than \$2000		less than \$3000		\$4000 or more	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
Brome	43.8	72.7	70.4	86.7	12.0	3.5
Rural	49.5	72.3	74.8	86.8	9.6	3.3
Non-farm	43.4	72.3	70.4	85.0	11.5	2.3
Urban	29.3	73.4	59.1	86.5	18.1	3.0
Sutton	28.7	77.6	58.7	87.1	19.2	2.6
Knowlton	30.3	69.0	59.7	85.8	16.6	5.3
Missisquoi	27.3	59.4	54.6	88.3	18.7	2.1
Rural	41.2	61.8	67.8	85.9	12.6	2.7
Non-farm	31.4	61.6	60.9	84.5	15.8	3.0
Urban	20.3	58.2	46.5	89.6	21.7	1.8
Cowansville	21.5	68.5	51.4	93.9	18.1	1.5
Farnham	19.5	54.8	41.5	86.8	24.6	.8
Bedford	7.8	55.9	18.1	70.3	27.4	9.9

Source: Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Census, 1961, v. 3.3, Table 14.

Since it is natural to suppose that wage-earners are attracted to the highest-paying jobs, it may be thought surprising that, of the three principal towns in the area, the town with the highest rate of growth has the largest percentage of low-income wage-earners. (See Table III-6)

TABLE III-6

BROME-MISSISQUOI: POPULATION 1901-1961

	<u>Brome (total)</u>	<u>Sutton</u>	<u>Knowlton</u>	<u>Other Municipalities</u>
1901	13,303	691	760	11,852
1911	13,216	986	865	11,365
1921	13,381	923	841	11,617
1931	12,433	967	990	10,476
1941	12,485	1,118	972	10,395
1951	13,393	1,389	1,094	10,910
1961	13,691	1,755	1,396	10,540
	<u>Missisquoi (total)</u>	<u>Cowansville & Sweetisbury</u>	<u>Farnham</u>	<u>Other Municipalities</u>
1901	17,339	954	3,114	11,907
1911	17,466	1,186	3,560	11,283
1921	17,709	1,364	3,343	11,378
1931	19,636	2,260	4,205	11,601
1941	21,442	3,978	4,055	11,712
1951	24,689	5,072	4,926	12,618
1961	29,526	8,008	6,354	12,309

Note: "Other Municipalities" includes the rural municipalities, and the following villages:

	<u>Pop., 1961</u>		<u>Pop., 1961</u>
Brome: Eastman	637	Missisquoi:	
Foster	453	Dunham	434
Adamsville	390	Philipsburg	379
Abercorn	378	Clarenceville	362
E. Farnham	323	Freelighsburg	361
Brome	279		

Source: Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Census, 1961, v. 1.1; Tables 6 and 14.

The absence of any correlation between wage-rates and population movements may be explained by the fact that wage-rates depend more on the strength of the union - if any - than on the availability of labour. In

Farnham, for instance, a worker is "lucky" if he gets a job with the C.P.R., because wages and working conditions are determined by collective bargaining on a nationwide basis, and hence they depend on the state of supply and demand in the national labour market rather than the local one. To find employment with the C.P.R. or other firms with a strong union - that is, firms which pay high wages - is a windfall; most job-seekers must be content with much less. Thus, if Cowansville almost doubled in size in ten years, it is simply because jobs were available. Industries established there, partly because tax concessions and other "deals" with the municipality could be arranged; and even though they did not pay the highest wages, the availability of employment was sufficient in itself to attract people from the surrounding territory.

The growth of employment possibilities has not, however, been great enough to prevent the efflux of a large percentage of young people from the area. As might be expected, emigration has been higher in Brome county, where no major industries have established in recent years. There, forty per cent of those aged between ten and fourteen in 1951 had left the county ten years later; in Missisquoi during the same period, the emigration rate was just under fifteen per cent. (Fuller data are given in Table III-7). Since the emigration rates are comparable for the group aged fifteen to nineteen, and since the bulk of those who leave do so in their late 'teens or

early twenties, it seems probable that the total emigration of youth - male and female in about equal numbers - was substantially higher than is indicated for either age-group taken separately. It may be speculated that if data were available, they would show that of those aged (say) fourteen in 1951, rather more than half had left Brome, and perhaps about a quarter had left Missisquoi, by 1961. Such an outflow of youth cannot but have a debilitating effect on the society, for it leaves a higher percentage of dependents (non-income earners: the old, and the very young), isolates the old from their children, and depletes communities of potential leaders of occupational associations, recreational clubs, and in political or civic affairs.

TABLE III-7
EMIGRATION, 1951-1961

Rate of emigration between 1951 and 1961 for those in the following age-groups in 1951:

	<u>10-14</u>	<u>15-19</u>	<u>20-24</u>	<u>25-29</u>
Brome	41.6	39.5	16.4	4.6
Missisquoi	14.3	14.7	4.6	0.1

Notes: (a) The rate of emigration amongst males and females in each group was almost identical.

(b) The percentages were calculated in the following way (using the age-group 10-14 in 1951 as an example):-

(1) population 10-14 in 1951	1230
(2) population 20-24 in 1961	710
(3) difference: (1) minus (2)	520
(4) expected deaths (calculated from provincial averages by age-group)	8
(5) migration: (3) minus (4)	512
(6) migration rate: (5) as a % of (1)	41.6

Source: Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Census. 1961, v. 1.2, Table 2; 1951, v. 1, Table 23.

Emigration from the area appears to have affected both ethnic groups in about equal proportions. There is no direct way of ascertaining this, but census data concerning ethnic origin and mother tongue for the population of the two counties indicate a slow long-term influx of French-Canadians over the decades; the ten-year period from 1951 to 1961 shows little change in the proportions of each group. (See Table III-8). The most interesting feature of the recent statistics on ethnic origin and language is that there has been a slight influx of people of "other European" stock, many if not all of whom (according to our own observations in the area) have been buying farms from native-born Canadians who are moving to the towns. An explanation of this phenomenon is contained in the next section of this chapter, which is concerned with particular sectors of the economy, and the social structure of diverse occupation-groups.

TABLE III-8

ETHNICITY

	Ethnic Origin			Mother Tongue		
	% British	% French	% Other	% English	% French	% Other
Brome						
1901	61.8	35.8	2.4	-	-	-
1911	58.6	37.7	3.7	-	-	-
1921	53.0	45.5	1.5	-	-	-
1931	53.0	45.3	1.8	-	-	-
1941	50.0	47.6	2.4	-	-	-
1951	44.3	50.5	5.2	52.1	45.3	2.5
1961	44.3	48.8	6.9	52.4	43.8	3.8

TABLE III-8 (continued)

	Ethnic Origin			Mother Tongue		
	% British	% French	% Other	% English	% French	% Other
Missisquoi						
1901	42.2	57.1	0.6	-	-	-
1911	34.1	60.0	5.9	-	-	-
1921	31.4	65.0	3.6	-	-	-
1931	28.7	67.9	3.4	-	-	-
1941	24.6	72.0	3.4	-	-	-
1951	20.4	76.9	2.7	23.1	75.3	1.6
1961	18.3	76.1	5.6	21.4	75.8	2.8

Source: Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Census 1961, v. 1.2, Tables 5,66; 1951, v. 1, Tables 34,56; 1941, v. 4, Table 6; 1931, v. 4, Table 47; 1921, v. 1, Table 27; 1911, v. 2, Table 7; 1901, v. 1, Table 11.

LEADERSHIP

We now turn our attention to a number of problems which are the product of the changes in the environment described in the preceding section. No attempt will be made to offer a comprehensive analysis of social problems in Brome-Missisquoi, nor even to make a full study of the problems chosen; the objective is simply to illustrate how changes in the society have given rise to a series of conflicts between groups at the local level and to examine the extent to which group interests were being articulated by an emerging network of voluntary associations.

Declining Farm Revenues

What efforts were being made to grapple with the problem of declining farm revenues? This question in-

vites the examination of two rival schemes of rural re-development, each seeking government support through the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Agency (A.R.D.A.). A discussion of this subject is most conveniently focussed on the activities of the Brome County Rural Development Association.

No action has yet been taken to implement a rural development program in Brome-Missisquoi, although a study was in progress at the time of our field research; we were told it was a preparatory step to the drafting of a project for Brome County. This study, which was being conducted by a private firm, had been sponsored by the provincial government and paid for out of A.R.D.A. funds.

The initiative for a rural development program came from a group of farmers, professionals, and businessmen from Brome County, who as early as 1962 had grouped themselves into the Brome County Rural Development Organization. The B.C.R.D.O. once described itself in the following way:

[It is] a federation of organizations and municipalities of Brome County. It was formed...to investigate the possibilities of establishing an organized approach to the social, economic, and cultural problems which exist in the area. ... Forty-eight people represent organizations attached to B.C.R.D.O. and these members report back to their respective groups. Any member of a group is automatically a B.C.R.D.O. member.1

¹"Guidelines to Rural Development: A Report on the Brome County Rural Development Organization Seminar, February 7,8,9 (1964), Foster, Quebec." Report compiled by Stuart Marwick. (Mimeo graphed.)

It is clear then that an attempt had been made to include - sometimes simply by co-optation - individuals who were members of a variety of organized groups (with the very noticeable exception of the Union Catholique des Cultivateurs or U.C.C.); but it is doubtful that these individuals really acted as representatives of their respective groups. The statement that "those members report back to their respective groups," seems to be an aspiration rather than a statement of fact. It is of great significance that this body, which was incorporated in 1965 under the name "Brôme County Rural Development Association" (B.C.R.D.A.), was never intended to concern itself solely with the problems of agriculture in the county, but with all the aspects of the rural economy. Its first project, which in 1965 the Association was still seeking to implement, was to persuade the municipal councils to adopt zoning regulations in order to prevent the undesirable consequences of uncontrolled expansion of commercial tourism (unsightly advertising, shoddy construction, excessive subdivision of lots, etc.). This danger had been posed by the establishment of a ski development at Sutton, and (more generally) by the growing popularity of the county as a tourist area. The B.C.R.D.A. also concerned itself with the location of access roads to the Eastern Townships Autoroute; another scheme was to establish a "land bank" to prevent farm land from falling into disuse. The idea of the land bank was that those who buy farms

for recreational purposes, as many Montrealers have been doing, should arrange for neighbouring farmers to use the arable land or pasture, thus preventing it from reverting to scrub or low-grade forest. The motive here, as for several of the B.C.R.D.A. plans, does not appear to have been solely or perhaps even primarily to aid the farmers who were then working their land, but to keep property values high and to make the region prosperous. Although no plan for agriculture in the area had been drafted because the study of land resources had not been completed, it appeared that several of those who are active in the B.C.R.D.A. tended to favour fundamental changes to achieve the rehabilitation of agriculture. In this connection, however, one can imagine that the more fundamental the change, the less the existing farm population would be likely to accept it, especially since the most far-reaching changes - such as replacing dairying by the raising of beef cattle, or converting marginal lands to woodlot - necessarily involve a substantial reduction in the number of farmers. To many people this is not a solution but a defeat; it means being shunted to the towns and being asked to embrace a way of life which is culturally alien to them and for which they are consequently unprepared.¹

¹I wish to emphasize that, here as elsewhere, I am not arguing in favour of any one solution to a given social problem. My concern is simply to point out the different effects which changes in the environment have on different groups of people, with the consequence that

In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the initiative of the B.C.R.D.A. had encountered some resistance. The core of this resistance was provided by a group of French-Canadian farmers who in 1964 formed a separate committee for the implementation of an A.R.D.A. program. This committee, which its President called "le Comité francophone de l'aménagement rural du comté de Brome," was seeking recognition from the provincial government as an official A.R.D.A. agency. They had two main complaints against the B.C.R.D.A.¹:

the objectives of one group often threaten the interests or aspirations of other groups. The most difficult problems have no solutions; they are not puzzles but dilemmas, and the choices which must be made necessarily sacrifice some people at the expense of others.

It should also be noted that in making the assertion that town life is "culturally alien" to those who have lived on the farm, I am following an interpretation of the social evolution of Quebec which has been propounded by a number of writers beginning with Leon Gérin and including, I think, most contemporary French-Canadian sociologists. This interpretation and the arguments in its favour are summarized in Hubert Guindon, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, v. 26 (Nov. 1950), pp. 533-51. It is challenged in Philippe Garigue, Etudes sur le Canada français, (Montréal: Faculté des sciences sociales, économiques, et politiques, Université de Montréal, 1958), pp. 5-27 and *passim*.

¹This account of the differences between the B.C.R.D.A. and the "comité francophone" is derived from interviews with the President of the Committee; an agronomist who is an advisor to the committee; and a former French-speaking vice-president of the then B.C.R.D.O. The story is confirmed by our interviews with several of the current English-speaking officers of the B.C.R.D.A., and by our own observations at a meeting of the executive of that Association.

(1) The B.C.R.D.A. had been from its inception and continued to be an almost wholly English-speaking body. Attempts had been made to include French-Canadians in the project, for of the two vice-presidents, one was always French-speaking. Meetings, however, were always in English, and there was little or no publicity in French. One informant, a French Canadian and a former vice-president, said that he had held that position in title only; he was without duties, and was even unsure whether he still held the position or not. His successor as French-speaking vice-president was very fluent in English, which was necessary in view of his substantial business interests. The predominantly English character of the Association appeared to be confirmed by the fact that the present officers to whom we spoke seemed to have made little effort to involve the U.C.C. or other French organizations in the work of the B.C.R.D.A.; and they seemed generally unconcerned about and certainly ignorant of any activities that "the French ARDA committee" was undertaking.

(2) The B.C.R.D.A. did not appear to the members of the "comité francophone" to represent the interests of the farms. The "comité francophone" pointed to the fact that the B.C.R.D.A. had been from the beginning a group which contained a large and perhaps preponderant group of businessmen and professionals. Three informants complained that at the meetings of the B.C.R.D.A. they talked

only of zoning and subdivision of lands for real estate purposes. To ourselves, as outside observers, this complaint of the "comité francophone" seemed in large measure justified. The president of the B.C.R.D.A. was a farmer, but he did not appear to be at all the effective leader; there was one other farmer on the executive (whom we did not meet) and also an English-speaking agronomist; the other six members of the executive had the following occupations: owner of ski development, editor of local (English) paper, retired store-keeper, real estate agent, farm machinery dealer, and lawyer. On the other hand, a number of the most active members of the B.C.R.D.A. were engaged in farming. Almost without exception, however, they had lived elsewhere for protracted periods of time, and some had come into the region as hired farm managers. This was the position of the man who initially was the leading, almost dominant, figure in the organization; according to testimony from some of the members of the B.C.R.D.A., he proposed innovations in farming methods which were technically unassailable, but which would take a long time for local farmers to understand and accept. One can imagine that this would be especially true of the French-speaking farmers, in view of the complete failure to associate representative French-Canadian farmers in the work of the B.C.R.D.A. Although the leaders of the B.C.R.D.A. lacked any real knowledge of what the "French A.R.D.A. committee" was doing, several of them criticized

it for having "limited and outdated" views on rural development; its members were "just looking for government subsidies for dams and bulldozing" and other minor improvements to the land. These projects did in fact play an important part in the program of the "comité francophone." In sum, this basic difference in the ideas of the two groups was recognized by both sides. It is simply that each body expressed the attitudes and interests of a different group of people.

Perhaps the major observation to make concerning the conflict between the B.C.R.D.A. and the "comité francophone" is that it illustrates the fact that no integrated leadership of the farm community had been developed in Brome County. It is likely that there would have been greater understanding between the two groups if it were not for the difference in language; for example, the president of the "comité francophone" had attended at least one of the early meetings of the B.C.R.D.O., but left the group because he was unable to understand what was going on. Perhaps even more important than this, however, is the fact that the more active of the two groups, the B.C.R.D.A., depended from the beginning on outside initiative. It was difficult to judge how much popular support the organization had amongst the English-speaking farmers of the region, but we saw no evidence that it was very great. We have already commented on the failure of the B.C.R.D.A. to seek out the leaders of the U.C.C. and

try to gain their support. Since the U.C.C. is the most important organization of French-speaking farmers, this constituted, in our judgment, a serious error for a group which purports to be a federation, as it were, of the major organizations in the area. But the striking fact is that the "comité francophone" had done scarcely any better in this respect. The president of the committee indicated his intention of co-operating with the U.C.C., but close contacts did not yet exist at the time of our study. One obstacle which he mentioned was the fact that the county does not lie within a single "Federation" of the U.C.C.; part of the county is included in the St. Hyacinthe Federation, and part of it in the Sherbrooke Federation. In some of the neighbouring counties, such as Stanstead, there had been open and protracted squabbles between different groups seeking official recognition as A.R.D.A. agencies, with the U.C.C. playing a prominent role on one side or the other. The president of the Stanstead group, which was aligned with the B.C.R.D.A. in the "Conseil d'Aménagement de la région de Brome-Stanstead," told us: "The U.C.C. leadership is rejected by our group 7, being too conservative in their way of operating. The members felt it would be impossible to be creative under such influence." In Stanstead and other counties the establishment of an A.R.D.A. group had been accomplished only through the activities of an A.R.D.A. employee working in conjunction with local agronomes; in no case was there

local initiative, except in Brome where much of the impetus came from businessmen and professionals.

The reliance on outside initiative for rural redevelopment can also be observed in an A.R.D.A. project which was under way in the township of St. Armand Est, in the south-east corner of Missisquoi (around Freightsburg, in the apple-growing area). We had two versions of the way in which this project was initiated:

(1) This version came from an English-speaking farmer, member of the township council, and formerly active member of the Farm Forum. According to his account, the project was a part of the plans of the B.C.R.D.O. Our informant was asked by the leading member of that organization to prepare a map showing the use of land in the township. The map was obtained from our informant by a retired deputy minister of agriculture who owned an orchard in the region, and the project was subsequently taken over by this person and a group which he organized. The township council was kept informed of what was going on, but the real planning was done outside the Council, even though officially the project was to be sponsored by them.

(2) This version came from the retired deputy minister. He explained that in the parish there existed a group of about a dozen men who usually had a leading hand in community projects of all types. They discussed ideas informally amongst themselves - for example, the distribu-

tion of Christmas presents to children of needy families - then they would get a formal association to carry out the project (Jeunes Commerces, etc.). This group had been discussing the possibility of starting an A.R.D.A. project in the region, and had obtained a copy of the statute from the federal Member of Parliament, prior to an unexpected visit from Maurice Sauvé¹ in 1963. On that occasion, they discussed with Sauvé the possibility of framing an ARDA project for the parish, and he suggested that they draw up plans. An official committee was then formed; a questionnaire was sent to all farmers in the parish; and there were three general meetings of the parish to discuss the plan, which was completed in March 1965. It proposed the improvement of land, creation of a local nursery, establishment of a model orchard ("verger de démonstration"), adoption of a system of co-operative marketing, etc.

Whether or not it is true that the project was initially a part of the B.C.R.D.O.'s operations, it was clear that the drafting of plans depended on the technical competence and also the administrative knowledge of the former deputy minister of agriculture. Here, as in Brome, the implementation of the rural development scheme depended on the efforts of people who had come from outside the area.

Our discussion of efforts to deal with the problem of declining farm revenues has been focussed on the attempts in some parts of Brome-Missisquoi to initiate a

¹Federal minister responsible for A.R.D.A.

scheme of rural development, because the conflicts which were revealed in this process helped us to judge the effectiveness of the leadership within the farm community; but it would be wrong to leave this subject without commenting also on two important farm organizations: the U.C.C. and the co-operatives. The Union Catholique des Cultivateurs is the major organization of French-speaking farmers in the province. Its objectives include both the general education of its members ("formation morale et technique"), and the representation of farmers' interests before the provincial government, and (through the Canadian Federation of Agriculture) the federal government. The major concern of the U.C.C. at the present time is the creation of "syndicalisme agricole", i.e. a network of regional and provincial bodies to control production, set prices, and sell produce collectively in order to secure a guaranteed income for the farmer. The U.C.C. is strongly organized in Missisquoi, especially in the more prosperous parts of the county. The St. Hyacinthe Federation of the U.C.C. claims to have a membership of sixty to seventy per cent of farmers in the diocese. No separate data were available for Missisquoi, but we had no reason to suspect that it might be weaker there than elsewhere.

The farm co-operatives are buying and selling agencies, the object of which is to reduce costs of supplies and increase the percentage of the final retail price of agricultural produce which actually goes to the farmer: in

other words the aim of the co-operatives is to replace the middleman at the purchasing and the selling ends of the farmers' operations. A very large co-operative is located in Granby, which lies in Shefford county, about fifteen miles to the north of Cowansville. This co-operative serves the interests of the dairy farmers, and membership from parts of Missisquoi appears to be quite high, although we could obtain no statistical confirmation of this. There are also two apple-growers' co-operatives, one in Farnham and one in Freightsburg. Each of these has a substantial number of orchardists from Missisquoi.

It will readily be appreciated that both the U.C.C. and the co-operatives are important organizations in serving the interests of the farmers. Both organizations are pressure groups. The political aspects of their operations, insofar as they have local importance, will be discussed in the next section of the chapter.

Wage-levels and Underemployment

The next series of problems which will engage our attention poses special difficulties because the solution to one problem may only serve to raise another one in a more acute form. In exploring possible solutions to the decline of farm revenues, it was evident that the most far-reaching solution - the diversification of the rural economy - was unsatisfactory to many farmers because it

requires a diminution of the number of people on the land. The alternative to this solution was to accept a lower average income for a rather larger farm population. Neither solution was perfect, but it was fairly clear what the alternatives were. The same could not, however, be said of the problem of low wages and insecure employment in the towns, as evidenced by the census data quoted in Tables III-4 and III-5. Since no figures relating to the profitability of plants in the region were available, it was impossible to tell whether the firms could survive a substantial rise in wages and/or the implementation of a more stable employment policy. For this reason, to look at wage-levels and stability of employment solely in terms of a conflict of interest between employer and employee may be too superficial an approach. Any substantial improvement in the position of the working class may, unless there are compensating changes in the regional economy, simply throttle the expansion of industry or jeopardize the maintenance of even the present level of employment opportunities.

We do not pretend to see any solution to the major problems of the urban economy in Brome-Missisquoi; nor would it be appropriate in this place to argue about such matters, which require both greater information and greater technical competence than I have at my disposal. It does seem clear, however, that any effective action must be initiated by the working class, because it is for

them, not their employers, that the present situation is least satisfactory. No other group has the incentive - or if that, they have not the numbers or the financial resources - to effect a solution to the problem of low wages and underemployment. The emphasis on financial resources, numbers, and incentive to action is due to the fact that these are components of political power. The state is a potential ally of any group which seeks to improve its position vis-à-vis other groups. Even if one considers only the collective bargaining process, the strength and sometimes even the existence of the trade unions depends to an important degree on the policy of federal and provincial governments in the field of industrial relations. Both the content of labour legislation and the government's role as a possible conciliator in particular disputes are important factors in this respect. Moreover in examining the potential role of the government in relation to the problems of the urban economy in Bromemissisquoi, one should consider not only the conflict between employer and employee, but a much wider range of government policy such as social welfare, industrial development, education, and transport: in each case the major governmental decisions are likely to affect different groups in different ways, and a group which fails to recognize this, stands to suffer as a result. It is for this reason that no effective action in relation to the problem of low wages and underemployment is likely to be

undertaken except by effective leadership from within the working class itself. Only the working class has the potential power, both economic and political, to improve its position; and only when organized can it exert the power which is potentially in its hands. At the present time, the workers in Brome-Missisquoi have not the organization or the leadership to take any effective action as a group.

Our research in Cowansville, Farnham, and Bedford revealed only a very feeble associational life amongst the town workers. We shall look first at trade union organization, and subsequently at workers' participation in other forms of voluntary association.

There is an obvious contrast between Farnham and Cowansville in respect of the strength of trade union activity. In Farnham, all major firms (i.e. those employing more than 15 workers) were unionized; whereas in Cowansville unions were virtually excluded.¹ Our comments will be limited to these two towns, because unfortunately we did not interview any union leaders from Bedford; on the surface, however, Bedford appears to be similar to Farnham in that the major firms, with one exception, were unionized. A special feature of the

¹At the time of our research in Cowansville, not one of the leading firms had a union. It is reported, however, that some firms have been unionized since our departure from the area.

situation in Bedford is that sixty-five per cent of the industrial labour force was employed in one firm (a needle factory), which had a United Auto Workers union.

It appeared that in Farnham the unions, although numerically strong, were not capable of providing effective leadership for the working people. The grounds for this contention are that each union was concerned almost exclusively with conditions of employment in its own factory, thus preventing the formation of a unified working class leadership. One cause of this situation may have been the structure of the unions themselves, for the largest single employer is the C.P.R., whose 350 employees were divided up into half a dozen or more different unions. Moreover, the other unions, almost all of which were C.S.N. affiliates, were not grouped into any city labour council, but (on the contrary) are linked directly to the C.S.N. regional headquarters in Granby and to the provincial bureau of their own "federation" - e.g. les employés du vêtement, etc. The structure of trade unions may therefore be a factor which contributes to the fact that union activities were restricted to collective bargaining, grievances, etc. On the whole, however, this must be considered to be simply a reflection of the mentality of trade unionists and their leaders. Wage rates are higher in Farnham than in Cowansville, Bedford, and Granby,¹ with the consequence

¹See Table III-4, above.

(so we were told) that workers in Farnham were generally satisfied; they were not inclined to compare their position to that of workers in Montreal. It must be remembered also that there has been substantial emigration of young people from the county, and according to reports from several informants, Farnham has suffered substantially from this general trend. Young people were said to be emigrating to Cowansville (which of course would not show up on the figures concerning emigration from the county as a whole) as well as to Montreal. One consequence of this emigration is that the work force is proportionately older in Farnham than it would otherwise be, and since many of the most enterprising of the youth have left, there can have been little challenge to the existing trade union leaders. One further factor, but one which affected only the C.P.R. employees, is that these men were, in view of the nature of their work, dispersed across a wide area; their families resided in Farnham, but their work took them elsewhere. Whatever the validity of these attempted explanations of the mentality of trade unionists in Farnham, it is a fact that with few exceptions union leaders appeared to be uninterested in the potential social role of their organizations; and these few were unable to do (or discouraged from doing) anything about it in view of the apathy of the others. Educational activities (for example, in co-operation with the Institut Canadien d'Education des Adultes), special programs for youth or

for women, contacts with other groups, e.g. Caisse Populaire, school commission - none of these activities was undertaken, although all of them are suggested by the C.S.N., which stresses its role as, ideally, a social movement rather than simply a bargaining agency. We do not mean to imply that unions in Farnham, in neglecting their role as a social movement, were very different from unions in other parts of the province. For example, the situation which we observed is similar to that in St. Jerome as described by Fernand Dumont and Yves Martin, who said of the trade unions: "Celles-ci sont assez nombreuses, mais il ne semble pas qu'elles soient très vigoureuses; elles paraissent manquer de militants actifs. D'autre part, leur diversité exclut pratiquement toute coordination de leur action, toute discussion commune de problèmes autres que le relèvement immédiat des salaires."¹ Although I do not wish to suggest that the role of unions in Farnham was atypical, it does seem important to stress that there is a great gap between the objectives of the trade union movement, especially as set out by the C.S.N., and the very limited activities of unions in Farnham. It was this contrast between the potential and the actual role of unions that caused one union leader in Farnham, a man who had formerly lived outside the area and who had

¹F. Dumont and Y. Martin, L'analyse des structures sociales régionales: Etude sociologique de la région de Saint-Jérôme (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1963), p. 165.

had the opportunity to observe working conditions and the role of unions across the province, to remark: "L'ouvrier à Farnham est bien ignorant de notre vie syndicale."

In Cowansville several unsuccessful attempts had been made to establish unions in the leading industries. Employers were reputed to have fired workers who were attempting to organize unions in their plants, an allegation which seemed to be borne out by the fact that a small group of people from the Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique were very cautious about discussing the situation with us even in private. Union organizers and other informants, when asked about unionism in Cowansville, were unanimous in emphasizing the hostility of employers towards unions - a view which is apparently shared by the municipal council. One of the aldermen, boasting about the go-ahead character of the town, pointed with pride to a new artificial lake and recreational centre. He beamed as he explained: "If you provide enough parks and other community amenities, the people will be too busy to want unions." There appears also to be some basis for the assertion (as, for instance, by the enthusiastic alderman) that the workers are indifferent towards or positively do not want unions. One union leader from Farnham was told by workers in Cowansville that for the sake of having steady employment they were willing to work for a lesser wage than they would obtain as unionized workers. The assumption here is that a higher wage would result in curtailment of production or

instability of employment; but is the assumption justified? We know only that managers are reputed to have fought the establishment of unions by threatening to close their plants. In conclusion: employers' hostility and employees' indifference or fear have prevented the establishment of unions in Cowansville, and thus have restricted the growth of working-class leadership.

Enough has now been said to make it evident that trade unions in Brome-Missisquoi were not capable of initiating any action to cope with the problem of low wages and unstable employment in Brome-Missisquoi. In the first place, the unions represented only a small proportion of urban wage-earners. This fact is most obviously true of Cowansville, where even the regular industrial employees were without union organization. Still more important than this, however, is the fact that day-labourers, who can never be said to be regularly employed, were not unionized at all. This applies as much to Farnham as it does to the other towns and to the rural areas in Brome-Missisquoi. This fact brings us to the second reason why trade unions were not in a position to provide leadership for the working class as a whole: that their activities were restricted to serving the immediate economic interests of their own members. To do so is admittedly their raison d'être, but were they also to concern themselves with educational and social activities at the local level, they might have done more to improve the long-run economic

position of their own members and at the same time create a nucleus of working-class leaders who would look beyond the collective bargaining process to improve the economic and social position of the wage-earner.

The fact that we have focused attention on the role of trade unions would not be justified if there were other organizations or associations which could have fulfilled the function of providing leadership within the working class. It must simply be recorded that there were none. In Farnham there were a number of organizations which are typically the preserve of professional, managerial, and commercial groups: Chambre de Commerce, Lions Club, Chevaliers de Colomb, Golf Club, and a "prestige" social club known as the Club Yamaska. But of the forty or so voluntary associations (some of them enjoying only a nominal existence) there was only one, the Club de Chasse et Pêche, in which working men were really active. This group existed for recreation, not for dealing with the problems with which we are concerned in this study. There was no Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique. In Cowansville there appears to have been the same absence of working-men's associations. Our information on this subject, however, was very limited.¹

¹Our information was obtained from a small group of young workers in Cowansville, who are associated with the Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique. The J.O.C. does not formally exist in Cowansville in view of employers' militantly anti-union attitude. Nevertheless there were a few individuals whose names we obtained from the J.O.C. in Montreal, and these persons met privately at our request.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF GROUP LEADERS

The aim of this section is to illustrate our earlier statement that the leaders of voluntary associations often seek to avoid identification with any political party, for fear that such an identification would weaken their associations. In quite a large number of cases, the individuals whom we interviewed had had occasion to establish contact with the government by virtue of their role as representatives of group interests. We were impressed by the fact that in most cases of this kind, these group leaders showed a strong preference for direct contact with the Minister concerned, or if the matter was of lesser importance, then they preferred to get in touch with civil servants rather than to work through the elected Member. This comment applies equally to the federal and the provincial levels.

Our evidence for these statements is of two sorts. It was not possible to interview a sufficiently large number of leaders of voluntary associations to obtain a statistically reliable sample. Accordingly, we shall first quote, as strictly impressionistic evidence, some statements made to us in interviews; we shall then comment on the pressure group activity of some of the voluntary associations mentioned in the previous section.

The following are some individual examples of political attitudes of some leaders of voluntary associations:

Farmer; vice-president of U.C.C. (St. Hyacinthe Federation); active also in numerous other farm and local organizations. This person was formerly an active supporter of the Union Nationale and the Progressive Conservatives, but since joining the U.C.C. executive he had refused to attend party meetings or to join in any other party activity, because this would tend to weaken the U.C.C. He said that it was an important function of the U.C.C. to represent the views of the farmers before the government, but not to undertake political (i.e. partisan) activity. It is the job of the U.C.C. to work with the existing government, not to change it: "On collabore avec le pouvoir." When he had been a councillor, he had seen the député about a variety of local matters: roads, school extension, bulldozer subsidy; he noted that a député in opposition is weaker than one on the government side.

Farmer; president of secteur (about three parishes) in the U.C.C.; mayor of the parish. Supported, although he did not work for, the Liberals in federal politics; independent in provincial politics. He attended the 1961 leadership convention of the Union Nationale, but claimed he was "chosen from the locality" so that his participation on this occasion did not mean he was a member of the party. This person had been in touch with Maurice Sauvé and with the provincial deputy minister of agriculture.

ture concerning an A.R.D.A. project;¹ in dealing with the government he preferred direct contact with the Minister or with the department of agriculture, although he had used the député as an intermediary in asking for an extension of the bulldozing subsidy.² In 1964, when the Minister of Agriculture for the province invited representatives of farmers from the region to discuss their problems with him, the delegation (of about 250, from 18 counties) complained about political interference in the allocation of the bulldozing subsidy; this form of "politicaillerie" has since diminished.

Jeweller, a director of the Caisse Populaire in Farnham. He explained that to associate himself with a political party would hurt the Caisse Populaire, because people would say of him, "Il a une couleur" - and they would hesitate to join the Caisse if they did not share his political views. He did not wish to indicate anything concerning his political opinions.

Manager of a co-operative. In this position, he worked closely with the Quebec Department of Agriculture including both the Minister and his deputy, on such

¹ See above, pp. 111-120.

² The government pays part of the cost of land improvement by use of bulldozer; this takes the form of a subsidy to individual farmers.

matters as the fruit inspection service, estimates of frost damage, proposed merger between his own and a neighbouring co-operative. Even at the time when the Union Nationale was in power, this man preferred to see the Minister himself, although he might also contact the député if he wanted extra support from the government. After the change of government in 1960 he usually, in such a case, contacted a Liberal député in a neighbouring county (a personal friend) rather than J. J. Bertrand, who was then in opposition. Party affiliation: independent; but he did on one occasion support a federal Liberal candidate in public - in this case he stressed it was because he knew the candidate personally and supported the man rather than the party or its leaders.

Farmer: a provincial director of the (English) Quebec Farmers' Association, also active in the Farm Forum. Born in Switzerland; mother tongue was German; spoke English and French equally fluently. He was independent in politics, and voted for the candidate rather than the party. This man was well informed about, and did not hesitate to express himself concerning, political affairs. He found the traditional political loyalties amongst Canadians difficult to understand; disapproved of the lack of co-operation between parties, and of the practice of treating most votes in the legislature as matters of confidence.

Farmer: a former provincial director of the Quebec Farmers' Association. An unshakable "Blue": the only two issues he mentioned were conscription (1917) and reciprocity (1911). Descendant of German Protestant refugees to England: "We've been Tories," he said, "since the time of Queen Anne." Grateful to Duplessis for a farm loan in the late 'thirties, and for the building of a "colonization road" to his farm and his son's farm (the only two on the road).

Farmer: president of Bronte County Rural Development Association, active in Farm Forum. Voted Liberal, but did not work in elections. He had contacted the local M.L.A., and the executive assistant of a provincial minister, in seeking A.R.D.A. funds to place an illuminated cross on Mount Sutton. He had had no other contact with either the federal or the provincial government concerning A.R.D.A. or other matters; he appeared to be only titular president of B.C.R.D.A., and not the effective leader.

Labourer: President of union local (C.S.N.) in Farnham. Since 1964 he had been treasurer of the Quebec Liberal Association in Missisquoi (provincial). In this position, he requested the government to dismiss the manager of the local Liquor Commission, and also the local automobile licensing agent, for partisan activities involving "the intimidation of widows." He expressed a preference for federal politics because of the role of

the government in economic affairs, but had not done so because he believed the politicians there "ne se tiennent pas debout," with the exception of G. Favreau, Maurice Sauvé, and J.-L. Pepin. In his position as union leader, he had not made any political declarations or exerted political pressure, except through the central provincial organization of the C.S.N. The only case which he mentioned in this respect concerned the adoption of a new Labour Code in 1964.

Textile-worker: President of Union local (C.S.N.) in Farnham. Although he himself was active in the provincial Liberal party as president of the Jeunes Libéraux in the county, this man said that public pronouncements on matters of government policy were justifiable or acceptable in the public view only as long as the unions do not become identified with any political party. He felt that the non-partisan orientation of the C.S.N. was weakening traditional partisanship amongst the workers. The fact that he was politically active did not weaken his role as a union leader; on the contrary: "Beaucoup réalisent que les idées pour lesquelles je me suis battu se sont réalisées ou se réalisent aujourd'hui. On me respecte donc plus qu'avant que je sois politiquement engagé."

White-collar worker. President of Union local (C.L.C.); secretary of Chambre de Commerce; Alderman; Secretary of Lions Club. French-speaking. He had been

active for many years as a poll worker for the Union Nationale, but said, "Si Bertrand n'y était pas, j'y perdrais 75% de mon intérêt." Of the political role of trade unions: "Même le central ne prendrait pas position contre le gouvernement."

Textile-worker. Former union leader (C.S.N.).

Worked for the Union Nationale at election-time. "Je n'aimerais pas que le syndicat se politicise. Il doit garder la neutralité pour être libre."

It will be observed from the above cases that union leaders were less hesitant than leaders of farmers' groups to identify themselves with a political party, but that in each case they were careful to point out that their participation in politics was purely personal and did not in any way involve or commit their union; on the contrary, they were unanimous in saying that the unions should remain politically neutral.

The political neutrality of farm and labour organizations was also revealed in the nature of their pressure group activity. Informants from U.C.C. groups and from C.S.N. locals gave examples of resolutions which were passed at their meetings and then referred to regional or provincial headquarters for eventual inclusion in briefs to the cabinet. The U.C.C. - to take one parish as an example - held monthly meetings during the winter at which one third to one half the members were present; since

approximately three-quarters of the farmers in the parish were members, this represents a reasonably large proportion of the agricultural sector there. The agenda for such meetings included a talk by an invited speaker (an agronomist, for example), discussion of local farm problems (agricultural techniques, etc.), and at some meetings, the passage of resolutions relating to government policy. It appears that these were usually instigated by regional headquarters, but attention to such matters constituted an effective means of political education. In 1964 resolutions were passed at this parish U.C.C. group concerning the industrial uses of milk (federal subsidies), the land tax (a resolution for submission to the Belanger Commission on the provincial tax structure), and curriculum in the schools (a demand to include the teaching of farming methods in the secondary schools). One informant described also the holding of a meeting of 500 U.C.C. members from about ten parishes, arranged by the headquarters of the St. Hyacinthe "Federation", to discuss agricultural (technical) education, and farmers' demands for a federal feed grain agency to sell prairie grains in the East; this meeting also was addressed by a variety of outside speakers.

The trade unions afforded no example of pressure group activity as vigorous as we have just described for one parish organization of the U.C.C. Several locals passed resolutions concerning the adoption of the new

Labour Code by the province ("Bill 54") at the request of C.S.N. regional headquarters. There was also a series of study sessions on Bill 54 at the regional headquarters in Granby, and the provincial member for Missisquoi, J.J. Bertrand, was invited to one of these. There were, however, no sessions at the local level devoted to a general study of the way in which government policy affects the working man. Union leaders to whom we spoke emphasized the importance of the unions' stating their views of matters of public policy, but they clearly regarded this as a function of the provincial convention or executive. It either did not occur to them to participate actively in this process, or else they were discouraged by the general apathy of union members, which we described in a previous section.

The most significant thing, for the purposes of this study, about the pressure group activities of farm and labour organizations is that no attempt was made to enlist the support of local political figures in favour of group demands. Resolutions passed at meetings were channelled through regional or provincial headquarters to the government. The U.C.C. parish association did also send a copy of its resolutions to the député, and one union local also sent a letter to the député to urge public ownership of Sidbec, a steel plant which was then about to be built elsewhere in the province. But we heard of no voluntary association which had discussions at the local level with

politicians concerning matters which affected them as a group; and we heard of no case of an organization's making a public statement on any issue.

The fact that local politicians were virtually bypassed in pressure group activities may be attributed to a combination of two factors. In part, it appears to be due to the wish to retain political neutrality. One U.C.C. leader, when questioned about contact by the U.C.C. with the député, pointed out that it would not be possible in view of the non-partisan stance of the organization, to invite a politician from one party without inviting opposition politician(s) also. Since it would be possible to do this only when opposition parties had designated candidates (i.e. near election time), this pretty well ruled out trying to influence government policy through the local Member, except by notifying him of official policy statements by the organization. To an equal and probably greater extent the lack of attention paid to the député as a possible proponent of group demands is due to the concept of the député as a person who deals with individual problems in the constituency, but whose concern with or influence on policy is slight.¹ It will be

¹It has been suggested to me that the "concept of the député" may depend on whether his party forms the Government or not. This possibility should not be dismissed, but none of our evidence led us to suspect that this factor was significant. When informants remarked that a député is weaker in Opposition (as some interviewees did) they were referring to his ability to obtain grants for his constituency.

observed from the examples of political attitudes cited above that it was quite common for leaders of voluntary associations to contact the député on matters concerning the locality. Further examples: a leader of the U.C.C. mentioned that he had participated in a delegation to the federal M.P. in order to obtain compensation for crop damage; several others said they had seen the député for road improvements and other such matters. (Requests of this kind were made by individuals not in their role as leaders of voluntary associations but quite often as town or parish councillors.) The fact that even those leaders of voluntary associations who were most scrupulous about preserving their political neutrality did not hesitate to approach the député for matters of an individual or local nature seems to us to indicate a good deal about their concept of the role of the député. It should also be understood that to appeal to the local Member for assistance of some sort, or to obtain through him access to the appropriate minister or civil servant, is not considered to be a partisan act. This fact is exemplified in the remark of one informant who, while indicating the propriety of an open appeal to the député, said that to approach the defeated candidate on the government side (when the député is in opposition) is only possible for people with the right party affiliations. It may be remarked that other individuals, who were less meticulous about maintaining their non-partisan status, did not

exhibit the same scruples as did this informant in having recourse to the defeated candidate.

POLITICAL PARTIES

There is a tendency among party workers at the constituency level to apply palliative solutions to the problems which gave rise to group conflicts. Thus constituency party organizations are quite ineffective in articulating certain categories of political demands. Moreover, by fostering the retention of partisan loyalties, they have probably hindered voluntary associations in performing the interest-articulation function.¹

As evidence for this assessment of the role of political parties in Brune-Mississquoi we shall examine first their organizational structure and then their personnel.

Party Structure

The purpose of looking at the structure of political parties is to understand better the activities which they are equipped to undertake and the functions which they perform.

Activities of political parties may be undertaken for their intrinsic interest or because they are necessary to the achievement of some goal which is recognized and desired by party personnel. When we speak of the functions performed by political parties, however, we

¹ See above, p. 94.

refer to consequences of party activity, whether these consequences are intended or even recognized by party personnel.¹

The traditional activities of political parties in each of our three constituencies have been those of organizing elections and distributing the patronage. The two activities have been very closely related: one must have acquired power in order to wield the patronage; but it is also true that the astute management of the patronage is an important tool for winning elections. Thus it is not possible to identify one activity as fundamental and the other as ancillary.

The question which concerns us particularly in this study is whether or not the parties, in attempting to acquire and retain power, have undertaken activities which result in their performing the interest-articulation function.

Those activities which I shall describe as "policy-oriented" may be presumed to contribute to the perform-

¹In this formulation I have glossed over Robert K. Merton's distinction between manifest and latent functions: the former are recognized and intended by the actors; the latter are not. The distinction is conceptually useful, at least for alerting the analyst to the existence of latent functions, but it is difficult to apply empirically. For this reason I have made no use of it.

ance of the interest-articulation function and also to the building of consensus. By "policy-oriented" activities I mean the study and discussion of policy as it affects large sections of the country or the province; I do not mean concern with only the administrative application of policies within individual constituencies. Study and discussion of policy, in view of the complexity of many contemporary political issues, constitutes an essential aspect of the process of interest-articulation. In no other way is it possible to identify the interests of the many groups which exist in a pluralistic society. Moreover, if parties undertake to promote discussion of policies, both within their own ranks and in public, they can perhaps create better understanding of the reasons for government actions. In this way they may generate support not only for the government in office but for the regime itself.

The traditional structures of political parties have not equipped them to undertake policy-oriented activities. The traditional form of constituency organization has been amorphous, being based on a few key men who exercised personal control over such important activities as nomination of candidates, keeping the election machinery in good order, and dispensing the patronage. For such activities, an informal organization, largely inactive between elections, is quite adequate. Indeed, as we shall show in our study of St. Henri, a more formal organization may well be a hindrance to the performance of these

traditional activities. Policy-oriented activities, on the other hand, require an organization which is more active between elections, has a larger membership, and is more open to new recruits (i.e. accepts new members other than by co-optation). A small, tightly-knit organization to which admission is restricted by the existing members is not well suited to the performance of the interest-articulation function, because by restricting access to positions of authority, traditional party organizations also rendered themselves less permeable to new ideas and less sensitive to the needs of their clientele.

Thus it is significant that both the Liberal Party and the Union Nationale have explicitly stated that the purpose of "democratizing" their organizations is to establish the machinery for popular dissemination of their ideas, and to keep the party leaders in close contact with public opinion in the province. According to the Projet de constitution des associations de comté de l'Union Nationale¹ the objectives of the constituency associations are:

1. de promouvoir la doctrine de l'Union nationale
2. d'être l'interprète du milieu auprès du parti; et,
3. de garantir le libre exercice de la démocratie.

¹Projet soumis par le Comité politique à l'assemblée constituante du Conseil national. Québec, le 12 juin 1965.

Similarly, Premier Jean Lesage told the Quebec Liberal Federation in October 1960:

Nous ne pouvons atteindre nos objectifs sans l'adhésion pleinement éclairée et sans la volonté positive de l'opinion publique. Nous n'obtiendrons cette adhésion et cette volonté qu'en diffusant la connaissance de nos moyens et de nos objectifs. ... La Fédération, en étroite collaboration avec les députés et les anciens candidats, doit donc dresser immédiatement un programme d'éducation populaire.... ¹

In the same speech, Mr. Lesage laid stress on the democratic formulation of party policy, while at the same time cautioning the delegates against attempting to substitute themselves for the government.²

The democratization of political parties aims at establishing a highly-structured pyramidal organization based on a large membership which elects officers at each level. Provisions are made for the holding of regular meetings of local and constituency associations, as well as their executives and satellite bodies. While the holding of regular meetings is no guarantee that the party is devoting its energies to policy-oriented activities, it will be readily appreciated that little can be done in this direction without a restructured organization which is active at all levels. We therefore turn our attention to an examination of the question, to what extent have

¹Quoted by Michel Roy in Le Devoir, le 28 juillet, 1962.

²Le Devoir, le 10 Octobre, 1960.

political parties reformed their structures to enable them to undertake policy-oriented activities. The following material relates to the summer of 1965, when we did our field research in Brome-Missisquoi.

The Liberal Party. In spite of the decision of the Quebec Liberal Federation in July 1964 to disaffiliate from the Liberal Federation of Canada, the federal and provincial wings of the party remained closely linked in Brome-Missisquoi, although the federal wing was then in the process of developing its own formal structure. Over a period of years - perhaps a decade, perhaps a generation - the separation of formal structures may lead to a real as well as to a superficial distinction between the federal and the provincial Liberals, but since they both drew on the same personnel, no real separation had yet occurred.

The provincial party organization has always been of primary importance, and remains so. This is simply a reflection of the fact that most party workers in Brome-Missisquoi, as in other constituencies, have been primarily interested in provincial politics. Not only did an overwhelmingly large majority of party workers whom we interviewed indicate that this was so; it was also the opinion of party organizers in Montreal and Quebec City. Some local organizers also said it was more difficult to get people to work in federal elections. In Brome-Missisquoi there was all the more reason for making the provincial

constituency the basic unit of organization, because the two provincial constituencies together made up a single federal riding. It was natural therefore, for each provincial constituency to have its own organization, and for the two bodies jointly to conduct federal election campaigns. (The assumption, of course, was "Rouge à Québec, Rouge à Ottawa".) Moreover, the importance of a federal organization was minimized by the long-standing practice whereby a candidate personally appoints his election organizer - hence, if the provincial wing maintained the strength of the organization in the polls and the municipalities, there was little left for a federal group to do. Thus the federal organization was for a long time merely an election-time amalgam of the provincial ones.

If the federal Liberal Party in Brome-Missisquoi possessed any formal structure prior to the summer of 1965, it was purely nominal. In August 1964 - that is, before the decision was taken to establish the Liberal Federation of Canada (Quebec) - we interviewed a person who described himself as the President of the Liberal Party in Brome-Missisquoi. Our informant, in explaining that he had been appointed to this position by the previous federal Liberal candidate, said that the normal practice in the Liberal Party was to elect officers, but that where there is not an adequate existing organization, they must be appointed. The fact that our informant was nominated rather than elected is one reason for doubting that any formal organ-

ization existed in the federal riding at that time; a second is that organizers at the Montreal office of the Party gave us the names of several prominent party workers in the area (among them the man whom we have already mentioned). They were unable, however, to furnish us with a list of officers for the riding, which indicates that the executive, if there was one, was not of sufficient importance to be known to the regional headquarters. A third piece of evidence is the manner in which a federal Liberal Association was established in Braine-Missisquoi. At the instigation of party organizers from Montreal, a meeting was held in June 1965 to elect a provisional executive. About sixty or seventy party workers were reported to have been present. Those from Missisquoi were invited by the Secretary of the provincial Liberal Association, although it was not clear whether he was asked to do this by virtue of the position he held, or because he was "the best contact in the county" (as one Montreal organizer had previously described him to us). A provisional slate of officers was nominated by the organizers from Montreal, and it was accepted by the meeting. The provisional executive was then charged with the responsibility of holding a membership drive, and a permanent executive was to be elected by all members in the early autumn of 1965. Since we left the riding in July 1965, however, I am unable to report what has happened since that time.

The provincial Liberal Association in Missisquoi has

been in existence since 1956. In the nine years since that time, however, it had not developed the structures which would have enabled it effectively to undertake policy-oriented activities. The democratic character of the Association was cast in doubt by the lack of an official membership, which would be the first step in providing the machinery to elect officers of the Association. As one member of the executive reported to us, it was difficult enough to find one good man in every village to handle party affairs; the shortage of party activists, therefore, required a constant effort by the party leaders in the county to maintain an organization in all parts of the riding. Most of the polls were not organized on a permanent basis. Thus the party lacked the broad base which was necessary to build up any democratic organization. The executive which was in office in 1965 had been elected in 1962, whereas new elections are supposed to be held annually. The executive met only very irregularly. Moreover, two of the more important members, the Treasurer and the President of the Youth Section, were unable to tell us what, if anything, the executive was doing. One of them even seemed uncertain whether or not he still held his post. Judging from how much the various members of the executive were able to tell us about the Liberal Party in Missisquoi, it seemed that power resided in the defeated candidate and a small informal group including the President of the Association and the Secretary, and also two individuals (a notary and a lawyer)

who were nominated to advisory positions by the executive.

It is not surprising that the eight committees envisaged by the constitution of the Quebec Liberal Federation for each riding association¹ did not exist. One informant did speak of trying, in the near future, to establish a committee to study farm problems; but at the time of our research in the riding, there was no body which undertook to study problems of the area, or to propagandize the Liberal Government's policies as they affected the area.

In Brome County the Liberal Party appeared to be quite effectively organized, although on an informal basis. As in Missisquoi, the party did not actually enrol members, so there was no membership list; but we were shown a list of party workers (three or four in every poll) dated 1961, that is, prior to the previous election. An attempt was being made to keep those people interested in the party between elections by holding a supper-gathering every month during the winter. As many Liberals as possible were urged to attend; the suppers were held in different parts of the riding each month in order to encourage partisans to go to at least one of these a year. The M.L.A. was always present, and the executive arranged to meet with him either before or after each of these meetings. They discussed affairs of the county - roads, contracts, hiring

¹These committees are: Congrès (convention), constitution, finances, groupes ethniques, juridique, organisation, politique (policy), propagande.

personal, grants to municipalities and community organizations, etc. Our overall impression was that party affairs were run very efficiently, with the M.L.A. playing the key role in looking after individual problems in the constituency, and performing the social duties which would remind people of his constant interest in the county and its people - acknowledging birthdays and anniversaries, offering sympathy for bereavement, etc. The M.L.A. was, then, very attentive to constituency affairs, and the Liberal Association was of substantial help to him in nursing the riding; but it did not appear to be well adapted to explaining the policies of the party to the people, or informing the Member (and through him, the leaders of the party) about the currents of opinion in the county on the major issues of provincial politics. The M.L.A.'s contacts with his riding executive, and the meetings of this body, were concerned with the problems of individual constituents and of localities rather than with matters of general policy; nor were there any other bodies, such as the committees which are envisaged by the constitution of the Quebec Liberal Federation, to deal with policy questions.

The Union Nationale. The Union Nationale Association in Missisquoi was simply a formal structure superimposed on an organization which had existed for many years to support the incumbent député, now a senior Union Nationale Minister, the Hon. Jean-Jacques Bertrand. We were impressed by the

degree to which the activists in this county were devoted to Bertrand personally, rather than to the party or to its leader.¹ Several of them, in fact, openly stated their indifference and even sometimes their hostility towards the leader of the party. Such feelings were undoubtedly due in part to the fact that Bertrand was the chief rival of Daniel Johnson for the leadership in 1961. It is not surprising that the formal structure of an organization which was so much the personal instrument and indeed the personal creation of one individual was not of great importance. Its unimportance may be inferred from the fact that the executive met irregularly; indeed, the president of the Association (who was chief organizer for the Union Nationale candidate as early as 1939) was unable to furnish us with a list of the twenty-one member executive. One prominent party worker - perhaps it is significant that he was English-speaking - did not know who the president was when we mentioned his name: his contacts had been directly with the député or the député's brother, who had managed election campaigns in the riding on several occasions, although normally he had not lived there. In sum, the Union Nationale organization in Missisquoi consisted of an informal network of personal relationships centering on one

¹At the time of our field research, the Union Nationale was in opposition, and the relationship between Bertrand and Daniel Johnson was uncertain in the public mind. These attitudes may well have changed since the 1966 election.

individual, the incumbent M.L.A. It was not a body concerned with or adapted to discussing policy, whether with the object of propagandizing a party program, or helping to formulate one.

The Union Nationale was in serious disarray in Brome County during a period of several years prior to its re-organization in the fall of 1965. In 1956 there was a dispute concerning the nomination of the candidate, which arose because a local road contractor failed by a very small margin of votes to get the nomination. The convention, which was called by one of the organizers from Montreal, was chaired by a Minister in the Duplessis cabinet, who picked out from the convention floor a sample, as it were, of those present, who were to indicate their preference for candidate. As one of those who supported the contractor (i.e. was on the losing side) explained to us, this was the only fair way to hold the convention. Had the Minister selected voting delegates by consulting with our informant or his friends, they could have rigged the convention by having the Minister select only those who would support their favourite, the contractor. In view of this haphazard way of running the convention, it is easy to see how those on the losing side could claim that the results had been manipulated - and this is what happened. The contractor was offered "all the (provincial) government work, that is a hundred per cent money", but turned it down because he was not guaranteed the same arrangement

on behalf of the municipalities. Our informant on this point - the man who had made the offer - explained that he could not commit the municipalities, since "There's a few of them would like to give the contract to the lowest bidder." An interesting feature of the story is that the contractor, who was English-speaking, was reputed not to want to have any contracts going to French-Canadians; or if they did get any he wanted it to be through himself, i.e. as sub-contracts. In the election campaign the contractor backed the Liberals, and many of those who had supported him refused to work for the official candidate.

As a result of this dispute, no doubt, the Union Nationale lost the election in Brome, which they had held since 1936. After that time, the factional dispute continued because the candidate who had won by such a narrow margin in 1956 was again the candidate in 1960 and 1962. During some of this period it was unclear who was President of the party in Brome, there being opposing claimants during part of the time. It was not until 1965 that the confusion was settled. During the summer of that year a young man who had not been mixed up in the earlier quarrels toured the riding to visit Union Nationale supporters and to prepare his candidacy. A convention was called in the early autumn with the co-operation of the Montreal headquarters, and the young man was chosen candidate. Because this event took place after we left the riding, it is not possible to describe the present organizational structure

of the party, or to assess the extent to which the breach has been healed. Nevertheless, although the story of the factional dispute lacks its dénouement, it tells a good deal about the interests and the attitudes of those who have been active partisans during the past few years.

The Progressive-Conservative Party. The federal Member of Parliament for Brome-Missisquoi stressed in interviews the distinction between the party's riding organization and its riding association. The former consisted of a group of men appointed by the candidate or Member as his personal agents in running elections. The Association, according to its constitution, elects officers and chooses the candidate; it has a formal structure and its decisions are taken democratically. In practice, however, the distinction between the association and the organization seemed to be nominal in Brome-Missisquoi. This was due to the personal ascendancy of the Member, who built up the party in the riding and who was very careful to see that it did not lapse into inactivity. He was instrumental in having a nominating convention called by the Montreal office when in 1956 he decided to contest the nomination; this he obtained virtually by default, and then spent four months in the riding making personal calls in order to revitalize the party. He had to heal a traditional division between the Brome and the Missisquoi wings of the party, (which he said he succeeded in doing only after

the 1957 election), and also to persuade the English and the French-speaking partisans to work together. He has consistently refused to set up parallel organizations composed of English and French-speaking party workers, or to hold separate meetings for supporters of the two language groups. By early 1957 there was a good organization, with a poll captain in every poll. With the help of the organization, he revised voters lists every year (marking political affiliation if known), and maintained a mailing list of 3000, with an elaborate system of cross-references for particular groups. He was also virtually indefatigable in performing a Member's duties for his constituents. He attended at least one public or semi-public function every week-end - the Brome County fair, or a social gathering amongst the small Polish community in part of Brome - made weekly press releases to seven local newspapers, encouraged visits to Ottawa by school children, etc. Every Saturday morning he put on a pair of dungarees and went to his office to meet his constituents about their problems and grievances - pensions, building subsidies, unemployment insurance, veterans' subsidies, a deportation order for a group of Negro musicians; about thirty appear every week with some kind of request, including quite a few for jobs, but often just for information (farm loans act, etc.). It will be appreciated from this account that the Member was personally responsible for the strength of the party in the riding, and (since his organizers are frequently

responsible for arranging meetings between the M.P. and his constituents, suggesting what social functions to attend, telling him who is getting married and whose wife is sick) also for keeping his organizers active. He even dropped in on organizers for the Liberal Party, and maintained that some of them secretly vote Conservative in federal elections. Since so much of the party's activity centers on the Member himself, to make the distinction between "organizations" and "associations" is of little practical significance; both are, in a sense, the creation of the Member and existed to support him. This fact is even reflected in the constitution of the Association, which lists for itself the following objects:

- a) d'assurer l'élection d'un député conservateur à la Chambre des Communes du Canada;
- b) de maintenir sur pied une organisation conservatrice efficace, y compris des chefs d'équipe pour tous les bureaux de votation;
- c) de faciliter dans la plus large mesure possible la participation des partisans de la cause conservatrice à l'activité politique tant au niveau de la circonscription qu'au sein du parti national;
- d) faire l'éducation du public sur les buts et les principes du Parti Progressiste Conservateur de même que sur son rôle dans le développement du Comté, de la Province et du pays et de la sauvegarde de la démocratie;
- e) collaborer avec l'Association nationale et les autres associations provinciales progressistes conservatrices à l'élaboration du programme du Parti et à la diffusion de ce programme. 1

¹ Association Conservatrice de Brome-Missisquoi. Constitution. (undated) Article 2.

There is certainly no distinction here between the purely electoral activities of the party, and its policy-oriented activities; all are stated objects of the Association.

The close relationship between the "organization" and the "association" is further emphasized by the following clause of the Constitution:

L'Organisateur en chef du Comté de Brome et l'organisateur en chef du Comté de Missisquoi dument nommés par le candidat ou le député conservateur sont membres de l'Exécutif et ont droit de vote à toutes les assemblées.

Avant de pouvoir assister et voter à toute assemblée de l'Exécutif, les noms de ces organisateurs doivent être transmis par le candidat ou député au secrétaire de l'Association. Ils demeurent en fonction durant le bon plaisir du député ou candidat.¹

We emphasize the close relationship between the organization and the association, and the personal ascendancy of the Member in both, in order to dispel the notion (should it arise) that the Association in any practical sense controlled the Member, or vested a mandate in him to urge the adoption in caucus of policies which they favoured. On the contrary, all the evidence points to the fact that the Association, like the organization, existed wholly or almost wholly for electoral purposes - objects (a) and (b) as quoted above. There was no evidence of the Association's playing any role in either the formulation or the propagandizing of policy - objects (c), (d) and (e). Perhaps the

¹Ibid., Article 9.

most convincing evidence for their neglect of the latter three objects is the Member's statement that his contacts with the Association executive generally concerned organizational matters, and were scarcely at all concerned with policy. One exception to this rule was that he consulted the executive concerning his stand on the adoption of the Canadian flag, and obtained their unanimous approval for his support of the new flag and against his party's policy on this issue.

There was substantial cross-membership between the Conservative Party and the Union Nationale. This is not true of the executives of the two parties - for example, the Union Nationale in Missisquoi required its officers not to participate actively in politics at the federal level - but most party workers who did not hold executive positions are equally active in federal and in provincial politics. It seemed, from the vocabulary of many of those whom we spoke to, that those political activists who were not rouge were bleu. The chief organizer for the Conservatives in Brome was able to point out, in all but a few cases, the political affiliation of the poll captains at the provincial level, and the vast majority of them were Union Nationale. Those who were not, with only a few exceptions, had stopped working for the Union Nationale as a result of the factional dispute which we described above. We had no comparable data for Missisquoi, but it was evident that there was considerable overlap in per-

sonnel.

Political Attitudes of Party Workers

How important to party workers are policy-oriented activities by comparison with electoral and patronage-dispensing activities? In our interviews we found a good deal of interest in the latter, and - although there were exceptions - scarcely any interest in the former, which are the activities relevant to the performance of the interest-articulation function.

Many political activists cannot be said to lack interest in a policy role for parties; it would be more accurate to say that they do not conceive of the possibility. As we have already remarked, to many people the idea that one can make a government or a Member responsive to group demands by offering support or threatening to withdraw it, is just not meaningful. To such people, the government is there, one gets what one can from it, and it is the Member's job to see that local and individual claims are heard. Naturally it helps a good deal to be on the right side, but since even the best of guessers cannot be right all the time, there are limits to partisan activity which one ought to observe. This attitude was epitomized by one old organizer who explained the difference between the parties with classic simplicity: "It's just we being National Union and they being Liberal." To him, politics is strictly an election-time activity; during a campaign different political allegiances are

accepted and expected, but the idea of continuing partisan activities "in peacetime" is unnecessary and would generally be regarded as excessive. An opposition party in particular has no reason to function between elections, because one only creates ill-will by advertising one's opposition to the government. (It was this argument which he used to explain the fact that few young people in Brome County are interested in the Union Nationale.) No other respondent gave such a description of political customs; but nonetheless it seemed to be an accurate summation of the concept of politics which is held by a large part of the population, including many party workers. We felt this to be typical because it was obvious that many organizers enjoyed politics as a game and as a social activity; because of the personal satisfaction which they derived from dealing with people's individual problems and participating in local decisions such as road repairs; and because of the usual though not unfailing observance of agreed limits of partisanship, that is, the avoidance of excessive partiality in exercising the patronage. In one case the agreed limits of partisanship amounted to genial co-operation between a Liberal and a Union Nationale activist, to the mutual benefit of them both. Both men were stone-contractors, and the one whose party was in power used his connections in the party to obtain government contracts; the other obtained sub-contracts through his friend in the government party. As one of them ex-

plained, when your party is out of office, it does not mean that no government work is available, but you have "to run around the bushes" to get it. He added that when the Union Nationale was out of power Jean-Jacques Bertrand, then in opposition, had lost much of his strength (i.e. power to obtain grants for the constituency). He also said that the American system of government is better than the Canadian one because the strength of a Member does not depend on whether his party has formed the Government or is in opposition.

We found substantial evidence that many party workers were dismayed at the diminution in the amount of patronage which is available. It must again be emphasized that although the word "patronage" has come to have adverse connotations, the practice is an accepted and generally an approved feature of political life not only in Quebec but also elsewhere in Canada. It is a means of distributing government grants to individuals and communities on a discretionary basis. The extent to which it is regarded as desirable to have government grants distributed in a discretionary manner depends on the structure and the customs of the society; as a rule, the more highly-evolved societies prefer the allocation of such grants to be made on a non-discretionary basis, which requires the establishment of a non-partisan bureaucracy. In Brome-Missisquoi, for example, we have noted the request from farmers' groups that there be less political interference in

allotting the bulldozer subsidy. The practice of patronage, however, is far from being universally condemned. Tacit agreements regarding its use form a part of the political customs of the society, and a man who exercises the patronage will be judged according to the manner in which he performs his function. A fair and honest patronage agent is a man of prestige in the community. Hence, the drying up of the springs of patronage is sometimes regarded by partisans as depriving them of the means of performing a valued social service as well as constituting a threat to their personal prestige.

Let us take the case of one individual, an English-speaking Liberal. He said that requests came to him daily concerning pensions, clearing out roadside ditches, the grant of licenses, road repairs, etc. For small things (e.g. ditches) he went directly to whoever was in charge locally (the "roadmaster"); but for bigger things (e.g. improvements to a road) he had to contact the defeated Liberal candidate. He said that he really enjoyed doing this work - "helping people" - and he did not conceal his annoyance that several Ministers were not giving the riding and Liberal agents in it adequate support. For instance, he mentioned having made a trip to Quebec to ask for a fire truck for one village and a dam in another; before he had heard how the Government had reacted to these requests, the député (in opposition), rather than the defeated Liberal candidate, announced the grant of the fire

truck - "there was a leak somewhere." These things were said with a genuine air of grievance which stemmed from the conviction that the government was destroying the basis of its own political organization in the riding - a fact which we inferred from the tone of the interview and in particular from our respondent's remark that the Government appeared to want Mr. Bertrand to retain his seat. Our respondent's concept of the political party as the natural and the proper mechanism to perform the distributive function is further elaborated in the remark that he was "against patronage", a statement which he explained by professing not to mind, for instance, a snow-plowing contract going to a Conservative, if that individual had the best equipment to do the job. Our respondent thus revealed both his preference for channelling government grants of certain kinds through the political party, and also the view that the party had an obligation not to show excessive favouritism in doing this. That this instance was not an isolated case can be shown by a description of the way in which the Liberal Party equipped itself to allocate government grants to individuals and communities.

The idea of the political party as an alternative to a non-partisan bureaucracy for the distribution of government grants and services emerges clearly from the following resolution passed at the convention of the Quebec Liberal Federation in October 1960 - the same occasion as that on which Mr. Lesage urged the federation to concern itself

with a vast "programme d'éducation populaire."¹ The text of the resolution is as follows:

- ATTENDU QUE dans l'état actuel des choses, la structure administrative de la province ne répond pas au besoin des citoyens dans les comtés;
- ATTENDU QUE la réforme administrative ne peut se faire sans un certain délai;
- ATTENDU QUE les députés ou les candidats défaits doivent assumer des responsabilités administratives dans leur comté à cause de cet état de choses;
- ATTENDU QUE seule une réorganisation du fonctionnarisme et de l'administration de la province peut corriger cet état de choses déplorable;

Le congrès décide:

- QUE, provisoirement et en attendant le réforme administrative appropriée, le Gouvernement continue à recevoir les informations des députés et des candidats libéraux sur les besoins exprimés dans chaque comté.
- QUE, pour éviter la renaissance d'abus, le député ou le candidat consulte un comité de conseillers constitué au sein de l'exécutif de l'Association de comté (123).²

The resolution, therefore, proposed the establishment of a recognized mechanism for handling the patronage.

One of our respondents in Missisquoi indicated that the consultative committees were established because it would be easier for a single individual to turn down an unacceptable request. Examples of the work done by the consultative committee in Missisquoi for provincial affairs

¹See above, p. 147.

²Fédération libérale du Québec, Rapport du 6^e congrès général (Montréal: Secrétariat de la Fédération libérale du Québec, 1960), p. 21.

are: the appointment of a "cantonnier-en-chef" or "road-master" who is responsible for making minor repairs to roads, keeping them clear in winter, etc.; grant of liquor licenses; grants to communities for recreational facilities; road and ditch-maintenance contracts; and hiring of all kinds of personnel for local government work. The Committee, however, was in an equivocal position because it was not officially recognized by the government or by the civil service; thus its only role was to assist the Member or the defeated candidate in his equally unofficial role of patronage agent for the county. The extent to which the Committee in a given county is used depends entirely upon the Member or the defeated candidate.

In Missisquoi, one informant estimated that about three-quarters of the patronage is handled by the defeated candidate without reference to the consultative committee, which met only once every two months in 1965. The partial inactivity of the consultative committee, however, cannot be explained by any desire on the part of the defeated candidate to handle patronage matters himself, for he was clearly tired of being besieged by requests for favours of one sort and another. In an attempt to rid himself of the obligation of dealing with all the matters brought before him, he resigned as chairman of the consultative committee. The details of this action have been difficult to ascertain - for instance, to whom did he send the letter? - but the fact of his resignation was confirmed

from a variety of resources including the defeated candidate himself. "Quebec" refused to take cognizance of this action, declaring that the position did not exist from the point of view of the Government, and that if he wished to resign from a position in the constituency association, he should address himself to the president of the association. In spite of this rebuff, the importance of the action can be judged from two facts: first, that the municipal council of the town in which he lived sent a resolution to the Premier asking him not to accept the resignation - for they feared that someone from another town would be appointed in his place who would discriminate against them; and second, polls were poorly organized because there was no accepted leader who was willing to devote the time which is necessary to maintain an effective organization.

The attempted "resignation" of the defeated candidate may have been provoked in part by the apparent unresponsiveness of Quebec to requests from the Liberals in Missisquoi. One respondent noted that the Missisquoi Liberals had little influence in the departments of the provincial government, with the exception of the ministries of Roads and of Agriculture and Colonization. Another informant was dissatisfied because he felt the government was not sufficiently generous in allocating money to the county for public works, grants to municipalities and to recreational associations, etc. The dissatisfaction with the provincial government culminated in a letter from the

executive of the Liberal Association to the Premier, in which they asked him for a direct statement of support for the party in Missisquoi. The suspicion was prevalent that Mr. Lesage did not really wish to win the riding from Mr. Bertrand, who at one time had shown some inclination to break away from the Union Nationale or to challenge the leadership of Daniel Johnson. According to one informant, the letter cited the failure of the Cabinet to support the Missisquoi Liberals in the previous election, for no Minister had visited the riding save for a brief visit from Paul Gerin-Lajoie at the beginning of the campaign. The letter was unanswered during the time of our field research, and local partisans were unwilling to undertake the reorganization of the party (putting poll organizations into effective shape, etc.) until they had received a favourable response from the Premier. The significant fact about this affair is that it demonstrates the extent to which the local partisans felt that the effectiveness of their organization required the active support of the government in making grants to the riding and co-operating in patronage matters.

We have less information concerning the Liberal Party in Brome County and concerning the federal Liberals. This does not seem, however, to be an important gap, because the presence of a Liberal M.L.A. in Brome has meant that the sort of difficulties which we noted in Missisquoi would not arise there. At the federal level there is less

patronage to distribute, but nevertheless there was a consultative committee which was set up in 1963 at the instigation of the Montreal office. Its functions were similar to those of the provincial consultative committee. It did not seem worthwhile to devote much time to the study of patronage mechanisms at the federal level because our concern with this matter derives solely from the fact that it may help us to understand the political attitudes of partisans. Since the personnel of the party organizations is largely similar at the two levels, not much would have been gained from a further study of patronage activities at the federal level.

The political attitudes which we have described were criticized by some of the party workers whom we interviewed. A small number of Liberals in Missisquoi, and especially the defeated candidate, were evidently wearied by the volume of patronage matters with which they had to deal. These individuals were some of the most senior officers of the Liberal Association; each of them had important contacts outside the riding, either with the Montreal office of the party or with ministers, or both. All were men of high status, being either professionals or substantial businessmen. They expressed distaste at the self-seeking attitude of most partisans, and scorned the local jealousies and personal rivalries which (as one of them put it) made the Liberal Party in Missisquoi resemble "un panier de crabes." We were unable, however,

to assess with confidence the political attitudes of these men. Specifically, were they interested in more than the electoral and the patronage activities of political parties? Unfortunately we have no evidence on this matter other than their own claims to be disinterested. Their personal actions, however, did not indicate any effort to carry through the democratization of the party or to undertake policy-oriented activities through the establishment of a revitalized and restructured party association. Perhaps, however, this could be explained by the fact that in view of the political attitudes of the bulk of party workers, any such attempt would require substantial effort, and might fail altogether.

Evidence concerning the political attitudes of the Progressive Conservative and Union Nationale activists was more difficult to obtain than for the Liberals. We hesitate to regard opinions expressed during interviews as an adequate cross-section of political attitudes of partisans since we did not interview a statistically significant sample, and there is the further problem that some of our respondents may have misrepresented their opinions. For these reasons our argument concerning the Liberals was based primarily on the structure and the activities of the Association. The Union Nationale and the Progressive Conservatives, however, were in Opposition during the time of our field research, with the result that their personnel lacked the opportunity to undertake those

activities which were of prime concern to the activists in the Liberal Party. Thus we can only record that our interviews with the personnel of the Union Nationale and the Conservative Party did not lead us to believe that political attitudes of activists in these parties were any different from those which predominated in the Liberal party. We have already noted the personal devotion to the Member which existed within the Union Nationale in Missisquoi and within the Conservative Party. Grafftey's key men in particular struck us as being "nice guys" - personable, inoffensive, genial; men who enjoyed organizing, and liked to work for a Member who saw them often and showed his appreciation for the way in which they helped him. Most of them were not men of wealth or high standing in the community; indeed, Grafftey said that he was embarrassed by the enthusiasm of one person who was of high status and wished to run the Conservative campaign in the town where he lived; this would have been damaging for the party since the individual concerned was a management representative in collective bargaining with the union, and his open identification with the Conservative cause might have driven some employees into the Liberal ranks. There were a few professional men who held senior posts on the executive of the Conservative Association, but apart from these individuals, the Conservative party workers whom we met were not men who had any real interest in matters of policy, or indeed, the breadth of outlook

to understand them. We have already noted Grafftey's remark that he seldom discussed policy matters with the executive of the Association.

The executive of the Union Nationale and to a still greater extent the poll workers included very few men of high status. In Farnham a list of poll captains revealed that almost all were labourers or white collar workers; there were also a few small businessmen. This fact supports the observation of several organizers who noted that the most active groups in politics are farmers and labourers. In addition to the executive and the poll workers, however, the Union Nationale had a Conseil Honoraire composed of professionals and businessmen. A full Conseil was supposed to include one conseiller per poll, who was to be appointed by the executive of the constituency Association. Our informants, however, discounted the importance of this body, and it was not clear to us whether the Conseil had anything like the full complement of members. In any case it was not meant to meet as a body, and its members were not publicly identified with the party because (as the President of the Association, an insurance broker, pointed out) most men in professional and business occupations are reticent about undertaking political activity. The assigned role of the Conseillers was purely advisory, although to what their advice pertained did not emerge from our interviews; it seems probable that the real aim of the Conseil was to provide some informal net-

work of contacts with the business and professional groups in the county.

Not much need be said about the political attitudes of Union Nationale activists in Brome. We may judge from the factional dispute which wracked the party for a decade, that personalities, patronage, and the distribution of government grants and public works are the stuff of politics in Brome, at least from the viewpoint of Union Nationale partisans. If such matters could immobilize the party, they must have been of some importance to the party workers. This inference was confirmed by our own impression of partisans' attitudes, and by the fact that almost all the active people in the party are old. It must be remembered, however, that shortly after we terminated our field research in Brome a new candidate was nominated, and he may have succeeded in bringing in a younger group of poll workers.

In conclusion we may state that in Brome-Missisquoi the major issues of federal and provincial politics were not reflected in the controversies either within constituency party organizations, or between the parties. In the opening sections of this chapter we described some of the problems affecting particular groups within the constituency, and it was pointed out that effective governmental action in relation to these problems involves the broadest aspects of policy at both the federal and the provincial levels: agriculture, labour, transportation,

education, industrial development, etc. To some extent, group interests in relation to these aspects of policy were being articulated by voluntary associations, although the degree of understanding of the implications of these issues was often not impressive, and pressure group activity was generally weak.

While the activities of farm and labour organizations --particularly the latter--fell far short of assessing and dealing with the problems affecting their respective groups, however, the activities of constituency parties were simply not relevant to such problems. The constituency organizations were equipped, through their structures and by the interests of their personnel, to handle the requests of individuals and localities for jobs and government grants. In limiting themselves to the handling of individual grievances and requests, the parties at the local level were applying essentially palliative solutions to the problems of the area, when in fact the problems called for action on a far wider front. Thus they proved incapable of contributing to the articulation of the interests of those groups - the farm and labour groups - which have been adversely affected by recent changes in the milieu.

We may go further. If the patronage activities of parties have had the effect of perpetuating partisan loyalties, they may indirectly and unintentionally have hindered the articulation of group needs through non-

partisan structures, viz. the voluntary associations. It must be emphasized, however, that this is a hypothesis which emerges from our study, not an empirical observation. It derives plausibility though not proof from the fact that in many cases, leaders of voluntary associations were reticent about becoming involved in political controversy. They feared that if they did so they could not escape identification (at least in the public mind) with a political party. This they wished to avoid because they thought it would disrupt the internal cohesion of their associations.

Our main conclusion, however, is that the constituency party organizations showed themselves to be ineffective in the articulation of certain categories of political interest. This view is perhaps best summarized in the words of one of our respondents, an officer of the Liberal Association in Missisquoi, who described the local rivalries which divided the riding association, and added:

L'Association n'est pas un canal entre la population et le gouvernement. Ce serait inouï de parler des problèmes réels ou de les expliquer à la population. Jamais nous n'avons été un canal pour étudier les véritables problèmes du comté.

CHAPTER 4

WESTMORLAND

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Westmorland County may justly be said to epitomize the bi-ethnic character of New Brunswick. Both in the rural areas and in Moncton, which is the dominant centre in the county and contains approximately half its population, there is a roughly equal balance between those of French and those of British origin. The commercial life of Moncton, which claims to be the most important distribution centre in the Maritimes, is largely controlled by its English-speaking citizens; but it is equally true that here the leaders of the Acadian community in the province are located. The only other towns in the county are Dieppe, which is a largely French-speaking suburb of Moncton; Shédiac, reputed to be the largest lobster port in the world, also predominantly French-speaking; and Sackville, an English town, site of Mount Allison University, otherwise occupied with the manufacture of stoves. The predominance of Moncton over these towns is indicated by the population figures in Table IV-1.

The process of economic development and the consequent ecological changes have been similar in several respects to what we observed in Brome-Missisquoi. There was a sharp contraction of the agricultural sector during

the decade between 1951 and 1961; people were attracted to Moncton as employment opportunities expanded there, and the whole region became functionally linked to that city.

TABLE IV-1
WESTMORLAND - POPULATION

	Westmor- land	Moncton	Dieppe	Sack- ville	Shediac	Sunny Brae(a)
1901	42,060	9,026	-	-	-	-
1911	44,621	11,345	-	2,039	1,442	-
1921	53,387	17,488	-	2,173	1,973	1,171
1931	57,506	20,689	-	2,234	1,883	1,364
1941	64,486	22,763	-	2,489	2,147	1,368
1951	80,012	27,334	3,402	2,873	2,010	2,048
1961	93,679	43,840	4,032	3,038	2,159	-

(a) Annexed to Moncton in 1954.

Source: Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Census. 1961, v. 1.1, Table 6.

There is not, however, the same counter-attraction of a larger metropolis which the towns within a fifty mile radius or more of Montreal are experiencing, for Moncton in 1961 could boast a higher average wage than St. John or Halifax, and greater stability of employment than either Fredericton or Saint John.¹ The employment opportunities in a city of this size and relative prosperity have meant that there is not, as there is in Brome-Missisquoi, as

¹See below, p.186; also Table IV-3.

powerful an economic motive for professional people and highly-skilled labour to leave the area.¹

The acuteness of "the farm problem" in Westmorland is indicated by the fact that more than half the farms which were operating in 1951 were no longer functioning as independent units ten years later. It is strong testimony to the marginal character of agricultural production in some if not all areas of the county, that the total area of improved land decreased by roughly twenty per cent during the decade. This decline did not affect all parts of the county uniformly, however, as may be deduced from the figures in Table IV-2. In some areas, the decline in the number of farms, and the consequent contraction in farm population, evidently occurred through amalgamation of adjoining farms, because the area of improved land decreased little or even increased; conversely, in other areas, the decline in area of improved land was more nearly proportionate to the decline in the number of farms. This differential within the county is important because it provides evidence of the fact that measures designed to achieve the commercialization of agriculture have been less successful in some areas than in other. It is also very significant for our present purposes to note that the

¹On the other hand, there appears to be some evidence of an exodus of Acadians in these occupations, due to the English control of commercial life in the city and in the province. See below, p. 324.

comparatively prosperous areas are mostly English and the poorer areas are inhabited largely by Acadians. Both of these facts will be discussed in the succeeding section.

TABLE IV-2

WESTMORLAND - AGRICULTURE 1951-1961

	Number of Farms			Improved Land Acreage		
	1951	1961	Change (%)	1951	1961	Change (%)
Westmorland (county)	3,108	1,385	-55	121,930	97,303	-20
<u>Parishes</u>						
Botsford	538	275	-49	23,132	14,672	-37
Dorchester	533	150	-72	15,643	9,792	-37
Moncton	530	260	-51	23,682	19,051	-20
Sackville	380	156	-59	10,229	11,948	+17
Salisbury	384	241	-37	22,750	19,937	-12
Shediac	533	194	-64	18,889	11,987	-37
Westmorland	210	109	-48	7,605	9,961	+31

Source: Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Census. 1961, v. 5.1, Table 28; 1951, v. 6.1, Table 29.

The fact that an ever-decreasing number of people now make a living from agriculture in Westmorland is compensated for in large measure by the growth of job opportunities in Moncton. The population of Shediac and Sackville remained relatively static between 1951 and 1961, but Moncton increased rapidly in size after 1951. The exact rate of growth is difficult to determine, since some of the expansion indicated by census data may be attributed to the city's annexation of surrounding ter-

ritory during the 'fifties. For this reason it is well to compare not only the size of the city itself, but also of Moncton Parish which surrounds the city. The relevant figures are contained in Table IV-3.

TABLE IV-3

MONCTON: POPULATION 1941-1966

	1941	1951	1961	1966
City of Moncton	22,763	27,334	43,840	46,510
Moncton Parish	9,797	14,532	10,740	-
Total	32,560	41,866	54,580	-

Sources: Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Census 1951, v. 1, Table 5; 1961, v. 1.1, Table 5. The 1966 figure was obtained from informants at the Moncton City Hall.

The increase in the number of jobs available has resulted not only in the growth of Moncton itself, however, but in the fact that in 1965 roughly one-quarter of the male wage-earners in Moncton commuted to work from outside the city. It is estimated that the majority of these lived in Westmorland, although some lived in adjoining Kent and Albert Counties.¹ The daily influx of salaried workers is only one indication that the area around

¹This information was obtained from the National Employment Service in Moncton. Exact figures are not released for publication.

Moncton (including all of Westmorland County) has become tributary to that city.

Moncton is primarily a service centre rather than a manufacturing town. It is strategically located as a distribution point for the Atlantic provinces, being more advantageously situated in this respect--though not, of course, for external trade--than Saint John or Halifax. Moncton is the Canadian National Railways headquarters of operation in the Maritimes. Indeed, of the city's relatively small manufacturing labour force of 1,550 (1961), more than a third was employed by the C.N.R. in its repair and maintenance shops. Furthermore, the growth of employment opportunities during the 'fifties was concentrated in the tertiary sector (e.g. transport, trade, services) as opposed to the secondary sector (manufacturing and construction)--see Table IV-4. This is an important fact if we wish to consider the ease or difficulty of transition to new occupations: as a rule the trade, finance, and service sectors are those which require the most education and highest degree of literacy. These are precisely the jobs into which those who are displaced from primary production would find it most difficult to move.

It will be noted from Table IV-4 that almost two thousand workers, or more than half the primary producers in Westmorland in 1951, moved or were forced out of their employment in the primary sector by 1961. If, therefore, job opportunities in Moncton expanded substantially in

TABLE IV-14

MONCTON AND WESTMORLAND: RESIDENT MALE LABOUR FORCE
BY INDUSTRIES

	Moncton	Westmorland	
	1951	1961	
Male Labour Force	7,363	10,354	20,777
Primary Sector	56	92	3,757
Secondary Sector	1,918	2,275	6,409
Manufacturing	1,497	1,550	4,612
Construction	421	725	1,797
Tertiary Sector	5,389	7,987	10,184
Transportation, Communications, and utilities	2,010	2,681	3,887
Trade	1,680	2,512	3,142
Finance	229	322	336
Community, business, and personal services	653	1,075	2,819(a)
Public admini- stration and defence	706	1,198	2,027
Unspecified	111	199	

(a) Combined figure for "Services", including Public Administration and Defence.

Source: Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Census. 1951, v. 4, Tables 17, 18; 1961, v. 3.2, Tables 5, 8.

recent years, still it must not be assumed that there was a uniform increase in prosperity. On the contrary, what appears to have happened is that unskilled workers, many of them formerly engaged in farming or fisheries, have often been unable to find stable employment at reasonable wages. In 1965 the rate for unskilled labour was about a dollar an hour in Moncton, and less elsewhere in the county. In a fish-packing plant one worker informed us that he worked a seventy-hour week for about six months a year, and was unemployed for the rest of the time, when the plant operated on reduced staff. For this he received ninety cents an hour, and time-and-a-half for work over fifty-four hours a week. This is the rate prescribed by the Minimum Wage Board of New Brunswick for employees in the food-processing industry. We cannot categorically affirm these data on wage rates since they were not adequately confirmed by further inquiries; but their reliability and their typicality of a part of the labour force is suggested by other data from the 1961 census. This material is contained in Tables IV-5 to IV-7. As in Brome-Missisquoi, one will observe the wide discrepancy in earnings between residents of urban centres (particularly Moncton) and the rural parts--a discrepancy which is reflected not so much in the average earnings, but in the percentage of those earning incomes of less than \$2,000 or less than \$3,000, and also in the large percentage of those in the rural areas who had no permanent work. One

TABLE IV-5
MALE WAGE-EARNERS: EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT

	Average Earnings	Earnings Under \$2,000 (\$%)	Earnings Under \$3,000 (\$%)	Earnings Over \$4,000 (\$%)	Fully-Employed (%)	(a)
Westmorland	\$3,188	24.9	43.7	31.2	70.8	
Urban						
Moncton	3,600	16.9	34.3	39.1	73.7	
	3,678	16.0	32.7	40.9	79.4	
Dieppe	3,113	20.2	41.5	27.7	77.0	
Sackville	3,655	17.8	38.1	35.5	79.0	
Shediac	2,821	30.1	53.2	24.4	66.7	
Rural	2,352	41.1	62.7	15.3	55.0	
	2,413	38.4	60.5	16.5	56.9	
Non-farm						
New Brunswick	2,807	33.5	54.0	23.4	61.4	
St. John	3,110	20.2	43.5	25.2	72.6	
Fredericton	3,780	15.0	36.0	37.5	78.0	
Halifax	3,446	22.2	42.2	32.4	81.4	

(a) A person who works 35 or more hours a week for at least 40 weeks a year is classified in this table as fully-employed.

Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census, 1961, v. 3.3, Tables 13, 14.

TABLE IV-6
FEMALE WAGE-EARNERS: EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT

	Average Earnings	Earnings Under \$2,000 (%)	Earnings Under \$3,000 (%)	Earnings Over \$4,000 (%)	Fully-Employed (%)	(a)
Westmorland	\$1,669	57.5	82.9	3.4	53.4	
Urban						
Moncton	1,822	52.7	80.1	4.3	58.4	
Dieppe	1,883	50.1	78.1	4.6	59.0	
Sackville	1,529	64.3	90.6	2.0	57.4	
Shediac	1,715	61.9	84.3	5.0	62.3	
Rural	1,244	73.5	93.5	1.6	46.6	
Non-farm	1,236	70.7	90.1	1.0	38.5	
	1,226	72.0	90.4	1.1	39.0	
New Brunswick						
St. John	1,569	62.2	84.5	3.0	51.3	
Fredericton	1,824	55.3	80.5	4.5	61.7	
Halifax	1,934	50.6	77.9	5.8	62.3	
	2,019	48.7	76.1	7.5	63.2	

(a) See Table IV-5, note (a).

Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census, 1961, v. 3.3, Tables 13, 14.

TABLE IV-7

AVERAGE EARNINGS OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, 1961
(based on population sample)

	Family Households		Non-Family Households	
	M	F	M	F
Westmorland	4,030	1,401	2,422	1,949
New Brunswick	3,609	1,216	2,030	1,668

Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census, 1961, vol. 4, Tables F2, F3.

further indication that the growth of employment opportunities has not been of uniform benefit to the population of Westmorland is contained in an unpublished study of the Roman Catholic parish of St. Thomas de Memramcook, which lies a short distance to the southeast of Moncton. The study indicates that about three-quarters of the wage-earners in the parish worked in Moncton (1965), and that thirty or forty per cent of them were without work for at least three months a year.¹

It appears, then, that the growth of Moncton as a service and distribution centre for an increasingly large region has not been able to provide steady employment at adequate wages for the whole population of Westmorland.

¹Fr. Robert Turcotte, i.c., et Leonard Leblanc: St. Thomas de Memramcook: Etude Sociologique, (Memramcook, New Brunswick), mimeographed, 1965).

There is a substantial group, consisting mostly of day-labourers, transport and construction workers - the unskilled - who are without work for a large part of the year. The incidence of such seasonal employment is concentrated in the rural areas, and it is highly probable that those most affected by it are those who at one time were occupied in the primary sector of the economy, which in Westmorland and elsewhere has undergone a very rapid contraction in recent years. By education, mentality, and previous occupation, such people are often ill-equipped to find employment in the expanding sectors of the economy.¹

LEADERSHIP

In this section we shall attempt--following the pattern of our study of Brome-Missisquoi--to identify some of the problems affecting different groups in Westmorland, and to discuss what efforts were being made at the time of our field research (1965) by voluntary associations to cope with these problems. It will be shown that here too, the most disadvantaged sectors of the population were those whose interests were least adequately articulated by voluntary associations. It should be noted that any improvement in the position of these

¹Ethnic relations, the leadership of the Acadian community, and the role of political parties in promoting the interests of the Acadian group are discussed in Chapter VI.

groups must either be made at the expense of other groups, or through fundamental changes in the structure of the economy.

Agriculture

It will be recalled that in the ten years between 1951 and 1961 the farm population of Westmorland was reduced by more than half.¹ This may be attributed to the widespread phenomenon of rising costs and stable prices which together have forced the individual farmer to expand the scale of his operations and to introduce vastly more efficient methods of production in order to prevent the "cost-price squeeze" from ruining him financially. Thus, one way of looking at "the farm problem" is to consider how the farmer can be assured an adequate and stable income without heavy subsidization of his operations by the state.

The New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture and the cooperative movement both appeared to contribute substantially to the commercial viability of agriculture in Westmorland. There were eight locals of the Federation of Agriculture in the county, two French-language and six English. At their monthly meetings they had guest speakers to initiate discussions on methods of production, and in this way the activities of the Federation encouraged

¹Table IV-2, p.181.

farmers to adopt the innovations which are essential to increasing their productivity. The cooperatives helped to reduce costs of production by operating a feed-mixing plant and distributing depot in Moncton; they also sold fertilizer, insecticides, seeds, hardware, building materials, etc., under an arrangement which provided for the distribution of profits to members of the co-op in amounts proportionate to their purchases. The cooperatives also attempted to increase the farmer's proportion of the final sale price of his produce by operating marketing services for certain products (especially wool and dairy products).

In addition to performing these services, the Federation of Agriculture and the cooperatives also sought to articulate the political interests of their members. The role of the cooperative movement as a pressure group was quite restricted; the movement concerned itself with legislation relating directly to cooperatives, as for instance in the request for a federal Act to allow chartering of cooperatives on a nationwide basis, or in a presentation to the Carter Commission on taxation.¹ The New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture, on the other hand, took a more general view of the interests of its members. For several years, the Federation had been asking the

¹In the submission to the Carter Commission the existing law relating to taxation of cooperative enterprises was defended against criticisms by the Retail Merchants' Association.

provincial government to provide farm loans at low interest rates, a request which was met in 1964 by the passage of legislation to subsidize interest payments on the federal Farm Credit Corporation loans. The Federation also asked for the implementation of the taxation provisions of the Byrne Commission Report on municipal finances and the functions of municipal governments in New Brunswick; this was the major undertaking of the Robichaud Government in 1965-6. Both these matters were studied at meetings of the Westmorland, Albert and Kent (English) or "W.A.K.E." "sub-federation", one of nine which together constitute the New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture. Other topics discussed at W.A.K.E. meetings, or at meetings of the locals, were the Canada Pension Plan, compulsory marketing of farm products through government boards, and the proposals of the federal government to establish a crop insurance program.

In sum, it seems fair to say that farm organizations did quite a lot to serve and promote the interests of farmers in Westmorland. The Federation of Agriculture and specialized producers' organizations (the Ayrshire Association, for instance) provided a forum for discussion of common technical problems, and presumably contributed to increasing the efficiency of farm production. In this aspect of the Federation's activities the members co-operated closely with and profited from the services of the government agronomists, whose job it is to advise

farmers on production methods. In its role as a pressure group, the Federation of Agriculture concerned itself with a wide range of questions which vitally affect the position of the farmer. The cooperatives, for their part, contributed to increasing the net return to farmers by cutting down their costs and increasing their sales price.

The problem of commercialization, however, can be looked at in two ways. One way is to ask how commercialization can be accomplished; the other is to study its social consequences. It must be acknowledged that the activities of farm organizations which we have discussed are relevant primarily to the first aspect of the problem only. The pressure group activities of the Federation of Agriculture, for instance, can be of substantial benefit only to the farmer who has already learned to run his farm as a business. A man who lacks the managerial ability or the psychological equipment to be a commercial farmer is little aided by such programs.

One of our respondents, a senior officer of the Federation of Agriculture, explained that in his view there are three types of farmer: the hobby farmer who has money anyway and doesn't care if he loses some of it on his farm, the part-time farmer who derives a large part or perhaps almost all his income from employment off the farm, and the full-time farmer. The activities of the Federation, and the agriculture policy of the govern-

ment, he said, should be directed to making it possible for the full-time farmers to make a living. The hobby farmer can look after himself, and the part-time farmer really wants to quit anyway and efforts should be concentrated on enabling him to do so. Another respondent pointed out that there is a certain degree of conflict between small- and large-scale farmers in that a small-scale farmer whose produce is not always graded may damage the interests of the larger ones by selling sub-standard produce, whereas compulsory marketing and grading through government boards increases costs to a small producer who normally sells only locally and often directly to the consumer. Even without placing heavy emphasis on the latter point (the importance of which we are not in a position to evaluate) it is clear that the problems facing a commercial farmer are of a completely different order from those facing a subsistence farmer.

For the subsistence farmer, the major and essential step--but frequently one which he is not capable of taking --is to start thinking and acting like a businessman. To this one must add the problem of acquiring technical and managerial competence, and obtaining the necessary capital. Even in the cases where the obstacles to the commercialization of agriculture have been surmounted, the amalgamation of farms which is necessary if large-scale operations are to be introduced leaves a surplus of farm population. Subsistence farmers are ill-equipped to take employment

in the expanding manufacturing and service industries. Thus it is inappropriate to think of "the farm problem" as being merely the technical one of how to make farming profitable. This solves only one aspect of the problem, for the process of commercialization also creates other problems of a different order. It forces people to adapt to a new way of life which frequently is destructive of traditional customs or values. The question arises, to what extent are those who are affected by technological change able to "fit in" in a transformed milieu? Such problems of adjustment are as immediate, to those who face them, as the technical problems raised by the question, "How can farming be made profitable?"

Recognition of the social as well as the economic aspects of the problems facing farmers enables us to appreciate the significance of the statistics relating to agriculture in Westmorland which are contained in Table IV-2.¹ It may be inferred from these figures that in some parts of the county the decline in farm population resulted from the amalgamation of adjoining farms in order to increase the scale of production by the individual farmer. Both our own inference from the census data and the information given us by several farmers in the area indicate that this is what happened in the valley of the Petitcodiac River and in the low-lying area close to the

¹Above, p. 181.

Nova Scotia border off the Bay of Fundy. Here, in the Parishes of Salisbury, Moncton, Westmorland, and Sackville, were many dairy farms with fifty or more head of cattle. Most of those who had left these areas were at least able to sell their land and to use the money to move to an area where they could find new employment. It is quite otherwise, however, in the Parishes of Shediac and Botsford, which comprise the coastal area along the Northumberland Strait. Here we saw abandoned farms becoming covered with brush, and others which were operated on a part-time basis while their owners obtained most of their income from other sources. The same was true, but to a lesser extent, of the hilly country on the fringes of the Memramcook valley (Dorchester Parish). It is in these parts of the county--Shediac, Botsford, and Dorchester Parishes--that the decline in the acreage of improved land was concentrated.

The problems of adjustment for people in these parts of the county were aggravated by the fact that, with the exception of the area around Cape Tamentine (on the Northumberland Strait, near Nova Scotia) these Parishes were predominantly Acadian in ethnic composition. By contrast with the majority of Acadians in Moncton, a large though undetermined percentage of them were not fluent in English and therefore found employment possibilities restricted.

The comparative poverty of agriculture in the Acadian

areas may not have been due wholly to inferior soil conditions. In Dorchester Parish there were only about fifteen farms where the farmer obtained his entire income from agriculture; but some of our informants suggested that the number could have been substantially larger if more efficient methods had been used. The problem, in other words, was probably in part a deficiency of skills. Partly cause, and partly effect, of the deficiency of skills was the fact that the French-speaking section of the Federation of Agriculture in this part of New Brunswick was much weaker than the W.A.K.E. "sub-federation". Both W.A.K.E. and the Fédération Agricole Française de l'Archidiocèse de Moncton are affiliated with the New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture, and the activities of the two sub-federations were similar. Nevertheless, although the Fédération Agricole did contain most of those whose principal source of income was from agriculture, there was a very evident shortage of competent leaders. There were exceptions, as for example the manager of the farm at the agriculture school at St. Joseph's College in Memramcook; but it is an indication of the paucity of farm leadership that the most important figure in the Fédération Agricole was not a farmer at all but a priest, who was Secretary-Treasurer of the Fédération. It is his opinion that the farmers were showing more initiative than formerly but he acknowledged their dependence still on his leadership. This depend-

ence would not have been so great if there had been a larger number of leaders such as the one to whom we have just referred. This fact deserves emphasis because the shortage of farm leaders amongst the Acadians constituted a serious obstacle to the development of a prosperous agriculture in those parts of Westmorland where farming has shown its sharpest decline.

It is also true, however, that a good deal of the land which was (or had been) under cultivation especially in the Acadian areas, was unsuited to farming. Those who depended on such land, once marginal and later increasingly sub-marginal, were forced to adjust to new occupations. By the mid 1960's it was no longer possible to obtain a living from a mixture of small-scale farming (vegetables and dairy products for home consumption and perhaps for local sale), while obtaining some cash income from fishing during the summer and from the farm woodlot during the winter. This combination of small-scale operations in farming, fisheries, and lumbering, often supplemented by day-labouring when road-work or other temporary jobs became available, could no longer ensure an adequate steady income. The number of people, therefore, who relied on diversified operations of this sort was reported to be diminishing very fast. Probably it was hastened by the unemployment insurance regulations, which made it unprofitable to accept short-term work. If one accepted short-term work he disqualified himself from

receiving unemployment insurance benefits. It was better to concentrate one's efforts in one area of production--fishing, for example--or else to seek employment as an unskilled labourer in the construction industry or in a fish-packing plant while relying, during the off-season, on unemployment insurance.

Fisheries

Fishing in Westmorland means fishing for lobster. Mackerel and smelt are also caught, but financially they are unimportant by comparison with the ugly, succulent crustacean.

The lobster fisheries provide a most unstable source of income. The season is short, and the lobster population fluctuates considerably from year to year, according to weather conditions at the time when the young are hatched. In 1965 the season was said to be the worst ever, and though one ought to allow for despondent exaggeration, fishermen reported daily catches of less than half of what they had obtained the previous season, which was supposed to be below average. It may well be imagined that a person who relies on such an unstable source of income faces times of extreme hardship. This problem is exaggerated by the unemployment insurance regulations, which tie the amount of the payment to the value of the catch during the season. Thus after a bad season, payments are low.

One can imagine ways by which the fisheries could be made more profitable, but possible solutions require first the development of some form of social organization among the fishermen, which (at least in 1965) was almost totally lacking. The fundamental problem was that there were too many fishermen. It was once the case that a fisherman would place his lobster pots in one area at the beginning of the two-month season, and when, after about 10 days, the daily catch began to dwindle, he hauled them up and placed them elsewhere. It is estimated that more than eighty-five per cent of the legal-size lobster are fished every year, and most of them in any one place would be taken in about a ten-day period. Thus, to fish profitably throughout the season, one would have to move the traps around every ten days or so. This was no longer possible, due to the large number of fishermen: virtually the whole lobster-fishing area in the Northumberland Strait was covered with traps on the first day of the season. Thus a fisherman was forced to leave his traps in place about six weeks after the real season was past, partly in order to pick up the few lobster which were left after the ten-day period, and partly in order to qualify as a full-time fisherman for purposes of unemployment insurance. Not unnaturally, therefore, many of them complained about the fact that an apparently substantial number of people who had a regular job used their two-week holidays to fish lobster. They were there

for the best of the season and then returned to their regular employment. If licenses had been limited to those who had no source of income other than fisheries, there would have been an immediate reduction in the number of traps. A further long-term decline in the number of traps, it was suggested, could be effected over time by refusing to grant licenses to those not previously engaged in fishing, until the total number was substantially reduced. This kind of regulation was in effect for the salmon fisheries, but for political reasons it could not have been applied unilaterally by the government; it would have required prior agreement amongst the fishermen themselves, which would have been most easily achieved through the formation of a fishermen's association.

There was, however, hardly any form of social organization amongst fishermen in Westmorland. In other parts of the province, notably in the north-eastern corner of the province (Gloucester County) where there are year-round fisheries with a high degree of capitalization and a more steady income for the fisherman, there were co-operatives which set up their own processing and marketing agencies in order to procure for the fisherman a higher price for his catch. In Westmorland, however, we found only one local of a cooperative (affiliated to the "Pêcheurs Unis" or United Maritime Fisherman). Most fishermen sold their catch to the privately-owned packing companies, either because they got a higher immediate

return for their lobster even though they obtained a substantially lower return in the long run,¹ or because they were in debt to the company and were not free to sell through a cooperative. Many fishermen--an estimate we obtained for one village was seventy-five per cent of them--had bought their boats and traps with a loan from the packing firm, such loans carrying with them the stipulation that the borrower sell his catch to the company (at their price). Indeed, some fishermen were reported to have sold their equipment to packing firms at the end of one season, only to buy it back at the beginning of the next--probably without the prospect of ever getting out of debt. The fact that the problem was basically one of fishermen's attitudes was revealed by the fact that both federal and provincial governments provided loans for the purchase of fishing equipment, but the absence of red tape for deals with the companies was apparently attractive to many fishermen, at whatever financial sacrifice.

There had been one noteworthy step towards improving the position of fishermen, but it is significant that the initiative in this case came from the government rather than from the fishermen themselves. On some parts of the

¹Cooperatives normally gave seventy-five per cent of the estimated selling price to the fisherman at the time of delivery. The remainder was paid after the season's catch had been sold and its exact value known. Private packers paid less, but they paid it all at once. To a fisherman who is in debt, this is essential.

coast, not in Westmorland, there had been privately organized meetings to request the placing of an upper limit on the number of traps which a single fisherman might put out. Such a limitation would inevitably have reduced the size of the annual catch, but if the limitation had been imposed on all fishermen, the diminution in the catch would have been more than offset by a substantial reduction in the cost of tackle. One federal fisheries officer in Westmorland said that he had conducted a poll among the 250 or so fishermen in his area, and that an overwhelming majority were in favour of such a scheme. His action had been undertaken on instructions from the Department of Fisheries, and had been designed to accomplish the same objective as meetings previously called by fishermen in other parts of the province.

One suspects, although there is no really solid evidence for this hypothesis, that what we have described is simply a correlation between economic deprivation and lack of initiative, self-reliance, and social organization.

Wages and Employment

We have shown that a substantial number of unskilled workers were adversely affected by seasonal employment and low wages. As was the case with the most disadvantaged sector of the farm population and the fishermen, the economic interests of the unskilled workers were those which were least adequately represented by voluntary associations.

The Moncton Board of Trade's propaganda brochure for Moncton ("written by businessmen for businessmen...") assesses the labour situation as follows:

Moncton has an adequate supply of contented labour, both male and female. The various skilled trades are becoming more and more unionized, but the unions are well managed and do not create a problem as far as their demands are concerned.... The business language is chiefly English, but French is also used and many people are bilingual. Labour rates for skilled and unskilled, if anything, are less than they are in larger centres in Canada. Factory labour is plentiful and there is a good percentage of available labour, which could be classified in the unskilled bracket, but make ideal personnel for training in factory work, being quick to learn and fairly well educated. ¹

In fact the unions were significantly stronger than is implied in the quotation, and they were incomparably stronger than were the unions in Brome-Missisquoi. The skilled trades were almost completely unionized, and the construction workers (semi-skilled and unskilled) were organized during 1965. Most unskilled workers remained outside union ranks, however, as did office workers such as those who worked at the mail-order office of the T. Eaton Company (the second-largest employer in Moncton, second only to the C.N.R.). Most retail stores had no unions. In all, about one-third of the wage-earners in

¹Moncton: Distribution Centre, Hub of Industrial Activity in Canada's Atlantic Provinces. (Moncton, 1962?), unpaged.

Moncton were union members--or so, at least, informants at the district office of the Canadian Labour Congress estimated.

We shall attempt to assess the effectiveness of trade unions in improving the position of working people in Westmorland. This requires, in part, an examination of the role of trade unions as a pressure group and also a consideration of the question of how much they were able to help the wage-earner through economic action (collective bargaining and grievance procedures). It is to the latter that we shall now turn.

Generally speaking, economic action by trade unions can be of benefit only to those who are actually members of a union or who work in union shops. For this reason the fact that about two-thirds of the wage-earners in Moncton were not unionized constituted a very severe limitation on the effectiveness of the labour movement. Union organizers were emphatic in saying that the most difficult workers to organize were those who were least secure in their jobs, because such workers did not wish to jeopardize what employment they could find, even if wages were low and the work only temporary. Thus the unions could do least, through economic action, for the irregularly and the seasonally employed--although these were the workers who most need help. By way of example, several efforts to establish unions in fish-packing plants on the Westmorland coast had failed. The employees them-

selves were frequently indifferent or even hostile to unions because they had to work very long hours during the season in order to earn enough to live during the off-season, especially since their unemployment insurance payments were proportionate to their weekly wages during their period of employment. Many workers were reported to be willing to accept a lower wage in order to work longer hours--thus earning a larger income. As a result, they frequently were unwilling to gamble on establishing a union, which would have had to provide them with a large enough wage increase to offset the probable reduction in the hours of work (since no union could negotiate a contract for, say, a sixty-hour week and still maintain its good standing in the labour movement). These considerations supplemented the one which was by all accounts the most fundamental, namely the hostility of employers towards unions and the consequent fear on the part of employees that they might lose their already none-too-secure jobs. Job insecurity, of course, is a factor which militates against the establishment of unions amongst all unskilled workers, especially when employment is temporary or seasonal.

With reference to the failure of the labour movement to include a larger proportion of the labour force, one union leader laid some of the blame on provisions of the New Brunswick Labour Relations Act. He noted that for certification of a union the law required an absolute

majority of employees in a given plant to vote in favour of establishing the union. This meant that an abstention was as good as a negative vote, and an anti-union employer could therefore take reprisals against any employee who participated in the certification vote--if the attempt to establish the union failed. It was reported to us by a number of informants that there had been several cases where overwhelming majorities of employees had signed their union cards, but that the necessary absolute majority was not obtained in the certification vote (supervised by the Labour Relations Board) which had been requested by the employer. The Federation had requested an amendment to the Act to make a majority of those casting ballots in a certification vote adequate for the certification of a union. The Federation had also asked for the insertion into the Act of, "A provision which should prevent the employer from using the time between an application and its consideration by the Labour Relations Board to undermine the union concerned, whether by improper dismissal or alterations in rates of pay or other conditions of employment."¹

It is noteworthy that some union leaders were of the opinion that Acadians were more wary of unionism than English-speaking New Brunswickers. This was explained as being in part the consequence of the fact that Acadians

¹New Brunswick Federation of Labour: Brief to the Select Committee of the New Brunswick Legislature on the Labour Relations Act (Dalhousie, N.B., September 16, 1965 [mimeographed]), p. 11.

were frequently insecure in their jobs, either because of lack of qualifications for the work, or because of discriminatory hiring practices. A union official from Quebec who was engaged in organizing workers in the construction industry reported that Acadians were mistrustful of his activities even though in this case (an exception) the employers apparently were not hostile. The workers seemed ready to sign the union card until they discovered they had to pay their membership dues; they wanted a raise first, not to pay their dues in order to get a raise later. The apparent coolness of many Acadians towards unions may also have been partly due to the fact that wherever a plant or firm had employees from both language groups, all union affairs were conducted in English. In the Moncton area, wholly French-speaking locals were most uncommon. In some cases French-speaking union officials from Quebec were brought in to organize workers, but often the organizers were English-speaking persons from the Saint John area. Our informants, however, did not seem to attach much importance to the fact that union affairs were generally conducted in English.¹

We have offered three partial explanations of the failure of unions to incorporate a larger percentage of workers in their ranks--(1) working conditions (instability of employment, the need to work long hours in order

¹Some further comments concerning the role of Acadians in the trade union movement are contained in Chapter VI, below.

to obtain as large an income as possible, and hostility of employers towards unions), (2) labour legislation in New Brunswick, and (3) the difficulty of organizing Acadians (whether because of their attitudes towards unions, or because union affairs are conducted in English). Of these obstacles to stronger unionism, the most intractable would appear to have been the first, namely that the workers who are least secure in their jobs are those for whom joining a union is a dangerous gamble. Skilled workers may be able to increase the stability of their employment through unions (due to preferential hiring clauses in collective agreements, etc.), but labourers are usually unable to do this because of the chronic over-supply of unskilled workers. Not only are the irregularly or seasonally employed workers the ones who are most susceptible to anti-union practices, but for them it is dangerous to allow a union to impose preferential hiring practices on employers, because no individual can be sure that he will be high on the union's list--at least, not until he has gained a good deal of seniority. For this reason the labour movement in Westmorland was least able to help those who suffered most from low wages and seasonal or irregular employment.

The pressure group activities of the New Brunswick Federation of Labour, as distinct from the unions' economic action, were sufficiently broad in scope that their requests or demands, were they accepted, would benefit the working class as a whole and not simply union members.

The annual brief to the provincial Cabinet, as presented in 1965, contained requests on the following subjects (among others): minimum wage, workmen's compensation, "a health charter for Canadians", unemployment insurance, mental retardation, abolition of the garnishee, housing, compulsory motor vehicle insurance, interest rates on consumer credit, vocational and technical training, and government inspection of meat. Other parts of the brief were of more direct relevance to trade union affairs, such as the assertion that employees of the Crown should have the right to engage in collective bargaining, and criticism of the granting of ex parte injunctions in labour disputes.¹ The real question which arises in respect of these demands, however, is not whether their implementation would benefit workers who are not union members, but how much political weight such demands may be presumed to have carried. We shall discuss this question in the next section of this chapter.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF GROUP LEADERS

In Brome-Missisquoi we found that group leaders often, although not in all cases, sought to avoid identification with any political party, because they were afraid that to link themselves with a party would weaken the voluntary

¹ New Brunswick Federation of Labour: Brief in Support of Proposed Legislation. February 3rd, 1965. The matter of interim injunctions was the subject of a separate 21-page brief submitted on May 18th, 1965. There were seven such "special-subject" briefs submitted in 1965.

associations of which they were leaders. As representatives of group interests, they frequently had occasion to communicate with the government, but generally they showed a preference for direct contact with the appropriate Minister or official; they did not wish to rely on the Member to make representations on their behalf.

In Westmorland we observed a similar desire to deal directly with the government--which was all the easier to do in view of the smaller size of the province and of the fact that two of the six M.L.A.'s from Westmorland County and Moncton were Ministers--but there was generally less reticence about becoming personally committed in party politics than in Brome-Missisquoi. This was especially true of trade union leaders, many of whom were active supporters of the New Democratic Party, although by no means all trade union leaders had accepted the idea of a partisan orientation for the labour movement. The Federation of Agriculture retained its political neutrality, but individual officers of the Federation had been candidates for political parties.

The attitudes of the trade union leaders towards political involvement are best illustrated by the conflict which took place within the New Brunswick Federation of Labour concerning its relationship with the New Democratic Party. The issue was raised at the August 1961 Convention of the Federation, which was held just after the founding convention of the N.D.P. The District

Labour Councils in Saint John and Fredericton, and the largest union in Moncton (the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport, and General Workers) each submitted a resolution urging that the Federation "endorse the New Party".¹

At the time, the leadership of the Federation was in the hands of craft union leaders, who generally are less militant and less inclined to favour direct political action by the labour movement than are the industrial union leaders. The craft union leaders, according to our (not impartial) informant, "Denied political affiliation but supported the government, and some of them sat on government boards--the old suckhole approach." They strongly opposed political action. When the word got around that the Resolutions Committee would recommend non-concurrence in the resolution to "endorse the New Party" (but before the matter was raised on the convention floor) there was a move by some of the pro-New Party delegates to force the resignation of the top officers of

¹The C.B.R.T. & G.W. (Moncton) resolution urged the Federation to "join other Federations in endorsing the policies of the New Democratic Party and the action taken by the Canadian Labour Congress on this matter". A summary of the debate on these resolutions is contained in Official Proceedings of the Fifth Annual convention, New Brunswick Federation of Labour, 1961 (hereinafter quoted as Proceedings). Our account of the discussions concerning endorsement of the N.D.P. is derived from the Proceedings and from one of those who helped to draft the C.B.R.T. & G.W. resolution. We did not obtain confirmation of his account from other informants, but those parts of it which could be checked in the Proceedings were accurate and he seemed to us to be fully reliable.

the Federation. This, however, was discouraged by a senior officer of the Canadian Labour Congress, who consulted the executive and persuaded them to agree to a resolution to "support the policy and program of the New Democratic Party". The Resolutions Committee, however, was not party to these discussions, and recommended rejection of the proposal to endorse the New Party, without substituting the agreed-upon resolution. Several of the backers of the New Party felt this to be a betrayal of the agreement reached with the executive, although the executive's influence on the committee on this matter must remain (for us at least) a matter of conjecture. In any case, the manoeuverings which preceded the debate on the convention floor only served to make that debate more heated, and at the end of a lengthy discussion the resolutions concerning the New Party were referred back to the committee. On the following day a substitute resolution was recommended to the Convention, proposing that the N.B. Federation of Labour "endorse the principles and policies of the New Democratic Party without direct affiliation". The Proceedings of the Convention tell us:

Several delegates attempted to debate the proposed Substitute Resolution. President Whitebone suggested that, as the matter was thoroughly debated at the Tuesday afternoon sessions, and further debate would be merely repetitious, that the delegates refrain from debate at this time and vote either yes or no on the recommendation of the committee. Delegates at the microphones took their seats and,

upon being put to vote, the recommendation of the committee was adopted.¹

The arguments raised in debate on the resolution to endorse the N.D.P. are instructive in that speakers on both sides showed that they regarded the issue as one relating to, first, the exercise of patronage, and second, freedom of personal choice (and the dangers to unions if they attempted to interfere in such matters.) The debate contained only two references to the actual content of the program of the New Party--its policies in relation to achieving full employment, and to education. One delegate, according to the Proceedings, said that "if we wished to have injustices corrected we will have to change them from the top by political action."² On the "freedom of personal choice" issue delegates made the following observations, each by a different speaker:

...many International Unions expressly forbid, by their Constitutions, discussion of religion and partisan politics within their local unions...
 Affiliation with a political party... would create serious problems for unions of municipal and government employees....Personally, he did not want anybody to tell him which party he was going to vote for.

A section in the Constitution of the International Brotherhood of Pulp,

¹Proceedings, p. 93.

²Proceedings, p. 89. All the following quotations from the debate on the Resolution are taken from the Proceedings, pp. 86-9.

Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers...should give us guidance here, which reads, "No political or religious agitation will be tolerated during the sessions of Local or International bodies...." ...We must be guided by our constitutions, and if their members i.e. of Internationals with such provisions in their Constitutions, were going to abide by the Constitution they would have to refrain from voting.

...the Resolutions being discussed were being deliberately misrepresented, and there should be no doubt in the minds of anybody what the Resolution proposes. He explained that the non-political rules in the Constitution of some International Unions should not prevent any delegates from voting. He outlined the freedom of choice accorded every local union and individual member in supporting or refusing to support the New Party...

With respect to the Constitution of some International Unions which had been quoted he said there is a difference between politics in the United States and Canada. He felt that information regarding the New Party was lacking among our local unions. He said local labour organizations had autonomy and the Constitution of the New Democratic Party provides for freedom of exercising autonomy at all levels.

Of equal and probably greater importance, judging from arguments raised at the Convention, was the patronage issue--what political action could do to stop patronage, and whether by endorsing a political party, the labour movement would be caught up in the patronage system.

Again, we rely on excerpts from the Proceedings.

The time has come in this Federation...when we must say to the rest of the Labour force

in Canada that we are behind them, that we are fed up with the patronage system. You have seen a union affiliated with this Federation destroyed by politicians¹ and this will continue. If the Liberal party goes out of power in four years do you believe the present Liberals in the Public Works Department will not be fired? Where are the Labour men in the Liberal party? There was not one elected. We are a vast majority in the population but we are not represented in the political parties. Every government is made up of lawyers, doctors and professionals; how can you have sympathy from these people who pay only lip service?

Delegate Yvon LeBlanc, Moncton...said we should get down to the problems of trade unionism before we branch out into politics. He felt we should not let this political business get a start in our Federation because, if we did, sooner or later we would find ourselves and our unions affiliated with a political party, our dues would go up and this will come about if we let it get a start.

...by bringing this New Brunswick Federation of Labour into politics, by endorsing the New Party, all they do is make a political machine of the Federation, which it was never intended to be.

The patronage issue had already been aired at the Convention, and references made to the possibility (or impossibility) of the New Democratic Party's doing anything about it, in the discussion of the following resolution:

Whereas: A firm commitment was given by

¹This is a reference to dismissals of government employees by the incoming New Brunswick government in 1960. Further information on this matter is contained in subsequent quotations from the Proceedings, below.

Premier Louis J. Robichaud when Mr. Robichaud was leader of the Opposition prior to the provincial election of June, 1960, that members of the Provincial Department of Public Works Unions who refrained from political activity would not be discriminated against if his party was elected to office; and

Whereas: Following the June, 1960, election which resulted in the election of the Liberal party as the government of this Province, wholesale dismissals took place merely on the recommendation of local political patronage committees without a proper investigation of charges made against individuals; therefore be it

Resolved: That this Federation of Labour representing all Organized Labour of this Province roundly condemn the dismissal of employees without just cause and call upon the Provincial Government to immediately institute arbitration procedure to investigate and rule upon the eligibility of re-employment of those employees claiming unjust dismissal.¹

The dismissal of government employees was of particular importance to the Federation because some 800 union members in thirteen locals were involved,² and the action of the government therefore posed a threat to the strength of the trade union movement. The employees' dismissal was roundly condemned by all participants in the debate; but what is of special interest to us here is the expression of opinions about how, or whether, it might be possible to stop arbitrary dismissals. One delegate, who subsequently spoke in favour of endorsing the New Party

¹Proceedings, p. 53. Quotations (below) from the debate on this Resolution may be found on pp. 53-7.

²Proceedings, pp. 16, 53.

was quite truculent:

I think we're all of the same agreement: that it's too bad that one government has to hang, but somebody's got to hang to correct the situation. I've had a little bit of experience, and know how the patronage committees operate. I know that about 99 per cent of this Convention knows it too. That everybody that votes wants a dollar back. That's human nature. On the other hand, this government guaranteed that they would not be fired, and they must live up to it. Our prestige is at stake, as far as the Federation of Labour is concerned, and it's time now to find out, are we Liberal, Conservative, are we Labour? How do you go about condemning them? It is all right to put a lot of words into a resolution. It makes you sound good, and it makes you feel good when you go home. We did that last time i.e. at the 1960 Convention. It didn't do any good. Exactly how far are we prepared to go?....If we are going to become enemies of the government, let's do so, and do a job of it. And if we can't do a job of it, well, let's just sit down and end it all.

The same speaker also had another idea:

...maybe they should give us the same system as I see worked in the province. Many of you have seen construction firms who are doing business with the Liberal party and the last eight years they were going business with the Conservative party. They've kicked in on both sides. Now if the contractors and companies are allowed to kick in on both sides, why didn't they tell us so that we could tell our union members that they could kick in on both sides too.

The expression of attitudes on the issue is rounded out by two further comments, both emphasizing the difficulty of ever getting rid of the system, "To the victor go the spoils."

As I look around here and see a lot of intelligent ladies and gentlemen I wonder if we are not all in kindergarten, when men past the juvenile age stand up and try to tell us that we could separate patronage from the political party. You might as well try to separate sex from a Christian marriage. And if the New Party is born, if you are ever going to get them into office, you are going to have to work and promise them something.

I was with the Federation when we met them at the Cabinet ⁷ in Fredericton. They all seemed to agree with us, sympathize. They hope they can do something ... but I have an opinion and it might be all of my own, that we are fighting the wrong people in this case. The people we are fighting with on behalf of these employees are not the people that are running this part of the country. The people that are running this part of our country are patronage committees and they're giving the orders to the M.L.A.'s, to the cabinet ministers and even to the Premier, because he admitted it in Campbellton¹ that they were the people that put him in power and they were the people he had to listen to because we questioned him on that point at length and he agreed time and time again that he had to take orders from these people, and I name them as "Woodshed Organizations." They were never elected by the people. It was the patronage committee of the Liberal party that did this and who are talking in the union halls. We were talking to the patronage committees of the Conservative party and we were asking them to do away with themselves, which they wouldn't do. They were willing to take a chance of letting the union go by the way-side, hang on to their patronage because in four years time when Robichaud comes

¹A reference to a private meeting between representatives of the Federation and Premier Robichaud at Campbellton, August 30, 1960. New Brunswick Federation of Labour, Official Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Convention, 1960, p. 43.

back for election from the people, they figure that their committee would be stronger and they could be the Robichaud government and they could fire all the ones that the Liberals hired. It's just one vicious circle. It has been with us for years and I think we have the bull by the wrong horn or the wrong bull by the tail, I don't know which. So that's why our Premier, and our cabinet ministers, and our M.L.A.'s hands were tied by committees. So the patronage committees rule, and your New Party, or any other party, you've got to solve the system of the patronage committee to have unions like we have here in Rexton to exist. It's not the government at all, and anyone who was there in Campbellton heard our honorable Premier admit that he had to listen to these certain people. I don't know who they are. I never met them, because they won't come out and show their faces where there's a good argument going on. They handle this back road stuff. So I say again, we are fighting the wrong system. Maybe there is a higher room of people that hold higher authority in this province today, much higher than is held in the cabinet chambers in Fredericton, and we haven't got to them yet because we will never find them.

It seems, from the debate about endorsing the N.D.P., that those who favoured political action did so primarily because they saw it as the only way of attacking the abuses of the present system of party politics; a few speakers also went beyond this to argue that the influence of the working man on the general policy of the government could thereby be augmented. Those supporters of the New Democratic Party who discussed the "personal freedom" issue did so to counter the objections of the opponents of political action. The latter, in discussing the

patronage issue, tended to minimize the effect which a new party would have in reforming party politics, and some even suggested that the New Party would be caught up in the system just as much as the Liberals and the Conservatives. In emphasizing that one's political preferences are a personal matter, as are one's religious beliefs, they declared that politics is no concern of trade unionism. They also implied that if the unions made incursions into politics, they would get their collective fingers burnt.

Thus we found in New Brunswick trade unions an echo, albeit a muffled one, of the desire which was quite widespread in Brome-Missisquoi to keep voluntary associations free of partisan entanglements. It must be recorded that our own interviews of trade unionists in Westmorland did not reveal any such hesitancy about political involvement, but our interviewees were far from a random sample in that they all held senior posts in the movement (unlike our union interviewees in Brome-Missisquoi). They indicated that by no means all union leaders supported the N.D.P., and a good many were active Liberals; there did not appear to be many Conservatives amongst the trade union leaders. We thought it significant, however, that one respondent, a full-time employee of the trade union movement and an active member of the N.D.P., expressed the opinion that "the trade union establishment" would probably not have hired him had he been a Liberal or a

Conservative. He also suggested that such a tendency to appoint N.D.P. supporters to union posts, if such a tendency does exist, may constitute an obstacle to the advance of French-speaking New Brunswickers in the ranks of organized labour, since many Acadians are associated with the Liberal Party.

The Federation of Agriculture and the cooperatives were careful to maintain their political neutrality, but some of the officers of these associations had been politically active as individuals. Two directors of the Co-operative Farm Services (Moncton) were candidates in the 1963 provincial election, one as a Liberal and one as a Conservative. They resigned their offices when they accepted the candidacy in order to preserve the non-partisan stance of the organization. After the election the victorious candidate, (the Liberal) was re-elected to his old position, although the fact that an active politician should hold office in the cooperative was a matter of some controversy. Apart from this incident, however, we heard of no attempt on the part of the cooperatives or of the Federation of Agriculture to restrict the political activities of their officers.

In respect of the pressure group activity of farm and labour organizations, we were impressed both by the competence of their leaders in assessing the effects of government legislation and administrative policies on their respective groups, and by the lack of overt sup-

port by rank and file members for the policies which these organizations were urging federal and provincial governments to adopt. This lack of participation by the membership presumably diminished the political weight which the requests of these groups carried. Somewhat paradoxically, this failure to mobilize the political resources of the group was most marked in the trade union movement, which had shown the greatest willingness to become directly involved in politics by endorsing a political party.

Farm organizations in Westmorland, in their role as pressure groups, were considerably aided by the fact that a man who formerly was one of the most prominent leaders in the Federation and in the cooperative movement later became a Member of the Legislative Assembly, where he was chairman of the Agriculture Committee. This man, Percy Mitton, was one of a small group who in the early 'fifties provoked a "revolution" (as one of the group put it) in the then-existing farm organization, and was instrumental in establishing the New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture. Prior to that time, there had existed a farmers' organization which had been restricted to an educative role since it was largely financed by government grants; this subsidization made it impossible to be at all effective as a pressure group. The present Federation was established in 1953 as a self-financed body, one of the main functions of which was to fight for government policies which would meet the needs of the farmers. Some

examples of the political demands of the Federation were given in the previous section of this chapter. Mr. Mitton had remained in close contact with the leaders of the Federation of Agriculture and of the cooperative movement; indeed, for some time he had been an officer of both bodies. Thus there had been no need for formal consultation procedures between them and the local M.L.A.'s; informal contacts were certainly adequate. Mr. Mitton was in a position to fight for the legislation requested by these organizations in the government caucus and on the floor of the House. According to his own testimony, he was a vigilant critic of the agricultural policies of the Government; he claimed (for example) that he had been instrumental in obtaining the withdrawal of a Farm Settlement Loans Bill during the committee stage, having opposed the Bill in caucus and later during second reading.¹ It is of some interest that Mitton had not discussed his stand on this issue with the constituency executive of the Liberal Party prior to taking this action, but he did explain it later, since he had opposed his own party on the Bill. As a rule, he said, he followed more the policy of the Federation of Agriculture than the policy of the Party.

¹ Mitton explained that this Bill would have provided for government loans for the establishment of new farms; he argued that this would only aggravate farm problems since the maximum sum for each loan was small (\$20,000) and it would therefore have encouraged the proliferation of small farms, rather than the consolidation of existing small farms into larger units.

For several years he also accompanied the executive of the Federation in their annual delegation to the Cabinet to present a brief concerning the government's farm policy.

The trade unions, in their role as pressure groups, relied on the presentation of briefs to the Cabinet in order to make their views known. The Federation of Labour presented an annual brief to the Cabinet, covering all areas of proposed legislation. Its contents were derived from the resolutions passed at the annual convention of the Federation. In addition to this, the Federation presented six or eight briefs each year on special topics (e.g. Labour Relations Act, Lord's Day Act, interim injunctions, federal meat inspection). Observers were invited to the annual meeting with the Cabinet, which was quite a formal affair. It consisted of the reading of the brief, the presentation being punctuated by Ministers' comments on specific points. About one hundred members turned up for the 1966 meeting to lend moral support to their executive. These representations, however, were not supported (at least not in Westmorland) by any vigorous action at the county level to convince the M.L.A.'s that union members were really concerned about the issues which were discussed between the provincial executive of the Federation and the Cabinet.

One possible way of increasing the effectiveness of trade unions as pressure groups might have been through

the activities of district labour councils. Each of the major centres of the province had a district labour council to which most union locals in the area sent representatives; and, if one may judge from resolutions put before the annual convention of the Federation, some of them were quite active in discussing political issues. We saw little evidence of this, however, in the Moncton and District Labour Council. The Council elected a Legislative Committee chairman, who was empowered to appoint members to form the committee; but the person who held this position while we were conducting our field research was reported to be rather inactive. The examples which were given to us of the Council's pressure group activities all related to municipal affairs--low-rental housing, promotions within the police force, municipal road-work. The Council also appealed to the provincial government to have a by-law annulled which would have raised the property qualification for members of the Moncton City Council, and in this they were successful. The major issues of provincial politics, however, were only infrequently discussed in the Council. On the other hand, the Council participated, through elected representatives, in the activities of a number of civic organizations such as the Board of School Trustees, the Hospital Board, the Town Planning Commission, Community Chest, Water Commission, Housing Board (low-rental housing), and the Y.M.C.A. Some of the labour representatives on these bodies were apparently

quite active. No doubt the influence of labour in these areas was increased by the fact that the president of the Moncton and District Labour Council and the chairman of the Legislation Committee "slept in the same bed as the mayor", as one informant put it. The president of the Council had been the mayor's campaign manager for several municipal elections.¹

Some support for the requests or demands made by the provincial executive of the Federation of Labour, although not a great deal, came from union locals. Naturally the degree of support varied a good deal from local to local. Most industrial (though not craft) union locals elected a political education chairman who, if he was active, provoked discussions on stands taken by the unions. By way of example, the New Brunswick Federation of Labour in 1966 began a campaign to amend the law relating to workmen's compensation. The officers of the Federation asked locals to send in resolutions on this topic. In some of the unions in Moncton members were asked to inform the executive of the local about problems experienced by them relating to compensation. The resulting information was used to formulate resolutions. At the time of our inquiry, some locals had forwarded resolutions to the Moncton and District Labour Council which intended to send a composite

¹This is of particular interest because the present mayor has long been associated with the Conservative Party, although in no official capacity.

resolution to the New Brunswick Federation of Labour; other locals were expected to contact the Federation executive directly.

Another example of the methods used by the unions in undertaking pressure group activity is that of the campaign which was launched by the Canadian Labour Congress to establish an auto accident compensation scheme analogous to the workmen's compensation program. The proposal envisaged a more comprehensive form of "unsatisfied judgment fund" for victims of highway accidents. A handbill published by the C.L.C. encouraged union members to have resolutions on this subject passed at meetings of their locals, and to forward them to the provincial premier; it also urged individual members to write to their member of the legislature.

In general, however, the normal practice was to place the burden of pressure group activities on the provincial executive. This being the case, we cannot help feeling that their representations must often have been unconvincing in the sense that the Government had no evidence that the demands they made had much support among union members as a whole.

The fact that labour organizations within Westmorland County did not make any concerted attempt to enlist the support of M.L.A.'s in furthering their group interests is probably attributable in part to sheer lethargy and in part to the assumption that the M.L.A.'s influence on the

formulation of policy was insignificant. Since many union leaders were directly active in the New Democratic Party and others in the Liberal Party (some of them not openly), the failure to hold group discussions etc. with M.L.A.'s cannot (it seems) be attributed to any desire to follow a politically neutral course. In Brome-Missisquoi, the lack of contact with the député seemed to be due in part to a feeling that excessively close relations with a partisan figure (even if he had been elected to the legislature) might compromise an organization politically; not so in Westmorland. Perhaps the difference may be attributed to the fact that the union leaders whom we interviewed in Westmorland were more senior officers of the union movement. On the other hand it is interesting to note that one informant, a senior officer in the Conservative Party (not a trade unionist) said that voluntary associations and municipal councils generally abstained from contacting the opposition party concerning matters of policy, except by sending a copy of briefs or other formal communications to the leader of the Opposition: "As a (municipal) council you could work with the Government but not with the Opposition." This view, he said, was a generally-held one amongst organizations in New Brunswick. Thus prevailing ideas about what kind of action may be construed to be partisan in nature did probably limit the effectiveness of pressure group action, because to be fully effective as a pressure group, an organization must either participate in

partisan affairs, or undertake non-partisan political activity involving contact with both (or all) major parties.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Before describing the organizational structure of political parties, and the political attitudes of those who manned them, let us review what we have discovered so far about the county of Westmorland.

Structural changes in the economy, and in particular a very rapid contraction in the primary sector, have produced corresponding changes in the structure of society. The evolution of the economy and the society has been similar to that which we observed in Brome-Missisquoi. Indeed, the same process is common to the many parts of eastern Canada (and elsewhere) where technological change continues to hasten the pace of industrialization and urbanization. In this respect the chief difference from Brome-Missisquoi is that Moncton is a larger city and provides a wider range of services for the surrounding territory than any of the towns in Brome-Missisquoi; correspondingly wider employment opportunities for highly-qualified people are available. Moreover, Moncton is one of the leading population centres in New Brunswick. For these two reasons one finds in Moncton and the surrounding area participants in voluntary associations on a provincial scale.

In view of the more eminent position of Moncton, by comparison with the towns of Brome-Missisquoi, it is not surprising that leaders of voluntary associations in Westmorland were found to be generally more capable of analyzing their own position relative to other groups, and also quicker to realize the political aspects of this position than the community leaders in Brome-Missisquoi. The evidence for this statement is to be found in the briefs presented to the provincial government, and in the role of some of our interviewees in preparing these briefs and discussing them with the Cabinet. The presence of these leaders, however, did not seem to have developed a greater general awareness of social problems of particular groups, and of the political action which might appropriately be taken to meet the needs of the group. Especially in the labour movement, we felt that there was a gulf--largely a gulf of competence or understanding--between leaders and rank and file. It must, however, frankly be admitted that a fuller investigation would be necessary to establish this with certainty. Our second major observation concerning the expression of group interests through voluntary associations is that some sectors of the population were virtually without leadership of the kind which we have been examining in the previous two sections of this chapter. In general, groups such as fishermen and part-time or seasonal labourers--the groups which were most adversely affected by the changes in the economy and

were faced with serious problems of social adjustment-- were those lacking in leaders.

Two major questions concerning the functions of political parties arise from the foregoing summary of conditions in Westmorland. First, did the development of voluntary associations have any observable effect on the structure and activities of political parties? Second, what were the parties doing, or what could they do, to articulate the needs of those groups which are scarcely represented by voluntary associations?

Our judgment on the foregoing questions was earlier expressed as follows:

There is a tendency among party workers at the constituency level to apply palliative solutions to the problems which gave rise to group conflicts. Thus constituency party organizations are quite ineffective in articulating certain categories of political demands. Moreover, by fostering the retention of partisan loyalties, they have probably hindered voluntary associations in performing the interest-articulation function.¹

This view, which was formed during the course of our field research in Brome-Missisquoi, was strongly reinforced by our observation of the structure and activities of political parties in Westmorland, and of the political attitudes of their personnel. Whereas one might have imagined that the political parties would have been affected by the existence of farm and labour organizations which were

¹Above, p. 94.

highly capable of expressing the political objectives of their members, in fact this does not appear to have been the case. The parties remained oriented to a purely electoral role and (with electoral objectives in view) to the distribution of patronage. Perhaps this is not too surprising in view of the fact that voluntary associations, in their pressure group activities, generally bypassed the local M.L.A.'s and totally ignored county party organizations. The case of Percy Mitton, the M.L.A. who formerly was a senior officer in the Federation of Agriculture and in the cooperative movement, was exceptional. Nevertheless, as will become evident later, he did not attempt to re-orient the Liberal party in his area to undertake policy-oriented activities.

In sum, voluntary associations and their pressure group activities did not have any observable effect on constituency political parties; there simply appeared to be a widening of the gap in political attitudes between the leaders of voluntary associations and the party activists. On the other hand, our inquiries did not enable us to estimate whether a similar gap in attitudes existed between party activists and the ordinary membership of farm and labour organizations. There may well have been a real difference in political attitudes between the leaders of voluntary associations and their less active members. This situation presumably would explain why the N.D.P., which had the support of a substantial proportion

of trade union leaders, did not have wider support amongst rank and file trade unionists. As for the role of political parties in representing those groups whose interests were not expressed by voluntary associations, the problems of individuals received a good deal of attention in the patronage committees, but party organizations were completely incapable of dealing with or even discussing the major problems of the area--those problems which affect occupation-groups or classes as a whole. Our evidence for this judgment rests, as it did in our study of Bromel-Missisquoi, on an analysis of the structures and activities of political parties, and of the interests of party workers.

We limited our study of political parties to the Conservatives and the Liberals. The New Democratic Party in Westmorland was not in a position effectively to challenge the hegemony of the two old parties.¹ No satisfactory comparison therefore could be made between the functions performed by this party and the older ones--there was, for instance, no possibility of the N.D.P.'s being involved in the distribution of patronage, and it was consequently impossible to compare N.D.P. supporters' interest in this activity with their interest in policy-oriented activities. Or rather, it is obvious that N.D.P.

¹In the 1965 general election the N.D.P. obtained 14 per cent of the popular vote; it did not enter any candidates in the 1963 provincial election anywhere in the province.

activists were not primarily concerned with the distribution of patronage, since the prospects of there being any patronage were extremely remote. One question which would be of substantial interest is, Who voted for the New Democratic Party--or, perhaps, Who refused to vote either Liberal or Conservative? This is a question which we are unable to answer in the present study. Nevertheless, our interviews with trade unionists were sufficient to indicate that the party depended heavily on the trade unions to supply party workers; it may not be an exaggeration to say that the core of the party in Westmorland was provided by the labour movement.¹

With regard to the structure of political parties in Westmorland, the fact of major importance is that no attempt had been made in either party to establish the machinery which would enable them to undertake policy-oriented activities. Neither party had an official membership list. Those who were active were those who had been appointed to organize polls, or who had been given some kind of authority in the distribution of patronage. Candidates were nominated, as in other constituencies, by election at a convention, but since poll organizations were set up and maintained through the action of elected Members or previous candidates, or by a constituency

¹The reader is referred back to our earlier discussion of the arguments raised in the 1961 Convention of the New Brunswick Federation of Labour in favour of supporting the New Democratic Party. Above, pp. 212-220.

executive which controlled election funds, the organization was democratic in only a restricted sense. Within the circle of those who were "in", ultimate authority was diffused by the custom of nominating candidates in convention, and also to a certain extent by the necessity, if the organization was to function smoothly, of agreeing on who should be entrusted with responsibility of organizing polls (i.e. dispensing the party's cash allotted to each poll). Nevertheless one can appreciate how power in the organization could be concentrated in a few hands, with campaign funds and patronage as the instruments of control.

The way in which a Member could control his organization will perhaps be made clearer by describing how one M.L.A. ejected some organizers whom he did not want. He had three tactics to get rid of a man:

- (1) To refuse to consult him on patronage matters, deciding location of roads, etc. This forced applicants to come to him personally, or else to someone whom he appointed to replace the old patronage-agent.
- (2) To refuse to give him money to organize a poll during elections. By way of example, we may note one case where our informant wanted to remove a man whom he knew was not doing the job. Some of the other party workers objected to this, so he was given the \$75 to run his poll, but our informant purposely did nothing to see that the job was being properly carried out. The money, apparently, was not spent--no drivers were hired, no outside-the-poll men were hired; and the party lost the poll by a two-to-one majority. In the next election, at the meeting to appoint poll representatives, the M.L.A. accused the old organizer of having simply pocketed the money, noting that other poll organizers had hired a certain number of workers, given an

account of their expenditures, and (in some cases) returned what was left over. In view of this indictment, the party workers agreed to vest responsibility for the poll in another man; and in that election the standing of the party improved substantially.

(3) To tell him: "You ought to talk less and say more." ("I haven't seen him since.")

By these means, our informant had turfed out several organizers who, he alleged, "wanted everything for themselves." His tactics provoked a group of them to see the Premier prior to the 1963 election, and to ask him not to approve our informant as a candidate. He also declared that the Premier had said there was a steady stream of complaints against him, but the Premier simply awaited the results of the 1963 election before acting. Presumably if the party's vote had dropped substantially in the M.L.A.'s area, the Premier would have intervened. Our informant also said that his opponents had sought (unsuccessfully) to steer the nomination in 1963 to another man. In sum, the success of the M.L.A. against these attempts at his political life would seem to indicate the strength of a Member in controlling his organization. On the other hand, one can appreciate the dangers involved in alienating a declared supporter. It is significant that in getting rid of the old gang, our informant had to move slowly; the whole process, he said, took five years.

It would appear, therefore, that the organizational structure of political parties in Westmorland was simply a mask for the power relationships which existed between

key individuals. No attempt had been made to provide a mass membership base on which to build a party adapted to the role of transmitting popular demands to party leaders, or of explaining party policy to the public. The effort, which we noted in Brome-Missisquoi, to establish democratic party structures had no counterpart in Westmorland.

One interesting feature of the structure of parties in Westmorland was the relationship between Federal and provincial wings of the organization. The county itself makes up one federal riding. For provincial politics, Westmorland is divided into two multi-member constituencies: the city of Moncton, and the surrounding territory which is generally referred to as "the county." Moncton has two Members; the county has four. In Westmorland, therefore, both parties had three executives: one federal and two provincial ones. In practice, the distinction between them was not important, however, since the same people were found at both levels; the only real purpose served by having three executives was to separate Moncton from "the county" in provincial politics, not to separate the federal organization from the provincial ones. As further proof of the close relationship between federal and provincial politics, it may be noted that the Liberal M.L.A.'s were all active in the last federal campaign, and presumably the situation would have been the same in the Conservative Party had there been any Conservatives elected to the provincial legislature.

Concerning the activities of the parties, there is nothing to report save that the parties had undertaken no activities beyond the organizing of elections and, for the party in power, the distribution of patronage. At the same time we did our field research, the Conservative Party was in opposition at both the federal and the provincial levels; consequently, apart from a provincial by-election campaign in September 1965 (at which time we were not in the riding) the party was almost totally inactive. Not even the executives held any meetings. This lack of vitality was acknowledged and deplored by some members of the executive, but (as one of them pointed out) the chief interest of party workers is in political appointments and in making decisions concerning road repairs and other local matters. A party out of power has no authority in such things, so that there was nothing left to do.

The political parties had evolved an organizational structure which was well adapted to dealing with the numerous requests for employment, social welfare payments, and (from communities) local public works; that is to say, they had set up a sort of administrative machinery which played a role complementary to that of the regular civil service. In the Conservative Party this machinery had gone into hibernation (as it were), but the mechanisms for handling "problems" were easily observable in the Liberal party. The prime feature of party organization was a high degree of decentralization, which was achieved

by dividing and sub-dividing the area on a territorial basis. The fundamental division was that between Moncton and "the county", since these are two separate provincial constituencies. Within "the county", each of the four M.L.A.'s had a specific territory for which he was responsible and within which he had authority. One M.L.A. reported that if an individual from outside his district came to see him about a problem, he would do what he could for him; nevertheless, there was an agreement between the four M.L.A.'s not to act in any way which would diminish the authority of one of the others in his own territory. This practice was illustrated by the following story, which was told us by another member. In one part of the county there were two individuals who had quarrelled with the M.L.A. for that district. They had lumber to sell to the government--cedar and hemlock, which is good for road-work because it rots more slowly underground than other woods; but it has little structural value and is therefore useless to private contractors. They were faced with the problem of selling the lumber to the government, and tried to do this without asking for endorsement of the sale by the M.L.A. They contacted the local road engineer, who said that instructions had to come from Fredericton. In Fredericton the civil service said they could act only on recommendation from the M.L.A. Then the two men approached one of the other Members, from a different part of the county, but he refused to sign because it was outside his

territory. Such an action would have weakened the control which our informant had over his own organization. It is very important to note that this does not mean that such purchases would be made only from those of the right political stripe: it is significant that the member who told us this indicated his willingness to sign if the two persons involved asked him to--what he was concerned with was proving to them that it was he who was in control. If he had lost control, his organization would have fallen apart.

No territorial division of authority between the two M.L.A.'s existed within the city of Moncton.

Within "the county" there was a party committee for each of the seven parishes. There was also a further subdivision into districts which contained up to seven or eight polls, each with its own committee; and in addition there were, of course, poll organizations. Normally requests, whether for matters of federal or of provincial jurisdiction, were made to the chairmen of the district committees or parish committees, and the more important problems were referred to the county executive. Thus the party organization served as a device for channelling requests to the Members; one M.L.A. stated that he was kept busy three days a week seeing people who were put in contact with him by his parish or district committees. The Member, for his part, would consult the appropriate committee before making appointments, awarding contracts, or endorsing purchasing orders. Consultation was necessary

because it was an established practice to employ local people for local work, with preference going to people of the right party. One M.L.A. also said that he received a good many requests which fell within federal jurisdiction (employment in the C.N.R.; fisheries). After contacting his committees to check up on their party affiliation, he took action either through the federal M.P., or he might contact one of the federal Ministers, who was a personal acquaintance.

Consultation with district or parish committees appeared to take place informally, although a meeting might be called if there was criticism of the actions of the Member in performing his constituency duties. This aspect of the activities of the organization appeared to vary somewhat according to the Member involved; some saw their committeemen and called meetings more frequently than others. But though the formality of consultation might vary, it was clear that in each case the committees provided an important link between the Member and his constituents, both in relaying to him complaints and requests of the population, and in advising him on appointments and other matters. The county executive itself was generally involved only in matters of substantial (though local) importance, such as the granting of an important contract. Meetings of the county executive were held whenever there were enough of these problems to warrant it - perhaps three or four times a year - or when (as sometimes happen-

ed) some district committees felt that they were not getting their share of the government largesse. In election time, of course, there are the problems of the campaign to discuss; in an election year there might be about twice the usual number of meetings. The agenda was limited to organizational matters and the distribution of government money. In the words of one informant: "Les problèmes véritables n'intéressent pas les militants. Ce sont les petits intérêts qui dominent les réunions.... Je ne crois pas avoir eu d'assemblée d'exécutif pour essayer de chercher et gruger un problème fondamental comme la pêche par exemple."

It must be emphasized that although our information concerning mechanisms for distributing the patronage was drawn from the activities of the Liberal party, it is not the practices or malpractices of one party which are being described; it is the political customs of the area. The importance of patronage in the life of the province was acknowledged and accepted by partisans on both sides of the fence; as one prominent Conservative said, political appointments must be made locally and, "They have to go to one of your own." Not surprisingly, those at the lowest economic levels are those who are most heavily dependent on the patronage and who encourage the retention of the practice of distributing government money and employment on a discretionary basis (i.e. as patronage, through the party committees). Many of those who are eligible for

social welfare payments do not know the rules and prefer to go to someone who is available--their Member--and who can tell them how to apply for assistance. The notion persists, although how widely we cannot say, that it requires someone with good contacts, someone with influence, to get what is really due a person as a matter of right, by legislation. Perhaps even more important, for the poor, is the obtaining of casual employment through the party, and this does require someone in the right position to intervene on the applicant's behalf. There is no trouble obtaining employment for skilled workers, but the vast majority of requests for employment come from those who can work only with pick and shovel; for them road-work or building a wharf may be an important source of income. The fact that so many people cannot do without the patronage system is what keeps the system alive, although a further reason for its persistence is that the dispensers of patronage find this activity interesting and enjoyable; for them it is a source of social prestige and perhaps profit. This letter culled from the Moncton Daily Times, may give some of the flavour of attitudes towards patronage:

To the Editor:

I think that Louis Robichaud is a good premier but does he know how his supporters are used? Almost every boy leaves Kent County as soon as he reaches 18 years. Why? I'll tell you why!

If he is English he cannot get work because he is English. If he is French the excuse is that he is not married.

Many of these boys go away to find work

and never return. The old homestead falls down, the land becomes covered with bushes, no one pays the taxes. I can count six such places from my windows. I know of four families which closed their nice homes and went to the U.S. because they were not used right in Kent County.

We supported the Liberal government all our lives, yet when one of our boys asked for a few days work where they were fixing a stretch of road, he was told "No." Yet they hired men who own acres of woodland and big farms. Why? You tell me!

A Taxpayer.

Conclusion: Political parties perform an important function in dealing with problems on an individual level. For those at the bottom of the economic scale, the help given by their local Member may be very important to them, even if what is involved is no more than filling out a form for social assistance which the individual does not know how to do. Nevertheless this kind of response is inadequate in view of the problems which are faced by the people in an area like Westmorland, although Westmorland, as we have pointed out, is one of the more prosperous areas of New Brunswick. One Member said, when we asked how (if at all) the parties could improve the position of those who lacked other organizations to represent their interest, "Well, they have their committees." The kind of response from the political parties which is implied by this remark is in the nature of a palliative; it is a rather short-lasting sweetener for the bitter pill of chronic unemployment or

¹Moncton Daily Times, August 20, 1965.

economic deprivation. The danger is that this solution will be mistakenly regarded as good enough, when in fact it does nothing to meet the fundamental problems of the society.

If political parties are to play an important role in making the Canadian political system responsive to social needs and political demands, then they must adapt themselves to undertake additional activities, besides organizing elections, distributing the patronage and allocating public works expenditure. They must serve as a channel of communication between the people and the government; and for this they must be sensitive to the basic problems of the area in which they exist, as well as to the short-run problems which face individuals within each constituency. Attention to the latter is important, but it is, like patriotism, "not enough." What we attempted to do in our study of political parties in Westmorland was to see whether they had expanded their activities beyond the organizing of elections and distributing the patronage, to include policy-oriented activities. We have seen that they clearly were not organized for the latter purpose. For this reason it appears that in Westmorland party workers tended to apply palliative solutions to the problems which gave rise of group conflicts, of the kind which occupied our attention in the opening section of this chapter.

CHAPTER 5

ST. HENRI

Autrefois, c'était ici [à la rue St. Ambroise, près du canal Lachine] les confins du faubourg; les dernières maisons de Saint Henri apparaissaient là, face à des champs vagues; un air presque limpide, presque agreste flottait autour de leurs pignons simples et de leurs jardinets. De ces bons temps, il n'est resté à la rue Saint-Ambroise que deux ou trois grands arbres poussant encore leurs racines sous le ciment du trottoir.

Les filatures, les élévateurs à blé, les entrepôts ont surgi devant les maisons de bois, leur dérobant la brise des espaces ouverts, les emmurant lentement, solidement. Elles sont toujours là avec leurs petits balcons de fer forgé, leurs façades paisibles, leur petite musique douce qui s'élève parfois le soir derrière les volets et coule dans le silence, comme la voix d'une autre époque: îlots perdus sur lesquels le vent rabat les odeurs de tous les continents. La nuit n'est jamais si froide qu'elle n'arrache à la cité des entrepôts des senteurs de blé moulu de céréales pulvérisées, d'huile rance, de mélasse, de cacahuètes de fourrures, de farine blanche et de pins résineux.

Jean avait choisi de s'y établir parce que, dans cette rue éloignée, presque inconnue, le prix des loyers restait fort modique, et puis, parce que le quartier, avec le roulement, le battement, les sifflements de ses fins de jour et les grands silences inquiets de ses nuits l'aiguillonnait au travail.

Il est vrai qu'au printemps les nuits n'avaient plus de silence. Dès que s'ouvrait la navigation, le cri cent fois répété de la sirène, le cri qui jaillissait au bas de la chaussée Saint-Ambroise depuis le couchant jusqu'à l'aube, montait sur le faubourg et, porté par le vent, atteignait même le Mont-Royal.

Gabrielle Roy¹

¹Gabrielle Roy, Bonheur d'occasion (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1965), p. 28.

The old town of St. Henri, which was annexed to Montreal in 1905, has become a working-class district of the larger city. It retains the physical barriers which separate it from the rest of the city--on the north, the C.P.R. tracks which are located at the edge of a fifty-foot cliff; on the West, the Turcot marshalling yards of the C.N.R., and on the south, the Lachine Canal. At the eastern edge, St. Henri adjoins the former town of Ste. Cunégonde, which itself abuts the now largely depopulated commercial centre of the city. There is, therefore, a geographically-distinct area consisting of the former towns of St. Henri and Ste. Cunegonde; but these "towns" have lost the heterogeneity of class composition and occupation structure which they once had. Together they form a quartier which is partly commercial and industrial but which nevertheless contains about fifty thousand people, a very heavy majority of whom are working-class.

The federal and provincial constituencies of St. Henri, which are almost identical to each other, consist of two parts which, as a glance at the map¹ will indicate, are scarcely even geographically contiguous. One part is a fragment of the old quartier St. Henri, which we have briefly described, and the other is known locally as Ville

¹The map is located at the end of Chapter VII, on a fold-out sheet.

Emard, although it too has been incorporated into the City of Montreal. Ville Emard lies south and slightly to the west of St. Henri, across the Lachine Canal. Like St. Henri, it forms a distinctive geographical unit, since it is wedged between the Canal and the Montreal Aqueduct (which almost join at the north-eastern tip of Ville Emard) and is bordered on the west by a large park which separates it from the suburban Ville Lasalle. Ville Emard is, by comparison with St. Henri, distinctly newer and income levels are also noticeably higher there. In view of this difference and of the geographical distinctness of the two parts of the constituency one might imagine that they would have little in common with each other. On the other hand, according to the testimony of a number of residents of the area, there has been a substantial shift of population from the old St. Henri to Ville Emard, so that social ties have been created and are maintained between the two areas. Some of our informants from St. Henri seemed to think of Ville Emard as simply an extension of their quartier; but it appeared that many people in Ville Emard do not share this view. Perhaps the residents of the higher-status district do not wish to be associated with St. Henri.

Let us take a closer look at St. Henri itself.

One of the most obvious physical features of the quartier is the presence of the C.N.R. tracks which divide

it lengthwise into two narrow strips running east and west. At the western end there are eight tracks side by side, which accordingly take up a substantial amount of terrain. The old St. Henri station, now demolished, once stood at the centre of the quartier, at the Place St. Henri, where the two most heavily-travelled streets in the district, St. Jacques (the main entry to the city from the west) and Notre Dame almost join, and then diverge again. The character of this spot is little changed from what it was in the 1940's, as it was described by Gabrielle Roy:

Un long tremblement gagna le faubourg. A la rue Atwater, à la rue Rose-de-Lima, à la rue du Couvent et maintenant place Saint-Henri, les barrières des passages à niveau tombaient. Ici, au carrefour des deux artères principales, leurs huit bras de noir et de blanc, leurs huit bras de bois où luisaient des fanaux rouges se rejoignaient et arrêtaient la circulation.

A ces quatre intersections rapprochées la foule, matin et soir, piétinait et des rangs pressés d'automobiles y ronronnaient à l'étoffée. Souvent alors des coups de klaxons furieux animaient l'air comme si Saint-Henri eut brusquement exprimé son exaspération contre ces trains hurleurs qui, d'heure en heure, le découpent violemment en deux parties.

Le train passa. Une acre odeur de charbon emplit la rue. Un tourbillon de suie oscilla entre le ciel et le faîte des maisons. La suie commençant à descendre, le clocher de Saint-Henri se dessina d'abord, sans base, comme une flèche fantôme dans les nuages. L'horloge apparut; son cadran illuminé fit une trouée dans les trainées de vapeur; puis, peu à peu, l'église entière se dégagea, haute architecture de style jésuite. Au centre du parterre, un Sacré-Coeur, les bras ouverts, recevait les dernières parcelles de charbon. La paroisse surgissait. Elle se recomposait dans sa tranquillité et sa puissance de

durée. Ecole, église, couvent: bloc séculaire fortement noué au cœur de la jungle citadine comme au creux des vallons laurentiens. Au delà s'ouvraient des rues à maisons basses, s'enfonçant de chaque côté vers les quartiers de grande misère, en haut vers la rue Workman et la rue Saint-Antoine, et, en bas, contre le canal de Lachine où Saint-Henri tape les matelas, tisse le fil, la soie, le coton, pousse le métier, dévide les bobines, cependant que la terre tremble, que les trains dévalent, que la sirène éclate, que les bateaux, hélices, rails et sifflets épellent autour de lui l'aventure.¹

Not far from the Place St. Henri is the Parc Cartier, traditionally the place where the elite of the quartier have lived. It occupies a fairly large city square, at one end of which is the parish church of St. Zotique, and at the other end a school, while along the two sides are ranged three-storey stone houses attached together in a single block. These generally contain a separate dwelling on each floor, with outside staircases up to the second storey - a type of residential construction which is very common in the moderately-old parts of Montreal. Although these houses appear still to be in very good condition, in other parts of St. Henri it is quite otherwise.

One of the salient features of St. Henri is the deterioration of the housing. All the houses are at least half a century old, and many of them substantially older. If one may judge by studies made for an urban renewal

¹op. cit., p. 32.

scheme which includes the eastern edge of our area, a substantial proportion of the houses are structurally sound though perhaps in ill-repair. This impression is confirmed by the fact that of the 7000 dwellings in the part of St. Henri which concerns us, the census lists only about 400 as in need of major repair--i.e. with one or more major structural deficiencies.¹ Nevertheless, a substantial proportion of the dwellings are crowded, and a startlingly large percentage are without hot water, bath, or shower. More specific information on these matters is contained in Table V - 1. It must be made clear that the data are not absolutely accurate because the census tract boundaries do not coincide exactly with the boundaries of the constituencies (federal and provincial) of St. Henri; nevertheless there is sufficiently close correspondence to supply data which are quite accurate enough for our present purposes. In Table V -1 and in all following tables, "St. Henri" refers to only that part of the quartier which is within the constituency. The table also contains data for Ville Emard (i.e. the other part of the constituency) and for the Montreal metropolitan area.

¹ Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census, 1961, Bulletin CT-4 ("Population and Housing Conditions by Census Tracts"), Table 2, p. 34.

TABLE V-1

HOUSING CONDITIONS AND MATERIAL COMFORTS, 1961

	St. Henri	Ville Emard	Metropolitan Area
crowded dwellings ^a	26.9%	19.7%	16.5%
dwellings with bath or shower	53.9	96.3	92.4
dwellings with television	91.0	94.7	92.0
dwellings with automobile	35.2	47.5	54.1

^aThe census definition of a crowded dwelling is "one in which the number of persons exceeds the number of rooms occupied".

Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census, 1961. Bulletin CT-4. ("Population and Housing Conditions by Census Tracts"), Table 2, pp. 30, 34, 35.

The characteristic architectural style is a solid row of brick or sometimes stone houses of two to four storeys; on some streets the facade is broken by periodic archways leading into a courtyard where the residents park their cars, hang out the wash, sit on wooden balconies and talk to neighbours opposite; these fonds-de-cours and the streets are children's play-areas.

The most unpleasant feature of the quartier as a residential district is the noise, smoke, and dirt which emanate from the factories which border on and indeed

invade the quartier. This, and the often dilapidated condition of the housing, have given St. Henri the reputation of being a place where people live because they cannot afford better. Our own inquiries in the area convinced us that many of the people in St. Henri do not have such an attitude about their own quartier but that, on the contrary, a number of people continue to live there although they could easily afford to go elsewhere. We met several people of this kind, who explained their staying in St. Henri by stressing the "neighbourhood" character of the district and indicating that community ties are strong there. We had no way, however, of telling how substantial a proportion of the residents of St. Henri live there, as it were, by choice. One clue, which suggested that the proportion is not large, is that census data indicate a very heavy preponderance of skilled and unskilled workers, workers in transport and communications, a smaller but moderately important proportion of white collar workers, and only a small percentage of people in the professional-technical and managerial occupation categories. Data relating to some indices of socio-economic status are contained in Table V-2. In 1961, incomes of male wage-earners in St. Henri averaged from \$2841 to \$3177, according to census tract; and from \$3190 to \$3889 in Ville Emard, compared with a Montreal metropolitan average of \$3972. This did not, of course, represent total family income, because

TABLE V-2

INDICES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, 1961

Occupation (Males)	St. Henri	Ville Émard	Metropolitan Area
Managerial, professional, and technical	6.0%	11.0%	22.8%
Clerical, Sales, Service and recreation	23.5	26.2	27.9
Craftsmen, production process and related workers	39.5	42.2	33.5
Transport and communications	17.5	12.2	9.0
Labourers (unskilled)	13.0	7.8	5.9
Primary	.5	.6	1.0
<u>Income level (male wage-earners)</u>			
\$2999 or less	39.6%	20.8%	29.5%
\$3999 or less	73.5	49.9	53.9
\$6000 or more	1.5	4.6	27.2
<u>Education (population aged over 5, not attending school)</u>			
no schooling	6.4%	1.0%	4.8%
elementary schooling only	63.1	53.7	43.4
university (one or more years)	1.5	2.2	7.5

Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census, 1961. Bulletin CT-4 ("Population and Housing Conditions by Census Tracts"), Table 1, pp. 4, 8, 9, and Table 3, pp. 56, 60, 61.

families apparently contained more than a single wage-earner. Average family income ranged from \$3922 to \$4475 in St. Henri, and from \$4399 to \$5133 in Ville-Emard, compared with the Metropolitan average of \$5295.¹

A recent study of St. Henri by a social worker who has been active in the area, Michel Blondin, describes the population of the quartier in the following way:

La crise économique des années trente provoque des transformations décisives. Montréal se développa vers le nord et vers l'est. Des zones résidentielles apparaissent à proximité de Saint-Henri: Ville-Emard, Verdun, Lachine, Ville-Lasalle. On peut dater de cette époque le début d'une émigration hors de Saint-Henri qui se poursuit toujours. Les éléments les plus dynamiques, et souvent les plus fortunés, quittent le quartier pour s'établir ailleurs. Les hommes de profession et les commerçants continuent à exercer leur métier dans le quartier mais élisent domicile dans des quartiers plus attrayants.

En conséquence, Saint-Henri se compose de deux catégories de population: les ouvriers et les indigents. Les ouvriers retirent de leur travail de médiocres revenus. Non qualifiés, ils exercent leur activité soit dans les transports, soit dans des industries anciennes et peu mécanisées du quartier. Ils ont peu de chance de voir leurs revenus augmenter substantiellement. S'ils sont syndiqués, ils sont peu actifs dans leurs syndicats. Ils sont stables à l'emploi et leur vie familiale est fréquemment d'une haute qualité.

L'autre portion de la population comprend des personnes ou des familles qui tirent leurs revenus de l'assistance publique ou de sources très irrégulières. Ce sont des chômeurs, des instables, des inaptes au travail, des invalides, des mères nécessiteuses. Selon le témoignage de curés et

¹Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census, 1961, Bulletin CT-4 ("Population and Housing Conditions by Census Tracts"), Tables 2 and 3, pp. 30, 34, 35, 56, 60, 61.

d'autres observateurs, leur nombre s'accroîtrait sans cesse car les nouveaux arrivants dans le quartier appartiennent à cette catégorie. On peut les caractériser tous par l'instabilité et l'insécurité. Ils constituent une strate sociale inférieure qu'il faut distinguer des ouvriers dont nous venons de parler. Géographiquement, ils sont concentrés à l'est et au sud du quartier tandis que les ouvriers habitent plutôt au nord et à l'ouest.¹

This description is of the whole quartier; the fragment of it which is included in the federal and provincial constituencies of St. Henri occupies the southwest quadrant of the whole. The population within the constituencies--if the foregoing statement is accurate--thus tends to be of the first sort described rather than the second, that is, workers with a steady job rather than those on public assistance. This coincides with our own impressions, although we had no very solid evidence on the question. On the other hand, one informant (a curé) mentioned that the demolition of some parts of the area to the east for Expo (the World's Fair, 1967) construction and the building of expressways had resulted in an influx of population from the east. The people who were moving in were reported to be considered, by many residents of St. Henri, to be of inferior character or social standing; the result was an efflux of the existing population in St. Henri to the south-

¹ Michel Blondin, "L'animation sociale en milieu urbain: Une solution," Recherches Sociographiques, v. 6 N° 4 (septembre-décembre 1965), p. 285.

west, especially to Ville Émard. If so, these developments were probably only hastening a process already begun. Table V-3 gives evidence of a long-term decline in population in St. Henri, and a rather faster increase in population in Ville Émard.

TABLE V-3

DEMOGRAPHY

<u>Population</u>	<u>St. Henri</u>	<u>Ville Émard</u>	<u>Metropolitan Area</u>
1941	34,345	26,839	1,145,282
1951	33,161	32,098	1,395,400
1956	29,799	40,654	1,745,001
1961	27,726	45,445	2,109,509

Age-groups (Males, 1961)

0-19	41.9%	39.4%	39.5%
20-64	52.7	56.1	55.1
65 +	5.4	4.5	5.4

Net migration 1951-1961

Age-group 10-14 in 1951	-29.6%	+49.0%	+61.3%
Age-group 15-24 in 1951	-30.7	+40.4	+52.9

Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census, 1951, Bulletin CT-3, Table 1, pp. 4-6; 1961, Bulletin CT-4, Table 1, pp. 4, 8-9.

It is interesting to note, however, that the decline in the population of St. Henri has not been sufficiently rapid to increase the rate of old-age dependency beyond the average for the metropolitan area. Nor, indeed, should one be surprised at the net emigration of the young-adult group; for some years there has been no unused space in St. Henri

and consequently no expansion in housing. In such a situation a substantial proportion of young people must establish themselves elsewhere when they start to raise their own families. There is, therefore, no evidence from the census data that the gradual efflux of population from St. Henri has been debilitating to the area.

It is difficult to obtain clues from the census data concerning the proportion of transients in St. Henri. It is certainly not an area which has attracted many immigrants--of the 1961 population, only 1.6% had come to Canada since 1946, compared with 9.3% for Ville Emard.¹

We also know that people change lodgings fairly often--in 1961, 44.6% of the population over five years old were living in a dwelling other than that which they occupied in 1956. Comparable figures are: for Ville Emard, 55.3%; and for the Montreal metropolitan area, 53.1%.² The fact that there is quite a rapid turnover in housing, however, is not the same thing as saying that much of the population is transient. If we exclude from our calculations the 0.3% of the population who had immigrated during these five years and taken up residence in St. Henri, 84.6% of those who moved between 1956 and 1961 came from within the centre of the Montreal metropolitan area,

¹Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census, 1961, Bulletin CT-4, Table I, p. 8-9.

²Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census 1961. Bulletin CX-1 (Catalogue 95-541), pp. 14, 48-9 (No Table number)

and only 5.0% came from parts of the province outside the metropolitan area.¹ Thus it seems that much of the moving around occurred within the centre of the metropolitan area--but how much of it occurred within the same neighbourhood? This is a crucial question, because a person who moves just around the corner and retains his old circle of friends can hardly be called a transient; but on this question the census supplies no information. For this reason it is difficult, as we have just stated, to obtain clues from the census data concerning the proportion of transients in St. Henri. The same statement applies to Ville Emard, except that we know there is a higher percentage of immigrants: 2.8% of the population of this area came to Canada between 1956 and 1961. On the other hand, of the 52.5% of movers within Canada, 90.3% came from the centre of the Montreal metropolitan area (compared with 84.6% in St. Henri).

In ethnic composition, as in class structure, St. Henri is quite homogeneous; and Ville Emard, rather less so. See Table V-4.

¹ Ibid.

TABLE V-4

<u>Ethnic Origin, 1961</u>	<u>St. Henri</u>	<u>Ville Émard</u>	<u>Metropolitan Area</u>
British	2.6	12.4	17.9
French	93.9	69.1	64.2
Italian	2.3	12.8	4.8
Other	1.3	5.7	13.1

Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census, 1961, Bulletin CT-4, Table 1, pp. 8-9

In sum, St. Henri is a French-Canadian, working class area in Montreal. The housing is old, and much of it in ill-repair. There has been a slow process of emigration from the quartier over the past few decades, as the commercial-industrial life of the city continues to encroach on the district. St. Henri may now be at a critical point in its social evolution, for most of the higher-status groups--professionals and business-men--have moved away; the question is now whether the more economically-fortunate of the remaining inhabitants will also decide to leave. There is now a certain proportion of the population which Michel Blondin has called les indigents: "...des personnes ou des familles qui tirent leurs revenus de l'assistance publique ou de sources très irrégulières..des chômeurs, des instables des inaptes au travail, des invalides, des mères nécessiteuses..."¹ People in this socially-marginal

¹Quoted above, p.256

category have little chance of developing or maintaining a very vital social organization.

One possible line of evolution for St. Henri is the gradual expansion of this sector of the population, to the point where the workers with stable jobs and--as the next section of this study will attempt to demonstrate--a social structure which is adapting itself to the exigencies of the milieu, may start to vacate the area in increasingly large numbers. The other possible line of evolution for St. Henri is the continued development of its social organization, and the surmounting of the physical problems of the milieu which have recently given it the reputation, which is much resented by those who live there, of an area on the skids.

Such a description of St. Henri emphasizes the difference between it and Ville Emard. Ville Emard has never had pretensions to being a swank suburb; but it is not an area to shock middle-class sensibilities. It is almost wholly postwar, more spacious, free of factories, warehouses, and railway tracks; and the people who live there are clearly above the socially-marginal category (see indices of socio-economic status in Table V-2). Ville Emard is also more diversified in ethnic composition than St. Henri (Table V-4); and the recent population growth in this area¹ is partly accounted for by an influx of

¹See Table IV-3 above p.183

immigrants, many of whom are Italian in origin.¹

On the whole we shall have rather more to say about St. Henri itself than about Ville Emard. Our attention was drawn particularly to the efforts of a number of people in St. Henri to improve the conditions of life in their own district. The field research revealed a very striking contrast between the activities and interests of these individuals, who have formed a series of voluntary associations to deal with the problems which confront them, and the activities and interests of those involved with the political parties. Ville Emard, however, does not pose the kind of problems which are so very evident in St. Henri; and it did not, accordingly, provide as useful a laboratory for investigation of the question with which this study is concerned--namely, the sensitivity of political parties to the needs, grievances, and aspirations of their clientele. We do not wish to imply that the people of Ville Emard do not make demands on the political system; but the problems of the people of St. Henri are ones which are immediately evident, and the analysis of the respective roles of voluntary associations and political parties in coping with the problems of the milieu are thrown into corres-

¹As noted above, 9.3% of the population of Ville Emard in 1961 had come to Canada since 1946. In 1951 the Italian population was 1,824; and in 1961, 5,803. (Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census 1951, Bulletin CT-3, Table 1, pp. 5-6; 1961, Bulletin CT-4, Table 1, pp. 8-9.

pondingly sharper focus.

LEADERSHIP

In this section we shall look primarily at the growth, structure, and activities of a group of citizens' committees in St. Henri. The establishment of these organizations provides us with a clear example of the emergence of a new working-class urban leadership of the kind alluded to by Dumont and Rocher, when they wrote: "...il est dans la ligne de notre évolution sociale que nous en arrivions bientôt à un leadership local ou régional tout à fait nouveau par rapport à la situation d'hier."¹

The reasons for this summary evaluation of the position of the committees in relation to their environment will be developed throughout this section. Nevertheless it is worth remarking at once that during the field research our attention focussed on the committees because they were the only organizations we discovered which aspired to grapple with what they considered to be the fundamental problems of the milieu.

The unique position of the citizens' committees in St. Henri became evident to us as we enquired into the activities of other organizations in the district. A few comments about these other bodies will, accordingly, place

¹Quoted above, p. 56

the committees and their role in the community in clearer perspective.

Trade Unions:

In St. Henri, as in other areas, one of the major obstacles to trade union activity in the community was the lack of any territorial basis of organization. It would have been difficult for union cadres to have provided leadership in matters of general concern in St. Henri, such as the renovation of housing, because this district is only a part of the Montreal industrial area. Workers who live in St. Henri commute to factories or construction-sites which are dispersed throughout the metropolitan area; conversely, the industries along the canal and railway lines in St. Henri employ workers from all over the city.

If, therefore, the trade unions were to organize effectively to undertake activities beyond those of collective bargaining and ancillary matters, a territorial basis of organization at the local and not only the regional level would be, if not a necessity, then a substantial help. The C.S.N. (Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux), according to a mimeographed information sheet for its members, "...met sur pied différents comités et services pour venir en aide aux corps affiliés selon les besoins;"¹ these services relate to a variety of matters

¹"Structures et services de la C.S.N." (n.p., n.d.), (mimeographed)

including education, family budget, and the study of economics. Moreover, the C.S.N. lists as one of the objectives of its regional organization that of helping members to participate effectively "à la vie politique, économique et sociale du milieu donné."

These aspirations, however, had not been realized in St. Henri at the time of our research there. Neither the C.S.N. nor the F.T.Q. (Fédération du Travail du Québec) was able to supply us with a list of the active union leaders by area of residence in Montreal, so that even the most basic information for undertaking activities outside the shop was not available. Interviews with full-time employees of several unions, and with two officers of union locals, yielded no evidence of activities within individual unions apart from collective bargaining and presentation of grievances.

Parish Organizations:

Under the rubric of "parish organizations" I mean to include bodies such as the Ligue du Sacré Coeur, the Dames de Ste.-Anne, the Cercles Lacordaire, St.-Vincent de Paul, and other parish-based associations with religious, moral, or charitable objectives, usually organized by categories of age, sex, and marital status. Such associations do not really come within the purview of our study, since they are concerned primarily with the moral or spiritual welfare

of their own members, or else (as in the case of charitable organizations such as St.-Vincent de Paul) with alleviating individual cases of distress. Our concern, on the other hand, is with the pursuit of objectives which may be perceived to require the assistance of the state and thus evoke the formulation of political demands.

For this reason we did not attempt to make an inventory of Church-sponsored organizations in each parish, or to enquire into the activities of each. I mention the parish organizations largely because of one interesting incident.

In the parish of St. Henri, it had become evident to the parish council ("conseil de paroisse"), composed of the leaders of several parish organizations, that people were not very interested in their almost-defunct associations. Consequently, in March 1963 the parish council met to discuss possible responses to the fall-off in interest and activity. One of the leaders of the first of the citizens' committees, founded in 1961 in the neighbouring parish of St. Zotique, was invited to explain the objectives and the activities of his organization. As a result, the "Association des parents de St.-Henri" was founded--the second of the committees--to press for the renovation or replacement of the primary school in the parish.

There are two reasons why mention of this incident is relevant to our study. In the first place, it is signi-

ficant that the traditional form of parish organization was recognized to be incapable of holding the interest of the parishioners; this was also true of St. Zotique. Although we did not ascertain the situation in the other three or four parishes in St. Henri, we had no reason to think that St. Zotique and St. Henri (parish) were unusual in this respect. Secondly, it is significant that the parish associations, though they themselves had no apparent role in providing community leadership of the kind with which we are concerned in this study, they did, at least in this one instance, form the nucleus for an organization of a different character.

Businessmen's or Professionals' Organizations:

In St. Henri and adjoining areas there was an association known as the Ouest Commercial et Professionel. It held monthly meetings--"diners-causeries"--at which about fifty local businessmen or professional men would come out to hear discussions on topics such as fraudulent bankruptcies, current affairs, "les caractéristiques d'un chef d'entreprise" or taxation. In all it had over two hundred members, of whom a fair proportion were inactive. The President of the Ouest Commercial (as it was generally known) indicated in an interview that the organization was trying to play a more active role in the community than formerly. Among the community-oriented projects which he

mentioned were the provision of lighting in the Parc Cartier and paying children's entrance fee to a municipal swimming pool. The latter was a gesture to publicize their feeling that admission to the pool should be free (which, soon after, it became). More important for our purposes, however, was the interest shown by the Ouest Commercial in dealing with the housing problem.

The Ouest Commercial's concern with the renovation of housing is of interest, less for its results than for the light it sheds on the relationship between the business-professional class and the community, which (as we have noted) is predominantly working-class. This relationship is best explained by referring to certain developments in St. Henri prior to our visit there.

In November 1946 a trio of local businessmen had established an enterprise under the name of the "Société Générale d'Embellissement et de Renovation de St. Henri," the object of which was to renovate some of the quartier as a private enterprise project, but with a government subsidy. The details of the project must remain obscure, since we did not obtain an interview with any of the individuals involved. We do know, however, that the Société did not co-operate very fully with the citizens' committees, some of which were also concerned with the housing situation. Although one of the founders of the Société attended a meeting to explain his project, later

requests for further information were ignored.

The Ouest Commercial, by contrast, was attempting at the time of our research in St. Henri to establish closer liaison with the committees. It aimed to adopt a joint stand with the committees, and to present the founders of the Société Générale d'Embellissement with a united front against the semi-private enterprise scheme. Although the outcome of this manoeuvering is not known to me, the Ouest Commercial's envisaged prise de position on the housing issue helps to define the interrelationship between various groups in St. Henri.

Of these groups there was one which was reputed, according to the testimony of several informants from a variety of backgrounds,¹ to have been politically powerful and to have wielded influence on a personal level in St. Henri. It consisted of businessmen operating a variety of small enterprises--a gas station, a furniture store, a funeral parlour, a tavern, and other firms with a local clientele. These individuals had been born in St. Henri, but most if not all had subsequently moved out, while retaining their business interests there. They were criticized by several of our informants for having no interest in the welfare of St. Henri, although anxious to obtain or

¹ They included: a lawyer, a trade union employee, a curé, a journalist, and a social worker.

retain local power for themselves.

The real position of these allegedly powerful individuals was impossible to assess; but two facts were easy to confirm--among those who were reputed to comprise the powerful group were the ones who had founded the Société Générale d'Embellissement; and the same individuals had been, a few years previous, executive officers of the Ouest Commercial. At least one of these men, the one who had taken the initiative in forming the Société Générale d'Embellissement, had resigned from the Ouest Commercial after a dispute with the incumbent executive, shortly prior to the period of our field research. Thus, in attempting to express its support for the committees and to weaken the Société Générale d'Embellissement, the new executive of the Ouest Commercial was repudiating the older governing group within the organization. That it would go to such lengths in trying to establish closer links with the community indicates the seriousness of their new orientation.

One may speculate about the motives of the leaders of the Ouest Commercial, concerning their attempt to make it become more of a community-oriented organization. Does the move indicate that the newer leaders had different personal attitudes or convictions, a larger "social conscience?" Does it suggest that the business-professional group in St. Henri--mostly now residing outside the

district--was afraid of losing influence or good will in the community? Does it constitute recognition of the importance of the emerging working-class leaders in the local society? All these are possible explanations, none of them exclusive of the others. But whatever the motivation for the "new look," its advent--involving a move against some of the former leaders of the organization--is one indication of the declining role in St. Henri of what appears to have been an older generation of "influen-tials," whose power was both personal and political. The more important piece of evidence for this view, however, came from a different source: informants from the political parties reported that these individuals are no longer active within their ranks.

Of course it is impossible to predict what long-term success the Ouest Commercial may have in its attempt to establish a closer liaison with the working-class leaders in the committees. On this topic I can only record our impression that the Ouest Commercial was still, even under its newer leadership, primarily a social organization, its role in relation to the community being essentially that of a service club. Even its "service" role was ancillary to its major activities--the dinner-meetings, recreation (e.g. golf) and discussion of affairs of common interest. Moreover, whatever role the Ouest Commercial might have aspired to play in St. Henri, most of its members were

essentially outside the community: while they might assist and co-operate with other organizations which were more a part of it, they were ill-placed to provide genuinely local leadership on their own.

One other organization of businessmen deserves mention: l'Association des Marchands de Ville-Emard. It, however, did not pretend to be other than a promotional body. The Association des Marchands owed its establishment to the construction of a nearby shopping centre: it was a defensive reaction by local store-owners to the threat of increased competition. It was reported to have been pretty well inactive for the previous two years.

Société St. Jean-Baptiste:

The S.S.J.B. had two sections in the constituency, one in Ville Amard and one in St. Henri. Neither section enjoyed much more than a nominal existence, one of them having had no meetings in five months, while the other was described by its president as having been "not very active" for the previous six or seven months. Interviewees from both sections reported lack of initiative in deciding upon topics for discussion, and subjects of the meetings were limited to those suggested by the Montreal headquarters. They included: repatriation of the constitution, the teaching of French, the "visage français" of Quebec, education reforms, and the Quebec-Labrador boundary. One

respondent described the role of his section as being that of participating in the activities of the central (Montreal) organization, "...et y faire connaître notre opinion."

Both sections of the S.S.J.B. still suffered the effects of disputes which had come to a head within the Montreal organization in 1964. At that time there was a conflict within the S.S.J.B. on proposals for important policy changes, including secularization (i.e. making the S.S.J.B. a non-confessional body), the adoption of a "indépendantiste" stance concerning the status of Quebec, and eliminating the sheep from the annual parade (too sheepish: the wrong image!). Prior to the holding of the critical congrès, new officers were elected in each of the sections which concern us - an election which had more than the ordinary significance because the new officers would vote on the important policy proposals at the congrès. The election in each of the two sections was strongly contested, both elections resulting in the defeat of the younger, more indépendantiste wing. Some if not almost all of those in this group were members of the Rassemblement pour l'Independence Nationale; informants from the R.I.N. later confirmed that a conscious effort had been made to gain control of these sections of the S.S.J.B.¹ Since the defeat of the indépendantiste wing, many of the

¹ The same strategy may have been used elsewhere; I do not know.

younger members had left the S.S.J.B.

The executives of the local sections of the S.S.J.B. were composed mostly of businessmen. Those whose occupations were known to us included: manager of a Caisse Populaire, chartered accountant (at a Caisse Populaire), businessman, president of an electrical firm, assistant manager of a Caisse Populaire.

For several reasons, then, the two local sections of the S.S.J.B. were not organizations from which a community leadership role could have been expected. First, as indicated by the topics discussed at meetings, the S.S.J.B. was interested primarily in matters affecting French-speaking people or Quebec residents as a whole; they did not focus on matters of primary concern in St. Henri. Second, the two local sections were not very active, having lost an important segment of their members because of internal divisions over the orientation of the organization. Third, the officers of the S.S.J.B. were of a substantially higher social standing and income-level than most of the people in St. Henri, and thus were only marginally, if at all, a part of the community. In this respect they were similar to the members of the Ouest Commercial.

Other Organizations:

There were a number of clubs or associations, such

as the Chevaliers de Colomb, which sponsored social activities; but we did not attempt to make a comprehensive inventory of them. Since our interest in this study is limited to those organizations which concern themselves with the problems of the milieu and thus may act as catalysts for the conversion of wants into political demands, or themselves contribute to the articulation of political interests, we did not investigate the activities of purely social or fraternal organizations.

* * *

The lack of working-class participation in the more "established" organizations, indeed the absence of organizations oriented towards the discussion and solution of the problems of the milieu, make the founding and growth of the citizens' committees a very remarkable occurrence. As I have already stated, these were the only organizations which we discovered in St. Henri which made a real effort to ameliorate the conditions which were obtained in the quartier.

There was one organization which might be considered to have been the forerunner of the citizens' committees. It was a club or informal group which went by the name of "Les Copains de St. Henri." This club was founded in May 1959, the outgrowth of a gang which hung out at a restaurant where the founder of the group worked. Its initial

purpose was recreational, but it later became a forum for the discussion of ideas, the object being (as its principal figure reported) to provide the worker with "...toutes les données possible, pour qu'il puisse choisir; rendre les ouvriers conscients de leur état défavorisé, qu'ils puissent avoir une vie décente." For a while the group published a paper, which was a failure amongst the local working-class population but was claimed to have had a readership amongst students, anti-clericals, and some clergy. This group was said by one of its members to have been the first body to raise its voice against the poor housing conditions in St. Henri. The Copains received a fair amount of publicity, and a variety of radical groups subsequently attempted to establish their influence within the organization, a development which tarnished its reputation in more conventional circles.

The Copains discussed conditions affecting the quartier; they put a premium on open-mindedness. They did not seek to undertake direct action to settle problems such as the low housing standards in St. Henri. I have described them as a forerunner of the citizens' committees, because they epitomized attitudes which later were translated into action by the committees. At the time of our research in St. Henri, the Copains were collaborating with two of the committees, the Association des Parents de St. Henri, and the Comité d'Education des Adultes.

The first of the citizens' committees was established in 1961, two years after the Copains had been formed. The first step towards its founding occurred when a resident of the area, Gérard Riberdy, wrote a letter to La Voix Populaire, a weekly newspaper which circulates in St. Henri, Ville Emard, and adjoining areas. In the letter Riberdy deplored the lamentable condition of the primary school in the parish of St. Zotique; after its publication he received a large number of phone calls urging him to undertake some kind of action on the matter. It was decided to hold a meeting, which was open to all parents of children in the school; invited also were the school commission, local municipal councillors, and the federal and provincial députés.

The provincial député promised a school and a hospital; while, in the words of Riberdy, "Les autres politiciens font de même; ils se lèvent et ne parlent que pour eux, que pour leur prestige personnel....Nous y réalisons que nous avions frappés à la mauvaise porte." Handbills announcing another meeting were later passed out to parishioners as they left the Mass. The new meeting was also publicized by letter distributed to children at the school, they being asked to pass it on to their parents; and it was advertised in La Voix Populaire.

The second meeting was held three weeks after the first. There were 125 to 150 people present, about half the number

who were at the first meeting. On this occasion a "Comité des Parents" was elected to seek renovation or replacement of the school.

The new committee deliberately avoided further contact with local politicians, and brought their requests to the Commission des Ecoles Catholiques de Montréal, which acted favourably upon them.

The Comité des Parents later expanded its activities to include the voicing of requests for a swimming pool, for a district public library, improvement of facilities in the Parc Cartier, and other objects. In view of the extension of its role, it was renamed the Comité des Citoyens (Section St. Zotique). This name was chosen because, as one informant said, it was realized that the movement would later spread to other parishes and districts.

The prediction was justified. The next step in the establishment and growth of the citizens committees was in the neighbouring parish of St. Henri. There, as I have already reported, the decline of interest in parish organizations caused the parish council to investigate the developments in the neighbouring parish, and Riberdy was invited to explain the structure and activities of the Comité des Citoyens. The "Association des Parents de St. Henri" was then founded. After several meetings with the Commission des Ecoles Catholiques, it was successful in obtaining a new primary school to replace the existing

structure, which not only had inadequate facilities but was commonly thought to be a fire-trap.

From March 1963 the work of the committees was encouraged by the Conseil des Oeuvres de Montréal. After the meeting with Riberdy, the St. Henri parish council requested help from the Conseil "...pour trouver le moyen de réintéresser les parents à leurs responsabilités." From this time the Conseil provided advice concerning the organization of the activities of the Association des Parents, and the procedure which might be successful in obtaining help from the appropriate authorities. The Conseil also hired an animateur social who encouraged the extension of the activities of the committees, and inspired the formation of additional organizations to deal with other problems.

By the time of our visit to St. Henri (1965 and 1966) the following committees existed, in addition to the Comité des Citoyens (Section St. Zotique) and the Association des Parents de St. Henri:

Comité d'Education des Adultes: Formed at the request of the Commission des Ecoles Catholiques de Montréal, subsequent to the initiative of the committees in the parishes of St. Zotique and St. Henri concerning their primary schools. The object of the Comité d'Education des Adultes was to provide local liaison

for the setting up of a pilot project in adult education. This project was started, with the aid of the Copains de St. Henri, in the winter of 1965-6.

Nous, St. Henri: Concerned with the renovation of housing. The committee was formed in 1964 after the animateur from the Conseil des Oeuvres arranged a meeting between interested local residents and one of the founders of the Société d'Embellissement et de Renovation de St. Henri. Dissatisfaction with the extent of information provided by the Société motivated the subsequent formation of Nous, St. Henri. Its object was to have the parish of St. Henri included in "La Petite Bourgogne," a municipal renovation scheme covering the area to the east of the parish (Ste. Cunégonde, including also a part of the quartier St. Henri).

The activities of Nous, St. Henri included the study of urban renewal schemes which was accomplished with the co-operation of invited architects and urban planners.

Reveil des Citoyens de la Petite Bourgogne: A committee to represent the residents of the area covered by "La Petite Bourgogne." The initiative for the founding of this committee came from the animateur social. The committee has presented two briefs to the

municipal authorities, one concerning the proposed establishment of a park, the other on the subject of expropriation and relocation of proprietors and tenants. The briefs were prepared with the help of a professional architect, and assistance was also received from the Conseil des Oeuvres.

Groupement Familial Ouvrier: Founded in 1965 as a recreational organization, largely in response to the initiative of two individuals, one an assistant manager of a lumber company, the other a priest living in the area but not attached to a parish. It included members of a lower economic status than were active in other groups. The primary objective of the G.F.O. was described by one of its founders as being to "...révaloriser les gens économiquement faibles en les faisant participer;" perhaps it is most concisely characterized as (at least in aspiration) an embryonic movement ideologically hostile to traditional concepts of welfare.

In November 1965 representatives of the committees referred to above, and one other outside St. Henri, met to co-ordinate their activities; to this end a "Fédération des Mouvements du Sud-Ouest de Montréal" was created. Its objects were described in a press release, as follows:

La Fédération est considérée comme un organisme de pression dont les buts sont:

1. de promouvoir l'émancipation de la classe

ouvrière afin de lui permettre d'atteindre un niveau de vie qui soit conforme à ses aspirations et à la justice sociale;

2. de coordonner le travail des comités mémores et de les assister dans leur tâche;
3. de tenter par tous les moyens jugés par elle utiles et raisonnables de trouver des solutions pratiques aux différents problèmes de notre district, que ce soient des problèmes particuliers à une paroisse, au quartier, et même plus généraux;
4. de soumettre sous forme de mémoires ou autres lesdits problèmes aux autorités concernées afin d'en permettre la solution dans le plus bref délai possible.¹

This declaration of the objects of the Fédération is significant as an expression of the manner in which the leaders of the committees have come to perceive the environmental conditions which affect their own position in society. It is a fact of great importance that a group of people who initially organized themselves into voluntary associations to deal with specific problems such as inadequate school facilities, began over time to adopt attitudes which amount to a basic re-definition of their own place in the social order. By dealing first with local and immediate problems, they were led to examine the fundamental problems of their milieu and to regard the local and immediate problems (such as poor housing) as symptoms

¹Mimeographed press release prepared by the Fédération des Mouvements du Sud-Ouest de Montréal [May 1966].

of the real problems, which are not in any sense specific to St. Henri, but common to the working class as a whole. Thus it was possible for one of the committee leaders to describe the problems of the area as being "unemployment, low wages, and sickness", and to think the more immediate problems, such as inadequate housing, as being consequences of symptoms of the precarious economic position of the residents of the area.

In summary, it may again be emphasized that the members of the committees occupied a unique position in St. Henri because they were the only people in the quartier who could legitimately claim to constitute a genuinely local leadership. They occupied this position by virtue of their concern for welfare of the community, by their own social position as members of the working-class, and by the efforts which were made by each of the committees to seek maximum participation in their activities from other local residents. Of these three points, no further comments will be necessary about the community-orientation of the committees; it will be worthwhile, however, to provide some evidence concerning the working-class composition of the committees, and to discuss briefly their role in relation to the other residents of the district.

The majority of leaders of the committees were drawn from the skilled-worker and white-collar group; there were

some small businessmen and a few unskilled workers. A more detailed breakdown of occupations, insofar as they were known to us, is as follows:

professionals	3 (including 2 teachers)
businessmen	4
white collar workers	9
skilled workers	6
unskilled workers	3
housewives	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	37

In addition, some of the committees had an aumonier (chaplain), and received advice and help from the animateur from the Conseil des Oeuvres. An interesting feature is that a fairly large proportion of members, although I do not have precise data, had previously been active in various parish organizations.

A fact of utmost significance is that the committees made a genuine attempt, and (it appeared) generally a successful one, to involve the population of St. Henri in their activities. In all of their projects--school facilities, housing, recreational facilities, adult education--public meetings were held to explain, discuss and mould the activities of the committees. Perhaps even more important was the informal network of neighbourhood contacts which the members of the committees had. Without

exception, they were local residents, and several of them spoke of frequent discussions and telephone calls on the subject of their initiatives. The committees were therefore not simply doing things for the community, but were seeking its participation in joint projects.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

As in the studies of Brome-Missiquoi and Westmorland, our assessment of political attitudes in St. Henri was based on a combination of impressionistic evidence from statements in interviews, and evidence derived from the actions of local leaders as they sought to achieve stated political objectives. An important difference between St. Henri and the other two constituencies, however, is that in St. Henri the local leaders were not members of provincial organizations. Thus they received no prodding from a regional or provincial headquarters, encouraging them to articulate political demands. Moreover, they were unable to voice their demands through the hierarchy of a provincial or Canadian organization whose executive officers were already accustomed to presenting requests to the Cabinet and discussing their objectives with senior civil servants.

It will be recalled that local political figures were invited to the initial public meeting which was called by those who later were to form the Comité des Citoyens

(Section St. Zotique). Gérard Riberdy, who was the principal instigator of the meeting, attempted to discuss possible means by which the desired objective, a school, could be obtained; the politicians (he claimed) responded with promises, thereby offering and indeed attempting to take the whole matter out of the hands of others. Riberdy concluded that it had been a mistake to invite the politicians, and thereafter he made no further attempt to associate local politicians with the requests of the committee.

Indeed, since this experience, on no occasion did any of the committees seek support from the local M.P., M.L.A., or municipal councillors. All contacts were made directly with cabinet ministers, with the chairman of the Montreal Executive Council, or (most frequently) with officials, whether in the Commission des Ecoles Catholiques, the municipal administration, or the provincial civil service.

As one of our interviewees said:

Tout ce qui fut obtenu--école, parcs, patinoires-- nous n'avons jamais demandé ou fait appel à aucun politicien du quartier....On voulait démontrer que sans pression politique nous pouvions obtenir des choses par la seule force des citoyens.

Another said, having noted that to his knowledge no member of the committees was active in a political party:

...on craint que la politique s'empare des comités et que les comités deviennent leur instrument....

Perhaps this view explains why a further respondent said:

Le type qui dans notre organisation veut faire de la politique doit donner sa démission.

In general, the attitude of our respondents towards the political parties was one of mistrust and contempt. They believed that the needs of St. Henri could be more adequately and more expeditiously met by avoiding contact with the local député or municipal councillor. Informants reported that once politicians became involved in a project, such as the building of a new school or the provision of recreational facilities, the project would inevitably get held up while arrangements were made for allocating the patronage associated with it.

In one case the practice of dealing with administrators rather than the député was explained as being both a matter of principle and also of expediency:

Pour moi le député est un législateur. Aller voir le député, c'est passer par dessus le dos des technocrates et saper la machine. Je ne l'admet pas....Ce genre de procéder [i.e., dealing directly with the administration], je crois l'avoir vendu aux membres. Auparavant, quand j'étais membre de l'Association des Parents, nous avions toujours des grosses promesses et jamais d'action. Il faut transiger directement avec l'administration.

Although, for reasons to be described in the concluding section of this chapter, it was not possible for the committees to act in concert with local politicians, this tactical restriction must have limited the political effectiveness of the committees. Major projects such as

urban renewal necessarily require specifically political decisions, and for these, the support of local political figures would be an advantage. Perhaps it is significant that in the case of "La Petite Bourgogne," the renovation project which includes the eastern part of St. Henri, the members of the Reveil des Citoyens de la Petite Bourgogne complained about lack of information concerning the city's intentions. Obviously they had not been very closely associated with the planning of this project.

Indeed, the city's failure to consult fully with the Reveil des Citoyens de la Petite Bourgogne leads one to question the real political significance of the citizens' committees. Although we have focussed on the committees as the clearest example of community leadership in St. Henri, it was very difficult for us to estimate the numerical importance of their following in the quartier. It was quite impossible to predict what long-term success they may have in inspiring in local residents a greater measure of personal self-reliance and fuller independence from the député-patronex as a mediator between themselves and the "Etat-Providence."¹ In short, how many people in St. Henri share or are likely in the future to share the committee members' instrumental view of government? On this question hangs their own political influence in the

¹Jean-Charles Falardeau's expression, quoted above, p. 58.

community.

Let us return to the case of "La Petite Bourgogne." In December 1946 a number of curés made a public statement deplored the poor housing conditions in the southwest of Montreal; it attracted a good deal of public attention, and it is generally credited with having a strong effect in goading the City of Montreal into committing itself to renovation of housing in this district.

At the same time, however, the declaration of the curés created a substantial amount of unfavourable publicity for St. Henri. Newspaper stories were written about the slum conditions and the intolerable housing situation. The reaction to this kind of publicity was, according to a number of sources including people who have had nothing to do with the citizens' committees, one of shame and embarrassment, because no one likes to be told he lives in a slum. This attitude was particularly marked amongst members of the committees, one of whom complained about the declaration as a "fifty-megaton bomb" which had been dropped to no purpose. He said:

Les curés sont allés trop vite sans consulter le laïcat pour leur déclaration: ils ont fait exploser une cinquante mégatonne....L'autorité a pris peur et a fait toute sorte de déclaration de travers.

Another complained:

Je critique énormément les quatorze curés. Ils ont fait un BOUM! une explosion de sa

grandeur qui se repand partout. Les gens se sentent maintenant gênés de dire qu'ils sont du quartier.

We had no way of estimating how much resentment the cures' declaration caused. It was intended, according to its principal author, primarily as a statement of their own position on the issue--a declaration to their own parishioners; and it was also a prod to the municipal administration. For its apparent success in evoking action from the city, many people may have been grateful to the cures for their initiative. Thus, two questions: (1) to what extent were the attitudes expressed by the members of the committees representative of generally-held attitudes in St. Henri?, and (2) did the committee members (or some of them) misjudge political realities in criticizing a dramatic gesture which, although it generated adverse publicity for the quartier, may well have been instrumental in securing a favourable governmental response to social needs which they themselves recognized and expressed? Were it possible to provide firm answers to these questions, one could more easily assess the place of the committees in their community and their influence in political affairs.

* * *

The preference of the emerging elites in voluntary associations for dealing with officials rather than with elected politicians is one which we have already noted

in our other studies. There is an important difference in this respect, however, which distinguishes St. Henri from both Brome-Missisquoi and Westmorland. In these two constituencies, the subjects of negotiation between voluntary associations and the civil service were comparatively technical matters, in which most elected politicians could be expected to have little competence. In St. Henri the reasons given us for this preference were other ones: our informants amongst the voluntary associations claimed that to involve politicians in pressing for the realization of their demands would simply involve them in the morass of political in-fighting and patronage disputes which were a normal part of political life in St. Henri. In the process, the initial objectives might well get lost from view - if not by them, at least by the politicians. This attitude was one symptom of what we felt was a cleavage of opinions or attitudes between the politicians and the leaders of voluntary associations which in St. Henri was more fundamental than elsewhere. The contrasts which we observed in Brome-Missisquoi and Westmorland were reproduced on a far larger scale in St. Henri. This opposition of ideas or modes of thought, or rather the exaggerated form of this opposition of ideas in St. Henri, is, I suggest, to be explained in large measure by the form of political organization in

the riding. This is the subject of the following section of this chapter.

POLITICAL PARTIES

One fact became immediately obvious to us in our study of the older political parties in St. Henri: it was the very great suspicion with which our inquiries were met.

At no time did we succeed in obtaining an interview with the Liberal député who was defeated in the provincial election of June 1966.¹ When contacted by telephone, he suggested that we see some of his organizers, and gave us names; but these men refused to talk to us unless he, the defeated candidate, were present. This refusal would have been a serious obstacle to our inquiry if it were not for the fact that the federal Liberal organization was composed of almost exactly the same personnel. After obtaining a personal introduction to the federal M.P., we saw him with his organizers and later some of his organizers by themselves. They refused to discuss specifically provincial matters, but it was nevertheless possible to assess their political attitudes. Thus we did not obtain any explicit information about the organization of the Liberal Party at the provincial level, but we did have an oppor-

¹No doubt his refusal was in part if not entirely due to his apparent weariness with politics--a weariness which was evident even before his election defeat, for he had virtually ceased to look after constituency affairs.

tunity of meeting the chief organizers in a different capacity.

In the case of the Union Nationale, we obtained a letter of introduction from a senior Minister in the new Government, which very evidently helped our inquiries. The newly-elected député introduced us to his chief organizer and told him to give us the information we needed. Other interviews were easily obtained.

It later became obvious why our interviewees were at first so suspicious. The explanation is to be found in the corrupt electoral practices of which each party accused the other. In our earliest interviews in St. Henri --with people who had no part in political organization-- we had been told that illegal electoral behaviour was very widespread in St. Henri; but it was not until later that we realized the connection between this alleged fact and the form of political organization.

Of course, if a party wishes to practise electoral irregularities it must have a highly-disciplined and semi-conspiratorial form of organization. But it is also true that even to protect one's party against such practices requires the same kind of organization. A centralized and quasi-secret form of organization is necessary in order to minimize the danger of the party's being infiltrated, or its personnel bribed, by its rivals.

Preparation for an election consisted in ensuring that every poll was manned by loyal and effective party representatives. The great danger was that a poll or group of polls should be left "open," i.e. without effective representatives, because then there was no way of guarding against improper electoral practices.

The most common form of improper electoral practices was that of "telegraphing" votes, i.e. sending a person to vote in somebody else's name. Voting in the name of fictitious persons, or persons who had died or moved away - that is, voting on padded electoral lists - was also alleged to have been common. In the case of real and eligible voters, telegraphing might be paid or unpaid: in the former case the voter was paid to stay away from the poll, and a telegrapher was sent to vote for him. According to one informant, the normal rate was five dollars for the voter and ten dollars for the telegrapher, who of course risked legal penalties. For an unpaid telegraph, the voter might receive a phone call asking him if he wanted a lift to the polls; if he said he preferred to go later then the telegrapher could be sent in. Naturally it was even easier if the individual was known to be at work, or sick, or out of town.

It was also possible to buy votes by obtaining an

initialled but unmarked ballot¹ from the poll at the beginning of the day--we were told this was not difficult, certainly not if the opposing party's representative looked away for a minute. The ballot could then be marked by the party's representative outside the poll and given to the voter (not an impersonator this time), who would be paid for returning a new unmarked ballot when he came out of the poll. The new ballot could be used for a new paid vote, and so on throughout the day. Of course a voter could destroy the ballot in the polling booth; but he could not vote against the party which had marked the ballot.

The essential point concerning electoral irregularities, as far as the purposes of this study are concerned, is that to telegraph votes or pad the electoral lists, or even to guard against such practices by the other party, requires that the electoral organization be both efficient and loyal. The only effective way to prevent telegraphing of votes by the other party is to have a scrutineer in the poll who knows the residents of his poll by sight, and is sufficiently alert to catch an impersonator. Moreover, to prevent the padding of electoral lists--and it must be remembered that possibilities for telegraphing are pro-

¹ After the voter has registered at the poll, the ballot is initialled on the outside by the deputy returning officer (the official in charge of the poll) and given to the voter, who marks his ballot in the polling booth. In counting the ballots, only those correctly initialled are valid.

portionately increased as voters' lists are padded--the list of electors must be carefully scrutinized by someone who is sufficiently familiar with the district to know of new arrivals and departures, so they can challenge false names.

The party man outside the poll must not only know by sight who the party supporters are, but also must be careful to check their names off the list as they vote and to send for those who have not voted. A good outside man is important to an efficient election-day organization; an efficient and loyal scrutineer is essential if the poll is not to become an open one. When a poll is open, then the telegraphers can be sent in.

Since it was essential to each party that it have effective and loyal representatives at each poll, it was necessary for it to protect itself against infiltration by the other party. Moreover, each party had to prevent its rivals from bribing its workers to neglect their tasks or to fail to show up on election day (without warning). Party organizers, therefore, were extremely wary about defections or betrayals in their own ranks. The lists of poll workers were kept secret until the last minute in order to reduce the danger of bribery.¹ Even so, there

¹ This is one reason why it is advantageous to a party to have the returning officer, who is in charge of the election in the constituency, on its side: he can tell his own party who its rivals' poll workers are.

remained the danger of finding, as the voting began on election day, that some of the polls were not manned. For this contingency, party organizers liked to have a reserve team for each poll if they could recruit one.

Election organizing in a constituency like St. Henri, therefore, is an almost conspiratorial affair. A semi-secret organization is necessary not only in order to perpetrate election irregularities, but also to guard against them. This makes it all the more difficult for a party to attempt to reform its structures on a more open, democratic basis.

It should also be noted that those men who are responsible for the organization of a group of polls are even more vulnerable to bribery than the scrutineers, outside-the-poll men, enumerators, and telegraphers. If they double-cross the party, they can destroy its organization in all the polls for which they are responsible. Several methods of sabotage are available: the organizers may simply slack on their work, or appoint unreliable poll workers, or assign workers to polls where they are strangers. In the latter case, even if the poll workers are conscientious, they cannot challenge telegraphers since they know few or none of the voters by sight. For these reasons, it can be highly profitable for an opposing party to bribe some of the more senior organizers, even if it requires a

large sum to do so. Even the principal organizers of a constituency party, therefore, are suspect, perhaps more so than the election-day workers.¹

In St. Henri the danger of betrayal tended to encourage the formation of highly-centralized constituency organizations, with one man responsible for the organizations of as many as sixty polls. Thus the control of the organization could be placed in the hands of half a dozen trusted individuals.

Electoral practices, therefore, appear to explain why in St. Henri, to an even greater extent than in the other two ridings we studied, political organization was based on personal loyalties and could be destroyed by personal rivalries and internal intrigue. For example, it was said by one of the supporters of the newly-elected Union Nationale M.L.A. that the party's defeat in previous elections had been due to betrayals within the organization in the Ville Emard part of the riding. The Union Nationale therefore equipped itself with an almost totally new organization in Ville Emard, where the candidate, a municipal councillor, drew upon his previous supporters in municipal politics to hold the top posts in his electoral organization; the more junior ranks were, apparently, recruited afresh.

¹This may help to explain why no organizer would see us alone until he had already met with us in the presence of the député.

The advantage of this strategy was that it secured workers who would not question the instructions which were given them.¹

In the wholesale house-cleaning which occurred within the Union Nationale organization in April-May-June 1966, we have one of the clearest examples of a party organization which is controlled by the candidate or député and a small group of personal advisors, and which in the lower ranks consists of paid workers without influence in the party and perhaps without much stake or much interest in the outcome of the election.

An interesting contrast to the case of the Union Nationale, but one which provides further evidence to support our general description of the form of organization in the older parties in St. Henri, was to be found in the provincial Liberal Party. As we have already noted, we were unable to discuss provincial political organization with any of the Liberal activists; but this gap in our information could scarcely hide the fact that the provincial Liberals were in bad disarray.

As we have already noted, the incumbent Liberal provincial député, Philippe Lalonde, had for some time been neglecting his constituency duties. It was alleged that

¹ An example of the professionalism of the electoral organization may be found in the hiring of a dozen commercial telephone operators, none of whom lived in the riding, to handle the telephones at the party offices on election day.

his inaction was causing substantial discontent amongst the Liberal partisans, although it was not possible for us to confirm this. It is known, however, that one Louise Limoges, the wife of a Liberal activist,¹ had announced her intention of seeking the nomination in opposition to Lalonde.¹ Her candidacy, however, was effectively blocked by the renomination of Lalonde at a convention "d'un style bien spécial,"² as the local weekly newspaper described it. The "convention" was reported in the following way:

...craignant sans doute une forte opposition, il [Phil Lalonde] a réuni une quarantaine de partisans dans l'après-midi de samedi dernier chez son fils Jacques.... Il a été proclamé élu. L'enthousiasme ne s'est pas fait sentir d'une façon délivrante dans le camp des libéraux. Plusieurs protestations nous sont venues de certains organisateurs qui en ont marré. De loin, on aurait préféré la candidature de M. Henry Yersh, un jeune industriel.... D'autres favorisaient la candidature de Mme. Louise Limoges qui avait d'ailleurs annoncé son intention ferme briguer les suffrages à la convention. Mais, voilà le trouble, ni M. Yersh ni Mme. Limoges n'ont été invités à cette convention, dans le plus pur style "paquetée".³

¹ It is doubtful that André Limoges, her husband, was ever really welcome in the Liberal camp. He said he had been excluded from the Liberal organization for three years before he succeeded in forcing himself even nominally into the party in St. Henri. On the other hand, both he and his wife claimed to have connections with some senior Liberals in Quebec and Ottawa.

² La Voix Populaire, 27 avril 1966, p. 1. La Voix Populaire was published and edited by a previous Unionale candidate in St. Henri, and contained on its staff the previous Progressive-Conservative candidate; so some allowance must be made for possible partisan bias in its reporting.

³ Ibid.

Mme. Limoges subsequently announced her candidature as an independent Liberal. The exact effect this had on the Liberal electoral machinery we were unable to determine, although we had no indication of its having had very momentous consequences. On the other hand, the initial difficulty which the Limoges experienced in gaining entry into the Liberal ranks in St. Henri and their defection in the 1966 election are important as symptoms of what can happen to a party organization when it falls under the control of an individual who is not equal to his tasks, or who simply ceases to perform them. Possible adherents of high calibre either refuse to join, or are kept out. Thus if there is a defection from the organization, as there was in the case of the Limoges, the defectors' failure to draw other activities out of the organization can by no means be taken as an indication that the organization is basically healthy. On the contrary, the defection (whether or not followed by other withdrawals) is evidence that there is probably but restricted access to positions of influence within the organization.

¹The effect on the vote can be more readily ascertained. Results were as follows:

Liberal (Lalonde)	8,849
Independent Liberal (Limoges)	2,470
Total (Lib., Ind. Lib.)	11,319
Union Nationale	10,410
Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale	3,034
Ralliement Nationale	371

Source: Quebec, Report of the Chief Returning Officer, Elections 1966, p. 285.

Each of the older parties in St. Henri did have a pro-forma association and held a nominating convention of sorts--the Liberals' in secrecy--but these democratic features of their organization were a mere facade. Indeed, it could not have been otherwise, since each had to protect itself against electoral irregularities, even if it did not seek to perpetrate illegal practices itself. Of necessity, party organization was informal and even secret in character; it was highly centralized; and access to power within the party was closed to all but those whom the candidate or député felt--or hoped--he could trust.

These characteristics of party structure in St. Henri were reinforced by the traditional conception of the role of the député as a mediator between the individual and the state. In performing the "mediator" function, the député was aided by his organizers, who in this way contributed to building up his personal popularity. Indeed, it was very common for politicians to hold office simultaneously at both the municipal level and at the federal or provincial levels, because those who did so were in a strong position to provide a wide range of personal services for their constituents. Examples of such services are:

Helping constituents to fill out forms for unemployment insurance, public assistance, and family allowances.

Cancelling the municipal water tax (from which welfare recipients are exempted--although many

of them apparently think of this as a special favour from the politician).

Handling problems concerned with immigration of relatives, or obtaining passports for recent immigrants who want to return home for a visit.

Obtaining student loans.

Obtaining jobs, either on the municipal payroll, or through personal contacts with contractors or other employers.

Since the largest proportion of the services which might be rendered to constituents were those which fell within the ambit of the municipality, a politician could build up his personal popularity by performing services as a municipal councillor, and cash in on it during federal or provincial elections.

Personal loyalties could be transferred from one level of politics to another, precisely because they were personal in character. In all the cases of services performed by politicians, it was important from the constituent's point of view to have a person who was "bien placé" or at the very least someone "qui connaît les rouages" and who could therefore help with personal problems.

The personal character of the relationship between the politician and the constituent was acknowledged and reinforced by the wide range of social activities which politicians were inevitably called upon to perform. These included appearances at all social events of importance in the constituency, sending out birthday cards and notes of

condolence; passing the collection plate on Sunday, etc. One politician noted that he places his car--a large convertible--at the disposition of his constituents for weddings and similar occasions. The very personal character of political life in St. Henri is also reflected in the kind of campaign which was waged for the provincial election in June 1966: the emphasis was on individual contact with the electors, and (for the winning candidate) only two public meetings, one of which was for the Italians in Ville Emard.

Of the principal features of party structure in St. Henri, the most significant for the purposes of our study is that access to power within the traditional political parties was restricted by the jealousies and fears of the few key individuals. For this reason it is quite unrealistic to imagine that non-partisans such as the people who were active in the citizens' committees could have attempted to support their political demands by action within the traditional political parties. Their undemocratic structure rendered them impermeable to new social forces under the leadership of persons who, under other conditions might have sought positions of political leadership.

Given the form of organization of the major parties, the only relationship which the committee members, or any other individuals who were not already involved in party

affairs, could establish with the traditional political parties was a suppliant-benefactor relationship. This, as I had indicated, is the precise antithesis of their manner of thinking and of the values which they held. They rejected absolutely the idea of any involvement in the traditional political parties, because no person might gain admission to party circles except on the basis of unswerving loyalty--or what might appear to be unswerving loyalty--to the organization and its leaders. In other words, it would have required the prior abandonment of the objectives for which, under different circumstances, the committee members might have been attracted to political life.

In view of the hostility of the leaders of the citizens' committees towards the traditional political parties (which was matched by the traditional partisans' ignorance concerning the activities of the committees), it is particularly interesting to notice a markedly different attitude towards the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (R.I.N.).

In this study we have not examined the structure and activities of the newer parties; but a few comments about the R.I.N. would nevertheless be appropriate. Our attention was drawn to the R.I.N. partly because of the interest which some of our interviewees from the citizens' committees evinced in this party (although they were not willing to become publicly associated with it), and partly because

of our special interest in the role of parties in representing the interests of ethnic minorities. The following data reveal the R.I.N.'s electoral performance by comparison with that of other third parties in federal and provincial politics:¹

R.I.N. (provincial) 12% (1966)

N.D.P. (federal) 8% (1962), 9% (1963), 14% (1965)

Social Credit or
Ralliement des
Créditistes (fed.) 5% (1962), 30% (1963), 8% (1965)

Prior to the election of June 1966, the R.I.N. in St. Henri, which had only a very skeletal organization, elaborated a local program to supplement the provincial platform. Special emphasis was placed on the need to renovate housing; as one informant said, with reference to La Petite Bourgogne:

On y parle que du côté matériel. Nous y exigeons un plan global de rénovation et non seulement comme présentement de la démolition sans reconstruction. La population a beaucoup plus besoin d'aide sociale que matérielle.

The R.I.N. also proposed a form of vocational training in co-operation with industry: "Il faudrait que les manufacturiers réservent des heures où l'étudiant pourrait faire un stage et apprendre dans la pratique son métier."

¹Data relating to federal elections was drawn from Canada, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 25th, 26th, and 27th General Elections, 1962, 1963 and 1965; data from the 1966 provincial election, from Quebec, Report of the Chief Returning Officer, Elections 1966.

Other aspects of the local R.I.N. program included the construction of a hospital in St. Henri (promised by the Liberals and the Union Nationale for many years), adult education, and the organization of recreational activities in the parks.

An analysis of the R.I.N. program reveals that it paralleled in several respects the objectives which the various citizens' committees were attempting to realize. One interviewee from the R.I.N. remarked that the party kept in contact with what the committees were doing, and another commented: "On était conscient que ce n'était pas seulement l'idée de l'indépendance mais le programme et ses applications pour le comté qui nous amèneraient des votes."

From our interviews with members of the committees it appeared--though the evidence was impressionistic--that this comment was apt. Members of the committees were unwilling to become actively involved in partisan affairs, as was recognized by our respondents from the R.I.N.; indeed, one of them remarked that its membership had dropped from seventy to thirty-five members when, in 1964, it became a political party. Nevertheless, there were informal contacts between the committees and the R.I.N., through committee leaders who were sympathetic to the nascent party. Moreover, R.I.N. members pointed explicitly to aspects of their program which had been drawn from, or

inspired by, the work of the committees.

In general it may be said that we noticed a wide measure of congruence in modes of thought and political attitudes between the R.I.N. activists and the members of the committees. Of the latter, several expressed their private support for the R.I.N. Their comments indicated that they were interested as much in the reformist program of the R.I.N. as they were in the independence of Quebec as such, or in questions directly related to ethnicity (such as language, promotion of French Canadians in industry, or cultural affairs). It would be incorrect to assert that the Federation members were uninterested in questions of the latter sort--quite the contrary--but it is a matter of extreme importance that to them the R.I.N. was both a social movement, and a political party devoted to the cause of constitutional reform.

CONCLUSION

Our study of St. Henri emphasizes the gulf in political attitudes which separated the members of the citizens' committees from the political activists, at least in the major political parties. It was not possible, however, to assess the political attitudes of the population as a whole in St. Henri.

On the one hand, the demand for the services traditionally performed by party personnel--in brief, those

which provided a link between the individual and the complex, often mysterious state apparatus--appeared to remain strong: ample evidence for this statement is found in the volume of requests which political activists said they had to handle. On the other hand, informants personally familiar with the district reported a growing dissatisfaction with the older parties, lack of interest in political affairs, and a weakening of party loyalties--all phenomena being most clearly evident amongst the young. The sudden spurt of the Social Credit Party in 1963 (30% of the vote) and the more moderate but perhaps more permanent growth of the N.D.P. (14% in the federal election of 1965) and of the R.I.N. (12% in the provincial election of 1966), all indicate readiness to abandon the traditional party ties.

We can only speculate as to the role of the citizens' committees in transforming generally-held political attitudes in St. Henri, but we ought to recognize at least the possibility that these bodies, while in part a symptom of changing attitudes, are also hastening the evolution of popular concepts of the role of government and of the relationship between the individual and the state. Should the attitudes which we observed in the committees become dominant in St. Henri, the demise of traditional forms of political organization, and a reorientation of their

activities, would be assured. Our present evidence, however, does not enable us to assess precisely present attitudes, and certainly is inadequate as a basis of prediction of future developments.

As I have argued in the section of this chapter dealing with political parties, the parties will have to undergo reform if the citizens' committees are ever to establish close contact with them, and to seek their support for the objectives which the committees are trying to achieve. In the concluding chapter we shall explore the consequences of possible collaboration between voluntary associations and local party organizations in the representation of group interests. An attempt will be made to assess the effectiveness with which voluntary associations and political parties, separately or in concert with each other, can be expected to represent the interests of various groups in a pluralistic society. Specific references to the the position of French Canadians in the Canadian political system will be included.

Before doing so, however, it will be necessary to examine a question which hitherto has been excluded from our consideration. This question concerns the representation of ethnic interests as such, where an ethnic group occupies a minority position in the political system. Since the political demands of French Canadians are both ethnic and non-ethnic in character (i.e. some are relevant to the

preservation and growth of their distinctive culture, and others concern them in roles other than their ethnic roles) we shall have to consider whether or not ethnic interests are politically different from other interests. In other words, we would not want to discuss how well groups may be able to realize their political demands, without first considering whether one kind of group, a minority ethnic group, is not at a disadvantage which is not experienced by other groups. After looking at this problem, we shall be in a better position to make an assessment of the significance of our three studies in relation to one another.



